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EDITORIAL

HUMAN nature is not lacking in the heroic. In time of disaster those who have a mind to help seem actuated by the common impulse to rush to the center of danger. We have many illustrations now. But, though men are needed in France, there are thousands eager to "go across" who are really able to perform more valuable service here in America. This is peculiarly true of the ministry. While chaplains and other Christian workers who may be drawn from the ministry are urgently needed with our growing army abroad, their sum total amounts to but a small portion of those of their calling. Then too, the feeling deepens that perhaps the most stupendous problem precipitated by the war will be that of the spiritual and social questions it is to leave behind it. To their right solution, as well as to the immediate but more transitory tasks the conflict imposes at home and abroad, the ministry of the church will most wisely address itself. Bishop McDowell's paper, *The Ministry To-day*, is a calm review of the place and opportunities of the ministry at this crucial time, and a

setting forth of certain vital needs of the world that only the application of the Gospel can supply. A quiet, reflective reading of these paragraphs must forcibly impress the pastor with the high and unique nature of his calling and the present rare opportunity for its exercise. It must also lay upon him anew the solemn and tremendous responsibility his calling bears before God when the world seems to approach a point where paths diverge and the souls of men look for one to direct them. Bishop McDowell's words are constructive and inspiring. One is led to exult in his vocation as he beholds its grandeur, to be overwhelmed as he contemplates its opportunities, and to be appalled as he seeks to fathom the possibilities of failure. Surely the preacher of Christ has ample reason to feel that he is called to a supreme task in the days of reconstruction that are ahead, and that he cannot strengthen himself for it too soon.

Perhaps no feature of Christ's life has been a subject of greater study than His temptation. That the divine Son of God the Creator could be tempted through creature need, through a suggestion of an un-called-for display of miraculous power, and through an invitation to worship His arch-enemy, has been a baffling mystery to many devout minds. In his paper, *The Unifying Principle in the Threefold Temptation of Jesus*, Dr. McQuilkin does not go deeply into the psychology of the temptation, but he does give an unusual meaning to the three individual attempts upon the integrity of our Lord's sublime loyalty to the Father. It is shown that they were not disconnected impulses on Satan's part, but three phases of a systematic attempt to cause the downfall of Christ. The temptation of Jesus was an assault

upon the harmonious and perfect relation between Father and Son; it endeavored to destroy complete trust by putting it to the test and to belittle its object by giving Satan a share of that perfect confidence which can belong to God alone. A practical homiletic value in this contribution is in the relation of our own temptations to those of our Saviour in their great fundamental character, the attempt to destroy the life of trust.

Few articles recently having place in these pages have attracted more favorable attention than that one in the October issue under the caption, *The College Class Room vs. the Christian Pulpit*. It is apparent that there is a growing feeling that the church should pay more attention to the religious aspect of the instruction given in our colleges. The same writer, Mr. Wyckoff, contributes to this number a companion article, *Theistic Implications of Modern Psychology of Religion*. It is a study of the evidence for faith in God found in the works of some of our most noted psychologists, notably in Professor Coë's new book, *The Psychology of Religion*. A very satisfactory characteristic of this contributor's handling of controversial subjects is its judicial and impersonal tone. A too common fault of many earnest defenders of the faith has been to regard all not in complete agreement, however sincere, as legitimate objects of drastic criticism and even most discourteous personal attack. Mr. Wyckoff's paragraphs have a wholesome freedom from such defects, while at the same time sounding no uncertain note as to his faith and principles with respect to the subject in hand.

Under the titles, *The Spiritual Failure of Classic Civilization*, and *Stoicism and Christianity*, we have

previously given in this quarterly two searchingly critical papers by Dr. E. G. Sihler, respecting the moral and spiritual conditions of classic antiquity. In this number we publish a third, *Under the Antonines*. Here the author may be said to summon two witnesses that he may secure direct evidence to guide us in the interpretation of the religious life and ideals of the times under consideration—Pausanias, the traveler, and Lucian, the shrewd observer. The former seems to have had the more impressionable and credulous nature, while the latter had the clear vision which penetrates shams and insincerities. The records left by these two writers, so far as they throw light upon the inward meaning of the idolatrous religion of their day, indicate that idolatry can never be admirable in its ethical aspect, even when associated with a high intellectual culture—with which it may be confounded. In justice to both author and reader it should be added that we have, in the case of these articles by Dr. Sihler, a fine example of thorough and independent research by one of the ablest classicists in America. In gathering material for these studies he has read, in the original, the works of all the Greek authors involved. The conclusions drawn are such as come from a direct and painstaking examination of the sources, and not from a comparative study of the works of other commentators and historians.

One of the compensations of stern and strenuous times is found in their tendency to strip away the mask, the tinsel, and the sham and to reveal life as it is. The expression, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," had come to be a glib argument for existence, as though life were justified merely as an

unhindered adventure after pleasure. But now hosts of men are vacating these three fundamental human rights in order that there may endure a divine ideal—righteousness. And yet the great burden of inspired prophecy has ever been that man must pay this very price for this same object, until he has learned its supreme worth. Thus the cannon are speaking in old familiar tones. Our forgetfulness of the message has resulted in a condition summed up in an almost insolent remark: "Nobody is afraid of God any more." Of course, no such thought is proclaimed outright in the churches as a guiding principle, yet in some pulpits divine justice is allowed few rights which an easygoing mercy is bound to respect. But, with the sacrifices we are now called upon to make, there may come the mood to put aside the prophets that "speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of Jehovah," and to hear what God thinks of the ways of men. In his paper, *The Prophetic Note in the Ministry of Jesus*, Dr. Sampey makes an earnest plea for a ministry that realizes its solemn obligations to call men to repentance from sin. Unregenerate human nature was no worse in Christ's day than in ours, and His messengers should be no less insistent in pressing home unwelcome but vitally important truths than was He. To inform one's hearers, to charm, and to entertain have their proper places, but the great mass of men are moved to decision and action by the preacher of absolute convictions and positive utterance as to their standing in the sight of their Maker.

R. M. K.

THE MINISTRY TO-DAY

By BISHOP WILLIAM FRASER McDOWELL of the Methodist Episcopal Church

SOME years ago an eminent scholar in England became for the first time acutely conscious of Darkest England and its distresses. All his life had been devoted to learning and teaching. When with his own eyes he finally saw human poverty, human want, human vice and helplessness, on a large scale, he was overwhelmed. This seemed to him the one supreme fact in the world and caused in him an immediate and complete reaction. In this new consciousness he cried out in words like these: "Let Greek go, let learning go; men must be saved."

The reaction to an interest in humanity was normal and wholesome, the reaction from scholarship and learning abnormal and unwholesome. There is always a danger of such reactions and it is never well for the world when they occur violently. Possibly we are seeing such a swing of the pendulum of estimate just now, a swing clear away from a true and right estimate of the place of the Christian ministry and the Christian church in human life. Many men are so eager for immediate and visible benefits to human life, such benefits as food, raiment, housing, entertainment, and the like, that they cut straight past those agencies and forces that redeem and save life itself. Conditions are usually obvious and urgent, and in certain moods are likely to be overimpressive.

It is always a bad hour in human life when the best institutions come to hold a low place in human regard, and especially if this low estimate is accompanied by

a lofty desire for life itself. History is full of lessons. No nation fares well when it puts a low estimate upon such forces as schools, Sabbaths, churches, homes, ideals, literatures, religion, teaching, preaching, and the like. These things exist for man's sake and man requires them for his good. Woe betide him when, apparently for his good, these are neglected or destroyed. Life itself fails when the forces that maintain it are weakened. In the long run, if you let learning and truth and love go, humanity will be lost and not saved at all.

Now there always is a danger that a low estimate may be placed upon the Christian ministry as an institution, as upon the Christian church. We are in such danger at this time, the danger that is common to all times and that which is peculiar to the strange times through which we are passing. The ministry always has to sustain its claim to a supreme place against many counter forces and claims. It is not necessary to restate that case in this brief paper. It has to sustain itself particularly in times like these when men are eager to be where they can immediately "do the most good." Many ministers have felt and are feeling that just now they can do the most good by getting into the fighting ranks or into some form of special activity which seems to "bear directly" on the war or on the welfare of our soldiers and sailors. It is rather interesting always, and particularly now, to see how many men think they can render their largest service somehow by "giving up" or "getting out of" the ministry into something else. It is not a hopeful or wholesome sign.

The discrediting of permanent forces and agencies because of temporary conditions always weakens

society and civilization. The enrichment and strengthening of these forces rather than their abandonment are called for when life gets troubled and confused, as it is now. The prophet, the preacher, the teacher, the seer—all these, all these in one man when possible—are required as never before when the world goes mad.

There are three or four places in which the estimate of the ministry may be low, and in each case it is the life of the world that suffers and pays the awful price. First: The ministry may not be highly thought of by the best youth in the church or out of it. This is not uncommon. The reasons for it are many. The effect of it is obvious. Second: There may be a low estimate of the ministry in the church itself. There may be a very high regard for an individual minister, but no corresponding regard for the ministry as an institution. Excessive deference to and overglorification of the “laity” and a certain attitude of levity toward the ministry are among the signs not wholly hopeful. Third: There may be a low estimate placed upon the ministry and upon the church by the world outside the church. Ministers and churches alike will be readily used by the world when the world thinks it needs them, but all this may happen without any adequate or just regard for the ministry or church. The world outside thinks of the ministry all too much as a human institution, of the minister as a man among men, with no special relation to the Almighty God, either in the call to His ministry or to its ongoing. Sometimes the ministers and churches justify this world estimate. Fourth: There may be a low estimate of the ministry in the ministry itself. Ministers who take a shallow or commonplace view of the ministry, who could just as well be in something else,

who in heart or manner make light of their calling, not only affect unfavorably all other views of the ministry, but virtually destroy their own ministry in the world. It is bad when, for any reasons and especially for any good reasons, the ministry is seriously discounted in men's thoughts.

I do no more than mention these four facts, without further analysis or explanation. They all rest at last, for one reason or another, largely upon the fact that men easily leave God out of this estimate. The professional estimate, the personal estimate, the commercial estimate, the social estimate, and the conventional estimate are all alike easy, all alike common, and all alike fatal to any true estimate of the ministry either by youth, by the church, by the world or by men in the ministry itself. It is a deadly calamity when such an estimate is widespread, and worse than deadly when the men in the ministry, by their lives, their characters, their services, their work, their influence, their standing, their relation to God, their lack of the great note in preaching and life, give justification to this low view of the ministry.

Our times are not wholly different from other times, except for the war. These conditions have always in too large measure existed. And men interested in the real life of humanity must bless God continually for those lofty, vital, flaming souls, always too few, who, in face of adverse sentiments and tendencies, have kept the radiant glow upon the ministry itself. Names and faces rise before us, imperial voices fall again upon our ears, crowned personalities walk once more before our eyes, and we see in them what the real ministry of Christ truly is. We properly interpret the institution in the light of the best examples

to be found in it and lo! the thing looks in our eyes again as it must look always to the eyes of "that other Minister" who is ever the living definition of the ministry.

Now upon that rather somber background I would like if possible to draw a few lines to show what need there is of the ministry to-day, what it can truly do for life in our times, what only it can do, what no other institution can do. For the ministry cannot rest in an insecure place. It must have an imperial standing in fundamental verities and elemental realities, or it can have no standing at all. The ministry is something more than desirable and helpful; it is necessary and essential. It is not simply one good agency among many. A true ministry, the ministry whenever and wherever it is true, has a place all its own. When it loses that its standing is gone. While it holds that place it walks by right with the chief Minister of the ages. The world cannot do without Him or those who serve it as He did.

What, then, are the world's fundamental needs which can only be met by the ministry, and cannot be met by it unless it be a genuine ministry like Jesus Christ's in character and purpose?

1. First of all the ministry is needed to call men from their sins and to declare to them Jesus Christ as their Saviour from sin. Certain words have acquired new emphasis and standing in very recent times. Sin and salvation from sin are among these words. They lost their edge and emphasis for a time. It was thought old fashioned to speak of them. Modern thinking did not set out to make such terms emphatic and to give them current standing. But modern thinking does not blink facts nor evade plain

truth. And it sees the plain truth that lies in personal and universal evil. And it sees as clearly as St. Paul or any old-time evangelist that no man can save himself from his own sin or sins. And it sees no other kind of salvation than that brought by the divine Saviour. The world has broken, as it always did, at the heart of it, in the morals of it, in its character. And the world's unrest and pessimism are due to the world's evil, not to the world's food or clothing. If it knew the language it would be crying out: "Who will rescue me from this body of death?" (Moffatt). And the minister is in imperial position, a position an angel might still covet, because he can cry back to the world: "God will! Thanks be to Him through Jesus Christ our Lord!" (Moffatt). No other institution has this message, no other is created, called, and commissioned as this is to cry out in triumphant hope, gladness, assurance, and mercy: "Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world!" This touches life, not on its rim, but at its center. This deals not with men's errors, but with their characters. If anything else is needed like this it would be hard to name it. Other things are good; this is absolute. The ministry must bring God to men and must bring men to God for the salvation of life.

2. The ministry has an absolutely vital place to-day as the agency for keeping men's visions clear and true and wide. Vision is not something mystical and vague, related only to religion in some dim way like things seen in twilight. For practical life it is equivalent to seeing straight. No wonder that old word said: "Where there is no vision the people perish." Where people do not see straight, do not see things as they are, do not see truth, do not "see

life steady and see it whole," of course they perish. Many diseases are traceable to the eyes; many kinds of trouble affect the eyes themselves. Many objects are presented in bad light or at wrong angles. Men are still seen as trees walking, which is not very accurate seeing. It is not good enough for practical or any other real purposes. The man who saw thus was mixed about both men and trees. In certain circles it is interesting to ask how big the moon looks. You get a wide variety of answers. To some it looks as big as a cartwheel, to others as big as a silver dollar. Now blessed the man who in any age can enable men to see things distinctly, in their true size, and at their correct value. If ever the world needed, not only good eyes, but clear light and proper angles, it is now. Failure to see straight is destroying more than one nation or costing it a frightful price in life and treasure. Spiritual and intellectual strabismus, myopia, and other diseases are nationally prevalent and destructive. Lights are bad, angles wrong, proportions utterly disturbed. Was there ever such a challenge, such an appeal to the ministry, as this present world offers at this point? Was there ever such a demand for the ministry as is created by the present world blindness and confusion? In the depths of it this also is a matter of character and the minister of Jesus Christ is a minister to the character of men and society. Men of pure heart see God.

3. The ministry has an absolutely vital place now as the agency for making and keeping men's ideals clear and high. In time of war it takes a supernatural power to keep warlike ideals from displacing the ideals of peace. In prosperous times it takes supernatural power to prevent the ideals of success

from displacing the ideals of righteousness. Nothing in the life of Jesus is more significant than the way He held fast to His ideals in the face of tremendous influences tending to obscure and break them down. The ideals of the older, nobler Jewish nation had already got perverted. That was the tragedy of the nation's history and life. It is a far cry from these words: "In thee and in thy seed shall the nations of the earth be blessed," to these: "Lord, wilt thou now restore the kingdom to Israel?" He preserved His ideals without faltering. Persistent and unwearied "following of the gleam" is not easy for men, for nations, for churches, for societies or races. Ideals grow dim or vague. They fade or ravel out with time. Or they sag and become flabby. Idealism itself is discounted as too visionary and unreal for a practical world. Then comes the sin against the holy spirit of idealism itself, the denial of its right to exist as a force. To save a church, a nation or a world from this sin is a royal task for the ministry, an inspiring challenge to it. Many forces are alive and at work in the world among men to-day, influencing favorably or unfavorably the ideals of the world. I cannot see any single force with such opportunity, such power, such interest to keep idealism clear and strong, as the ministry of the men who follow that supreme Idealist yonder in the first century. His ministers have both the pattern and the power.

4. The ministry is supremely needed in order to keep the world's spirit steady. No matter where you touch the question of spirit this is seen to be true.

At the point of courage? It would not seem that this is lacking. Everybody apparently wants to fight. Surely courage is not wanting when the world is full

of brave men, when the heroic spirit is more manifest than it has ever been before. But fighting is only one of the places where courage will still be needed, needed as every man and woman knows well, far more than for fighting. The bravest battles that ever are fought are fought not with hands or guns. The supreme demand for courage is not in battle. Courage is not a thing of fists, but of spirit.

At the point of faith? Who is to keep the faith of men from flickering and expiring under stress? It is so easily befogged and confused. Of course men keep on believing. They cannot live without faith, but who shall keep steady that faith that overcomes the world? Who is going to put into faith the victorious quality, set before it always the supreme Person and the certain goal of high adventure and holy endeavor? Who is going to keep it shining in the darkness, singing in the night, conquering in trenches, on seas, in air, unflinching in the face of collapse, error, and falsehood? Who is going to keep faith marching straight ahead with that supreme Believer? Who but His ministers?

At the point of hope? Spirit is made of such qualities as courage, faith, hope, love, and the like. Against such there is no law. But who is to keep them steady? Who is to keep hope jubilant and expectant? Who is to keep it from pessimism and despair? Hope is something better than playing away on the last string, all the others being broken, though that is fine. It is something more than hanging on with grim determination when there is every apparent reason for letting go; it is something more than the patience that waits, though both of these are magnificent. Hope puts the buoyancy of the wave under

the ship, the swell of the breeze into the sail of endeavor and enterprise. Hope, between faith and love, is like undying, undaunted youth in manhood's strength and warmth of life. Who shall keep it alive but the minister of Jesus Christ?

At the point of love? Hate has abundant encouragement. It has plenty of advocates. Poets sing its ugly hymns, orators inflame men's hearts with it, writers feed it upon hard names and bitter speech. There will be hate enough; there is too much. We do not need to conserve it. Who will preach and exemplify the gospel of love, love that leaps across racial and national boundaries, love that gladly includes friends and sincerely covers enemies? Love rests upon a far deeper foundation than congeniality or amiability. It goes at last down to the depths of holiness and moral passion. It carries a cross, prays for its enemies, and looks for a new heaven and a new earth. Who is to keep it alive among men? Who, in other words, is to "keep the soul of the world alive" but the minister of Jesus Christ? There really is no one else. The scientist will not do it, the merchant will not, the reformer will not, nor even the poet. What they do will be worth doing, but it will not be this. The place of the prophet, the minister, "the servant of the Spirit," is permanent and always large. As Dr. Silvester Horne said at Yale: "But for every voice that carries inspiration to its fellows; for every soul that has some authentic word from the Eternal wherewith to guide and bless mankind, there will always be a welcome. No changes of the future can cancel the commission of the preacher." "Show me the man who, in the midst of a community however secularized in manners, can compel it to think with

him, can kindle its enthusiasm, revive its faith, cleanse its passions, purify its ambitions, and give steadfastness to its will, and I will show you the real master of society."

5. The ministry has an absolutely vital place in men's lives to-day as a fortifying power. Two influences are sweeping over human life with almost overwhelming force, in many cases with quite overwhelming force. One is temptation, and the other is sorrow. These are not new. They always exist, but in times like these they sweep over men like billows. War may have, certainly does have, certain tremendous spiritual values. Some men are driven by it deeper into the heart of God. Conventionalities and unrealities are destroyed. Essentials are exalted of necessity. Great terms like faith and sacrifice, love and fellowship, suffering and brotherhood, get new meaning as actual red blood runs through them afresh. All that is true. But the other truth is this, that temptation comes in like a flood, comes upon men in armies and camps, comes upon communities, comes upon youth, comes upon all life. Ordinary standards are lowered, restraints removed, conditions disregarded. The world is in mental and physical fever. Nothing is normal, moral moorings, subject to unusual strain, break, and character is lost. The parents of youth are more anxious about the morals of their sons and daughters in these unnatural times than about their lives. Well they may be, for this is the hell of war, that it lets loose so many of the forces of hell. They are never idle or quiet, but in such times they become rampant everywhere. Now a minister has a chance and duty in such times that may well drive him deeper into the heart of the Eternal, the chance and duty to fortify

life, life in camp and out of it, against these evil forces that sweep like a storm over men and women, over boys and girls. It is easy to dispute the statistics. Some of them cannot be proved, but no one can dispute the dangers. They can be proved all too easily.

Men are inoculated to make them immune to certain diseases dangerous in and to camp life. There is a moral and spiritual inoculation against the evils of such life and such times. Paul had it in mind when he wrote: "Lead the life of the spirit, then you will not satisfy the passions of the flesh" (Moffatt). The Comforter, it has been pointed out, is not simply given to console, but to fortify and strengthen, to make men strong so that they can resist the attacks of evil, to tone up the moral system so that it can throw off those germs that destroy weak men, men with weak powers of resistance. If there were no other use for a vital ministry this use would more than justify its existence. Ministers do not see this always as clearly as they should, but the ministry of fortification against all evil is large and imperative.

So with comfort in sorrow of every sort. Many a character breaks down, disintegrates, goes to pieces, under sorrow, loss, shame or disappointment. The ministry of comfort is not a soft ministry, though men sometimes seem to think so. The strongest men find here a call and challenge to the exercise of their best powers. To hold a human life together when it threatens to dissolve under a grief is one of the noblest functions in this world where grief so abounds all the time. As I write this paragraph the mail brings me a letter from a dear friend who cries out across the miles between us: "I bury my father tomorrow. Yesterday my son, my student son, had a

pulmonary hemorrhage. My heart and my flesh cry out for God, for the living God, the God of all comfort." To brace a life against a storm, whether of temptation or sorrow, to fortify it against sudden attack or against slow and gradual siege, against evil or against apprehension is as needful a service as can be performed any time. At such times as these are, and are certain to be for years yet, such service is imperative.

The single item of sorrow due to death is always large. That item will now be enlarged incalculably in extent and immeasurably in the pain of it. So many young men will be broken and die prematurely, in battle, in the thousand ways that make Europe one vast mourning place. "In all the land there is not a house where there is not one dead." If the ministry of comfort did not exist God would have to create it in order to serve the world now bruised and bereft. The thing is so pressing that it hurts even now. We pass the houses bravely and proudly flying service flags bearing one star, two stars, and often more. It thrills us, of course, but do we also long to comfort, to fortify, to strengthen the men and women behind the windows that their lives shall stand the strain already severe and sure to be heavier?

Let no one just now, for any reason, think lightly of the ministry of comfort in all its deep reaches and wide sweep. This is the ministry that builds the houses of life on the rocks against the beating of winds and floods of all sorts. And the need of it is both imperative and universal. In a little church where I was on Christmas Sunday evening they called the names of thirty-three young men and two young women from their own number already in the service.

I never dreamed that in my ears would sound with such insistent and compelling urgency those old words: "Comfort ye, comfort ye my people saith your God." Heaven help the ministry not to fail just now at this point.

6. The ministry is supremely needed to-day in order that it may bring to the world the truth in which men must live. Men do not live by bread alone, nor chiefly. They live at last and at their best by every word, every true word, every inspiring word, that comes from God Himself. One of the finest of the designations of the ministry is in the term "ministry of the Word." When this is associated with those first verses in St. John's Gospel, with Jesus Christ as the perfect Word, the perfect utterance and revelation of God, it fairly thrills one to think of his ministry as such a ministry. That any man should be chosen by God, should even be permitted by God, to bear to men His living truth, is humbling and exalting to the last degree. No true man can think of such privilege lightly or estimate it cheaply. Think of being the herald and interpreter of God's truth to the world big or little, far or near. The work of Moses in making known the truth of God to his age was the most important bit of work done by any man in that period of the world's history. Getting that truth and setting it forth for the guidance of men, of a race, and finally of a world, constitute an achievement and a service of the first order of value.

The true preacher is a prophet. He takes his place with Isaiah and Micah as a messenger of God to his own times. He goes up the shining heights until he meets God and returns in the Spirit to speak to man, saying humbly as he does it: "The Spirit of the

Lord is upon me." He need not look for scientific or historical infallibility to fall upon him, but he must look for divine power and divine reality to be in his utterance. Think, then, of the royal chance to present and interpret God's truth that came in one age to Moses, in one to Isaiah, in one to Jesus and St. Paul, in one to Savonarola, in one to Luther, in another to Wesley. Think of the opportunity Moses and Isaiah had with the Jews and other nations, that St. Paul had with Jews and Gentiles, with Corinth, Ephesus, and Athens, that Luther had with Central Europe, that Wesley had directly with modern England and with America in its youth. They had the chance and the duty to make those new, living statements about God, about the new life for men and peoples, which really make all that is worth while in our world to-day. No one facing what they did, by the truth they spoke to their time and to all time, can have a low estimate of the ministry in any time. Kings and priests have made no such figure, wrought no such work, left no such influence in the centuries as have these men who received the Word from God and spoke it for Him.

Now the value of historical study is not to discredit but to illuminate current times. Times past, and men of those times shed their light upon and into other times, so that later men may see to walk and serve. How, then, in the light of all times, all conditions, can one fail to see the overwhelming challenge of these times, the unequaled opportunity of these times to the true minister of Jesus Christ? I would like to state it calmly, though it is impossible to think of it with quiet nerves or complacent, controlled feelings. No other such times in history have fallen into the

hands of the ministry. It may fail, as it has done before. It may only partly succeed. It may miss its day. It may go on saying small, outworn, unreal, conventional things to a world which will not, and ought not to, hear them. It may busy itself with a thousand minor activities and let a whole world die while neither prophet of God nor apostle of Jesus Christ says a word of power and life. Its message may be remote and formal with no real touch with this new modern world. It may go on insisting on immaterial things. It may not see what it means to "preach Christ," "the glorious gospel of the blessed God," *to-day* to the non-Christian world and to the nominally Christian world. But there never was another challenge equal to this.

Who shall redeem and restore Germany, France, England, Russia, and America, if not those who speak for Christ and speak of Christ with modern Christian imperialism and vitality? Who shall lead China, Japan, India, Turkey, and Africa unto the light and into the light but those who bear the light? Who shall recover and create for the world "the lost consciousness of its essential unity and universality in Christ"? Who shall furnish light and inspiration, leaven and grace, hope and faith, the vision of brotherhood and love, to a broken world, except the ministry of Jesus Christ? Paul had no larger opportunity in the Jewish world or the Roman world of his day. The war makes a thousand new opportunities—for commerce, for philanthropy, for education, for legislation, but its opportunity for true preaching outranks them all. The capture of Jerusalem is a supreme event for the preacher of Christ, there and here.

7. The ministry of to-day has a task of supreme importance and surpassing difficulty in the social reconstruction of the world. This can only be mentioned and not elaborated. Even if there had been no war an immense reconstruction would have been inevitable. The war has brought the necessity down about our heads with a crash. The economist alone cannot do the thing needing to be done. Nor can the political scientist nor the social theorist, no matter how good their doctrines and theories may be. The social reconstruction must rest in that personal and social righteousness, justice, and brotherhood which the Man of Nazareth came to bring. The minister must make the atmosphere in which the relations of men are determined. He must create, by God's Spirit helping him, the spirit that moves men in their approaches and adjustments. The social and economic reconstruction, which will follow the war, in America and the world will call for the atmosphere and spirit in which society's evolution may be real and onward. The minister need not be, may not be, the leader in technical or formal theory and plan, but he must lead in making the mind for brotherhood and in shaping the soul of the new day. He must furnish the religious doctrines, the theology for the social reconstruction which must rest at last upon the truth as it is in Jesus Christ.

One cannot pretend that this is a true picture of the entire ministry as it is. It is only a partial sketch of the ministry as it ought to be, as the times call it to be, a challenge and vision to the ministry as it is. Many men and institutions are needed in the world for to-day and to-morrow. I do not underestimate or lowly value one of them. Here is a short

list: Statesmen, teachers, physicians, merchants, financiers, workmen, mechanics, artists, writers, musicians. The time would fail me to complete the list, but the world to-day needs and the world to-morrow will need more than anything else what can be brought to it only by "good ministers of Jesus Christ," viz., Jesus Christ Himself at once "the wisdom of God and the power of God."

WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

THE UNIFYING PRINCIPLE IN THE THREEFOLD TEMPTATION OF JESUS

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TEMPTATION is a cardinal element in human experience. The Son of God, therefore, by the fact of His incarnation, in which He assumed "the likeness of sinful flesh," became exposed to temptation. When He, as "the Word," "became flesh," it was not a partial process but a complete assumption of every faculty and of every experience, except the experience of sin in its twofold character of corruption and guilt, together with the consequent experiences of remorse and repentance.

Free constitutionally from every taint of defilement, and in that sense forever "separated from sinners," "holy, guileless and undefiled," He nevertheless became, in His incarnation, "perfect man of perfect man," and allied Himself with His "brethren" in the flesh in every other objective and subjective experience known to them, according to the very remarkable interpretative declaration of His incarnation contained in Hebrews 2:14-18. Starting with His partaking of the "flesh and blood" in which His brethren are "sharers," He passes through the mediatorial necessity contained in these words: "Wherefore it behooved him *in all things* to be made like unto his brethren," and reaches the culminating point of His divine incursion into our human experiences as given in the conclusion of the paragraph:

“For in that he himself hath suffered *being tempted*, he is able to succor them that are *tempted*.” And the comprehensiveness of His experience of temptation is further set out in the same Epistle, 4:15: “For we have not a high priest that cannot be touched with a feeling of our infirmities; but one that hath been in *all points tempted* like as we are, yet without sin.”

When Christ “became man,” therefore, it became an essential part of His program to undergo temptation—genuine, everyday temptation, such as men everywhere are undergoing. Nor did the necessity reside merely or even mainly in the mission of redemption on which He had come, except as that mission expressed itself through His complete identification of Himself with our human nature. In other words, the exposure of Jesus Christ to temptation was immediately and primarily constitutional, and not vocational, except as regards the ultimate goal of His incarnation, viz., the eternal overthrow of the tempter and the rescue of man from his dominion. Christ’s temptations were real and natural, not professional or artificial.

Growing out of the fact of Christ’s vital and complete identification with us in our temptations, through incarnation, is the character of His temptations in their relation to ours. If He was like us, then His temptations were like ours. That is to say, His temptations are to be taken as the norm of our temptations. The discovery for ourselves of this human normality of His temptations will bring immeasurable help to us, both generally and specifically; for it will not only illumine the perfect humanity of our Lord and bring Him near to us in our daily wrestlings, as our “sympathetic and faithful high priest,” who, as such, is “touched with a feeling of our infirmi-

ties," but it will also illumine the whole problem of temptation, showing its origin and nature and the "way of escape" from each "fiery dart of the evil one."

We follow the account of Christ's temptation as related by Matthew, whose statement of the order of the three assaults of Satan may be taken as the one conforming to the fact. In seeking the complete identification of Christ's threefold temptation, with our own experience, so that we may feel His kinship with us as we go down through the testing, we shall find greatly added light and power issuing out of His recorded experience with Satan if we can discover a correlative character in the three temptations which He underwent.

We are confronted with the inquiry as to whether these three temptations represent a unity in diversity, or whether they represent three separate and distinct enticements to evil. In other words, is there any unifying principle imbedded both in the sacred record and in the experience of Jesus? Upon the answer to these questions much hinges, for that answer will determine whether the allurements of evil as they were presented to Him came as fragmentary, dissociated enticements, or whether they were woven together in a vital web, so that they formed a true and valid "modal trinity" in the realm of temptation. Are they then three unrelated assaults of the Evil One, or are they in reality one assault, representing three aspects of the same principle?

Without doubt the latter hypothesis is the correct one. The threefold temptation of Jesus was not a collocation; it was a concatenation. The concatenation was vital also, not mechanical. These three

experiences were not like beads, which are strung on a thread, but like the branches of a tree, springing from a common trunk and sustained by a common root. The unifying principle which runs through all three and binds them together is both deep and comprehensive. It may be best stated as that of the life of trust. That is the unifying principle in these three temptations. Each of the three represents an attack on the life of trust, and in each case our Lord's reaction to the temptation represents the protection of the same life of trust. Now this principle penetrates to the deepest recesses of the soul. It comprehends also the relations between God and man. If religion is defined, according to the etymology of the word, as "a binding back" to God, then this unifying principle which runs through these three temptations covers religion. Religion is attacked and defended. It is nothing short of this that passes before our view in our Lord's threefold temptation.

Let us state the articulation of this principle with the three solicitations of Satan in terms of Christ's reaction to them. In the first temptation the life of trust is defended by our Lord; in the second, it is defined; and in the third, it is dedicated. These three verbal characterizations are not impositions on the experience; they are deductions from within. They represent the climacteric of the experience of Christ in each case, and so possess the logic of life. The devil, sought out by the anointed Son and Heir to the Kingdom and challenged to the trial in the wilderness, a trial from which Satan would fain have been spared could he have had his choice, concentrated all his ingenuity and energies to break down the life of trust in God on the part of Jesus Christ.

This he did by seeking to alienate the Son from the Father through an attack, first, on the fact of that trust itself; second, on the quality of that trust; and third, on the scope of the trust. Our Lord defends the fact, defines the quality, and, through dedication of the trust, limits its scope.

Taking the first of these temptations, in which the tempter undertakes to undermine Christ's life of trust through impeachment of its validity, we behold it set forth thus: "And when he had fasted forty days and forty nights, he afterward hungered. And the tempter came to him and said unto him, If thou art the Son of God, command that these stones become bread."

To get the force of this solicitation, we must remember that only forty days previous God the Father had spoken out of the heavens, saying: "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." In that divine attestation, carrying with it divine approbation, and in the solemn ceremony of baptism in the Jordan, by which He had been sealed to His redemptive mission, Christ had reached one of the high points of His fellowship, as the God-man, with His Father. And in passing it may be noted that this swing in the experience of our Lord, from the heights of devout religious observance and rapturous fellowship with God to the very nadir of life's circle in mortal conflict with the powers of darkness, is in accord with the movement of the human mind, which often encounters Satan in bitter temptation while the approving voice of God still echoes in the ear.

Now Satan meets Christ and begins his subtle and terrible assault at the very point where the opening heavens and the assuring voice left Him, viz.,

the confident assurance of His divine Sonship. "This is my beloved Son," said the voice. "If thou art the Son of God," says the tempter. The diabolic cunning of Satan appears in fixing on this relationship, publicly pledged by the Father and confidently and joyously accepted and realized by the Son—fixing on it and seeking to destroy it by acknowledging the fact, yet suggesting a totally unwarranted and vicious inference from the fact. "If thou art the Son of God"—that is the fact on which, as shown by the grammatical construction, Satan seeks to cast no shadow of doubt, but which he, quite to the contrary, lays down as a sure basis for what follows. "Command that these stones become bread"—that is the inference. The speciousness of this conclusion lies in its apparent naturalness and soundness, whereas in reality it carried in it the very essence of distrust and alienation.

The devil is a supple logician. He can reason in a circle, backward or forward, as the case may require. With apparent candor, as in the case of this first temptation, he will lay down a premise the truth of which will tend to dispel all suspicion, and then with the utmost dexterity of movement he will arrive at a conclusion alien and hostile to the premise from which he has drawn it. This satanic logic has wrought the downfall of unnumbered multitudes of well-meaning, unsuspecting people. With it he would seek to compass the ruin of Jesus Christ.

The force of the conclusion in the hands of Satan was brought to bear against the citadel of Christ's life of trust in His Father through the falsity of his minor premise. That minor premise was this: Fatherhood involves the primary responsibility to

provide bread. Here lay the deadly poison with which the arch enemy sought to kill the life of trust on the part of Jesus. This is the poison with which that same arch enemy is daily destroying the life of trust in men and women. To Christ, and to the children of men, he comes with his proffers of guidance in the great relations of life, proffers made with apparent sincerity and bearing every mark of innocence, and he says to them: God has said He is your Father, and that you are His child. Since this is true, He ought to provide for your bodily needs. He is well able to do it. No earthly father worthy of the name would stand by and see his child hungry. Surely your heavenly Parent will not do less than an earthly parent would do. If He doesn't look after your physical necessities, how can you trust Him? Doesn't His failure at this point disturb your confidence in your sonship? After all is there sufficient warrant for your belief? In the face of the evidence of neglect, it would be best to give up the reliance and acknowledge to yourself that, after all, you are mistaken and you will have to look for new sources of sustenance and hope.

We must conclude that in this first assault Satan's aim was not to persuade our Lord to do what many commentators indicate, to put into immediate operation, in full reliance on the fact of His Sonship, His rights as the Son by producing the bread He needed for His hunger; but rather to disintegrate His reliance in the fact of Sonship itself. His suggestion to activity on the part of Christ for the production of bread was not meant by him to be acted upon. It was intended to weaken His confidence and fellowship with His Father. Alienation, not provision, was

the satanic goal. Reverently, trustfully to have supplied the necessary bread by the exercise of His miraculous power, would have been no violation of any divine requirement. To say that it would have been a selfish exercise of that power, as is often said, wholly misses the mark and takes the real force of the temptation away.

The reaction of Jesus to the solicitation is sufficient to establish the purpose which it had concealed within itself. "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." What "word" that had proceeded out of the mouth of God would be sounding in the ears of Christ, as the impact of the suggestion of Satan struck against His life of trust; what word could it be except that last gracious word before the Spirit led Him into the wilderness for this ordeal of temptation: "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased"? Assuredly that was the "word" by which now He would live, nor allow suggestion to rob Him of that deep, abiding sustenance of His whole being.

In the mind of Jesus it was the case of hunger versus God's declaration of Fatherhood, and judgment was speedily rendered by Him in favor of the latter. Jesus repudiated the idea that the prompt and abundant supply of the lower, the material, demands of life constitutes a trustworthy standard by which to determine the fact or measure of God's interest and care. Adversity may be the sign of real Sonship with the Father who knows the proportionate worth of soul and body. Tribulation and anguish may be the golden ladder on which the feet are to mount up into the richest fellowship with Him whose love will not leave us ashamed of our hope. Hunger

shall not break down Christ's confidence in the Father's pledged relation to Him. Satan has failed in his diabolic attempt. The life of trust has been successfully defended.

As a practical observation, it should be said that this first satanic onslaught on the life of trust is being borne by vast multitudes of people daily. Satan insinuates the notion into their thinking, that they who are good should be prosperous. A Christian woman, sitting beside her dead mother, said to the writer recently: "God has gone off and left me." Successfully that first temptation was being used in her case. An earnest Christian man meets with overwhelming misfortune in his business; money, home, goods, all are swept away. Perhaps he goes down under it and gives up his hold on his Bible, his church, his confidence in the promises of God. What has done it? Satan.

If men are to enter into their joint-heirship with Jesus Christ, they must fix their feet firmly on His position when He too was faced with this subtle temptation and through His example and indwelling strength defeat Satan as He defeated him in that hour. Like the patriarch, they must maintain their place with God, even when loss and sickness and death have done their worst against them, in words of immortal glory: "Though he slay me, yet will I trust him." St. Paul's "light affliction," to use his own depreciative expression about the matter, fully catalogued and sympathetically felt, may give to those who suffer under Satan's first solicitation to their Saviour a new understanding of that Apostle's triumph over the temptation and a new inspiration to fight through to victory. St. Paul and St. Paul's Lord

both counsel all such tempted souls to keep on praying, trusting, loving, and laboring till, as in the wilderness, Satan "leaves" them.

Defeated in his covert but deadly attack on the fact of the life of trust as it was being lived by Christ, Satan next addresses himself with equal cunning to the attempt to spoil the quality of the fact. And in this second temptation he acknowledges his complete failure in the first by accepting the fact in Christ and proceeding to use it as the foundation for his next enticement. Making a virtue of a necessity, the Prince of Darkness takes Christ's unshakable trust in God's loving care and explicit declaration of Fatherhood and seeks to vitiate it through perversion. If he cannot take the life of filial trust away from Jesus, he will try to render it useless, to say the least. Success in the second attempt would finally accomplish all that was attempted in the first.

Craftily the tempter meets Jesus again at the point of His greatest strength, that is, at the point of His resolute confidence. Buttressing his second suggestion with Scripture, wrested out of its proper context and so made into an instrument of ensnarement, as it may still be made under the same treatment, the devil takes Jesus up on the wing of the temple and says: "If thou art the Son of God, cast thyself down," following the suggestion with his talk about guardian angels and their ministrations.

Parenthetically, it may be remarked that Satan's exegesis is as flexible and convenient as is his logic. He fumbles definitions in this trial of Jesus. He always fumbles definitions. The life of trust must not only be defended, it must also be defined. And this is what Jesus does.

Satan says to Him, as He stands there on the lofty height of the pinnacle of the temple gazing down to the earth far below: If you are determined to trust God as your Father through thick and thin, let me suggest a way in which you may manifest that trust in a way that will do great honor to God and result in great advantage to you through the influence of your example on those who witness the demonstration, and who will thereby be convinced of the truth of your claims when they see you miraculously upheld by the divine power of God through His angels, whom He has explicitly promised as ministers of protection to those who trust Him. Satan will seek to lead the life of trust to unwarranted lengths.

What human life is there that does not know by experience its kinship with Christ in this temptation? Those who are most susceptible to its power are just those, too, who have attained to the higher levels of the life of trust. Indeed, they are the only ones to whom the temptation can have any appeal. The very strength and stability of their confidence may be made, by satanic manipulation, the occasion of its corruption. Even so worthy a thing as faith is subject to definition. It can be delimited. There are boundary lines, the removal of which will result in taking away the specific character and the merit of faith. Not only must the object of faith be fixed in God, but the subjects, the things we may legitimately expect from Him through faith, must be carefully defined and determined. There is a point where trust may pass into trespass, faith into presumption. It is this line which Satan sought to obliterate for Jesus in the second temptation, and which he still seeks, too often with melancholy success, to obliterate for men. The

temptation is exceeding plausible and alluring. The path seems to be a prolongation in a perfectly straight line of trust, but it may be a deflection camouflaged by the artful hand of Satan.

Careful inspection of the path of trust along which the devil led our Lord in this second temptation will reveal clearly the point at which the course veered off from the line of validity. It was at the point of the proper use of means for the accomplishment of necessary or desired ends in life. God has established a certain economy for the maintaining of His world, including man the crown of creation, and into that economy He has interwoven the principle that certain means will, when used, achieve certain ends. Man, endowed with wisdom and the power of discrimination, is intended by his Creator to be a manipulator of these means, arranging, organizing, and employing them for his own good and the good of others. To reject the use of means, where they are reasonably indicated, is to reject the divine order, and so to impeach the divine administration. This is not trust; it is insubordination. As such it dishonors and displeases God, while it vitiates the whole life of the one who has strayed into the forbidden path.

In the choice of means, there are different grades and spheres from which the selection may be rightly made. Ordinarily, material means should be selected to accomplish material ends and psychical means to accomplish psychical ends. Nevertheless, there is an interlocking relationship between these two realms which makes it difficult often to determine where one ends and the other begins, and which justifies the interchangeable use of the forces of both. For instance, in the case of therapeutics, it is a justifiable and com-

mendable thing to employ material or mental means, as the exact character of the disease may seem to demand, when properly diagnosed. There are abundant evidences of the excellence of this practice all about us in the results that have been obtained through its use. The life of trust demands that in all the selection and use of the means, no matter from which realm they may be chosen, there shall be the realization that the therapeutic principle resident in the means employed is from God and that there shall be the conscious and grateful reliance on Him as He broods over the use of that which He freighted in the beginning with its healing potency and introduced into His perfect economy. This is to say, that prayer and the use of remedial agencies should always go together.

Nor does the proper definition of the life of trust preclude the resort to God for the accomplishment of necessary ends through His own immediate interposition without human means, provided the circumstances are such that the employment of those means is an impossible thing, or provided the full and faithful employment of them has failed to bring about the desired result. But it must be said that in appealing to Him to work thus on our behalf for the amelioration of our earthly condition, we must exercise the greatest care to make our request in the spirit of complete acquiescence with His will in the matter. In the use of the means which He has ordained we have this certification of His will and may therefore proceed with vastly less concern, for He Himself has labeled them for us. But the meansless ministry is one on which no man should presume when he comes to God. "Thy will be done" must run all through the petition for help of this kind. No "sight drafts" on God's

bank of superhuman manipulation of forces for the betterment of man's earthly condition will be honored. Entreaty, not demand, is required, if we are to meet with His approval.

Now in the second temptation Satan suggests to our Lord that He cast Himself down from the dizzy height of the temple wing. But Christ, discerning the infernal fallacy in Satan's logic, promptly spurns the suggestion on the ground that to obey it would be nothing short of "making trial" of God. This response on the part of Jesus reveals His thorough comprehension of all the intricate currents and cross-currents of the divine law of means for the outworking of human purposes and needs, a comprehension that is exceedingly difficult for men to attain to, even in human measure. It showed that all we have tried to say in the foregoing words concerning the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the employment of certain means, or concerning the propriety, under certain circumstances, of asking God to step in and work for us without means, was as clear to Him as the sunlit paths of morning. Clearly He saw where Satan's suggested path for Him left the straight path, and resolutely He refused to set foot in it, although, as we have said, that crafty Prince of Darkness had camouflaged the path at the point of divergence with Scripture paint.

Christ's repudiation of the devil's proposal, as it lay in His mind and was brought to bear against the temptation, may reverently be stated thus: No, I will not cast myself down and demand that God hold Me up, for He has provided the means by which I may descend. The men who built this wing ascended thither and descended again to the earth, and I may do the same. It is not necessary to ask God to discard His

own means, which He has put within My reach for the very purpose of accomplishing My descent. To do so would be trying Him and would be an offense to Him.

Thus Christ defined the life of trust for Himself and for all who come after Him. Thus He makes it forever clear and sure that if we, through indolence or the desire for the extraordinary and spectacular, refuse to use all the means known to us and available for our necessary ends and make demands on Him for a supernatural interposition on our behalf, we have passed beyond the boundaries of the life of trust and have entered the desert wastes of effrontery.

With the completion of the second temptation, the life of trust has been, on Satan's part, attacked, first, as to its factual existence, and, second, as to its quality; while on Christ's part, that same life of trust has been, first, defended, and, second, defined. But defense and definition will not suffice to defeat every device of Satan. With his attack on the fact and then on the quality of the life of trust, he has not exhausted his resources of evil solicitation. He will make one more attempt on the citadel of Christ's confidence in His Father, a confidence involving loyal obedience as well as full reliance and enriching fellowship.

In the third temptation the assault is made upon the scope of the life of trust as Jesus lived it. With the fact and the quality of that life of trust firmly established now in Satan's mind, he makes one last grand move for its destruction through the broadening of its scope. Again the diabolical cleverness of Satan emerges in the form of this third seduction. Witnessing the stability and purity of Christ's life of trust in God as His Father, he apparently accepts and com-

mends both, and then proceeding right on from the point of commendation, naïvely suggests that he himself would like to be included along with God as an object of that life of depending, loyal trust. It is a question of inclusion, that is all. Shall God alone receive His devoted confidence and obedience, or shall others enter in and share it with Him? "Fall down and worship me," says the devil—Acknowledge me as worthy of your fellowship and fealty.

How innocent it all looks on the surface! So innocent, indeed, that men are all the while being overcome by the temptation. It is only a case of one or two; and twice one is two. It is only a case of simple addition or multiplication, Satan suggests. But Jesus replies that it is more than a matter of numbers; it is a matter of character and government. It is a question of concord and equality. Contradictions must be separated. "No man can serve two masters." To bow down to the wrong is to throw over the right. To worship Satan is to reject God. The relation between God and Satan is one of eternal alienation; Satan is "foreign" to God in the worst possible sense of the word. Therefore, nor Christ nor Christ's can include both in the life of trust. Hyphenated worship is treason to God.

How splendidly the Son, the last Adam, unmasks and hurls from Him the enticement! "Get thee hence, Satan: for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." The strategic word in this utterance is the little word "*only*." The whole point of the declaration on the lips of Jesus is God's exclusive right to be the object of the life of trust. To trust any other alongside

Him is perfidy to Him. He is a jealous God. His very first word of commandment on Sinai utters this eternal fact.

But Satan is willing to pay a heavy price for the divided allegiance of the Son of God. His whole kingdom he offers in exchange. Wily creature of duplicity! Well he understood that if Jesus should accept the offer and include him in His life of trust, not only would the kingdom he had bartered come back to him, but far more would come to him. Christ, alienated then from God through the dual allegiance He would have undertaken the moment He bowed the knee to God's adversary, would have been in his malign power, and the vast domains of God's grace in Christ, yes, more than that, God's very Kingdom itself, would have become annexed to Satan's empire, and he would have become sovereign over all. Vassalage was in Satan's mind that day, but it was not his own; it was God's. It was a bold and desperate move on the tempter's part. He staked all—and lost! For Christ peremptorily orders him into banishment from His presence. Thereby He dedicates his life of trust to the Father. In God and in God alone will He trust. God and God only will He serve.

Thus is completed the circle of the threefold temptation, including Satan's assault on the fact, the quality, and the scope of Christ's life of trust, and including as well Christ's defense, definition, and dedication of that life of trust. There was nothing more to attack. The three enticements had covered every possible point. Satan's wilderness campaign was a comprehensive one. He had tested Christ on every point. When the life of dependent, loyal,

obedient trust has been tested and proved as fact, quality, and scope, what is there remaining?

But before leaving the whole subject, let us glance again at our kinship with our Lord in the experience of temptation as that kinship is reflected through this third and last enticement. Who is there that knows life that does not know, often to his bitter sorrow, Satan's nearness with this same solicitation? To bow the knee to Satan's principles, policies, methods, is to bow the knee to Satan. To the business man he comes insinuating the suggestion to compromise his moral standards in business in return for increased gain. To the professional man he comes with similar suggestions in return for which he promises to deliver quick advancement or increased income. To men and women alike in society he comes and hints the advisability of lowered ethical ideals in order to gain social favor and position. Even to the preacher he comes asking for softened utterance on him and his dealings, in return for which he agrees to deliver popularity and place. It is the same seductive tempter, still seeking the overthrow of God's holy Kingdom and the destruction of men's souls.

And in his never-ending enticements to men, the devil still runs the circle of his three assaults. He will seek to pry us loose from God by putting suspicion of God's love and care into our minds; and if that will not succeed, and he cannot ruin us through doubt, he will seek to lead us into dangerous and destructive extremes of confidence; and if that will not accomplish his sinister purpose with us, he will ask us to give him just a little place along with God. But as he failed with our Lord, so will he fail with us, if with Christ's strength in our hearts and His

wilderness example before our eyes, we meet him to *defend*, *define*, and *dedicate* our life of trust in Him to whom we bow, and, taught by our once tempted Lord, say reverently: "Our Father, who art in heaven."

THEISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

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THE mere announcement of the above title may result in the instant erection of such a perilous intellectual hazard that it will have a tendency to discourage further pursuit of this study. For the two subjects here brought together, Theistic Implications and Modern Psychology, suggest conflict rather than co-ordination. At least it must be acknowledged that theistic implications are about the last type of implications that any one at all familiar with the recent trend in the development of psychology would expect to find, through its authority, established. For it cannot be denied that the psychologists are, some of them at all events, among the most violent and aggressive opponents of theism. And among them, according to Professor Leuba's statistics, is to be found the largest proportion of those who no longer believe in a personal God.

One of the great reasons why psychology of religion interests them is because it seems to hold out the most promising hope of aid in their great task of emancipating humanity from the bondage of the moral and spiritual hindrances with which belief in God now handicaps it. With regard to this point Mr. Balfour remarks:

My main contention rests * * * upon the difficulty of maintaining moral values if moral origins are purely naturalistic. That they never have been so maintained on any large scale is a

matter of historic fact. At no time has the mass of mankind treated morals and religion as mutually independent. They have left this to the enlightened; and the enlightened have (as I think) been wrong. They have been wrong through their omission to face the full results of their own theories.¹

This phase of the subject has been fully treated in the preceding paper on *The College Classroom vs. the Christian Pulpit*. With Mr. Balfour we believe that the enlightened are wrong, and for the same reason. We believe that the primary factor in creating and maintaining this impression arises not so much out of the psychology of religion as out of the religion of psychologists. For psychology itself has opened our eyes to an entirely new element in the whole complexion of scientific investigation. It tells us that the original impetus which gives directive character to all investigation is not what science proudly used to style "the unquestioned facts in the case," but rather the motivated-will-to-think, and selective attention. So that even among scientists neither eminence nor knowledge nor sincerity can be accepted as certain guarantees of genuine truth. The data used, and the use made of them, are always unconsciously colored by inherent predispositions. With regard to this important feature Professor Coe says:

Focusing attention on one point or another, may result in either the heightening or the lowering of appreciation for something valuable.²

The investigator of the psychology of religion, whatever be the case with others, cannot afford to neglect the psychology of his own psychologizing.³

¹Theism and Humanism, p. 133.

²The Psychology of Religion, p. xii.

(All subsequent quotations from Professor Coe will be from this book, so in reference, the title will be omitted, and only the page given.)

³P. xi.

Every investigator, whatever his specialty, as a matter of fact (1) selects his data, and (2) treats them from the standpoint of a particular interest. What a blessing it would be if a catalogue could be made of the principles of selection actually employed, and of the particular interests that determine analyses, in each science.*

In our present undertaking we do not claim exemption from this rule. But, since practically all the original investigations which have been carried on in this department have been by those whose primary interests have been psychological, and whose attitude has been to a greater or less degree of cordial sympathy with traditional theism, and Christianity historically defined, it may be valuable to allow those whose predominating interests are primarily religious and whose attitude toward these two great historic faiths is that of profound belief, to go over the same ground and see what their motivated-will-to-think and selective attention may find therein bearing upon these beliefs.

In the present crisis this is the only method that holds out great hope of meeting the requirements of the situation. For it is too late in the day to attempt to discredit psychology, or to deny its right to investigate the phenomena of religious experience. Its position is already too firmly established to be disregarded. Another factor which commends this method lies in the fact that the opponents of theism have been using psychology as the chief weapon in their attacks. And they have become so skilful and clever in the manipulation of some of its methods and material that they have almost succeeded in convincing the younger generation that psychology of religion, in its fundamentals, is pre-eminently anti-theistic.

There remains, therefore, only one successful way to counteract and overcome this impression, and that is, as Professor Sweet suggests in his article on *The Task of the Modern Apologist*,⁴ by "going over the same ground with the plough-share set deeper," and the motivated-will-to-think kindled by deep conviction. Unless something of this kind is done, and done speedily, theism is going to lose its hold upon the coming generation. For, however stable its other time-honored lines of defense may yet remain, unless it is able to prove that psychology of religion is its unquestioned ally it cannot hope to win or hold the faith of the future. This is the angle upon which the enemy is attacking the great citadel of religion, and this is the point at which it must be defended. Theism must be shown to be psychologically tenable. And there is no reason why this cannot be done. The previous paper contains these words: "There exists no irreconcilable conflict between theism and the psychology of religion. * * * Though the present situation demands immediate attention, the ultimates are not in peril. Truth bears a charmed life, and Time and Experience are its guardian angels."

We are now going to attempt to justify that statement.

In order to attest the sincerity and open-minded purpose of our undertaking we will not select our own data, nor will we use those presented by any recognized conservative worker in this field. We deliberately chose to adopt the material presented by Professor Coe in his recent book, *The Psychology of Religion*. Many might claim, with much justice, that it is not necessary to follow quite such a progressive

⁴THE BIBLICAL REVIEW, July, 1917.

and advanced thinker in this department. But our desire is frankly, fairly, and fearlessly, to meet this question in its most up-to-date form, and thus to test our position at that point. And nowhere else is it thus presented quite so well as in this work. The whole field is splendidly covered. Every point is brought right up to date by a critical discussion of earlier contributions, and then the subject is carried far beyond into new fields that are destined to change both the method and scope of the whole problem. It will be years before some of the material here presented will be satisfactorily incorporated in the common working point of view of the psychology of religion. So that if, in this vanguard, theism stands the test, there will be nothing to fear for years to come.

This method of treating our problem may seem like quite a hazardous adventure, but it will be worth the experiment. It is very important for its success that there be kept clearly in mind the exact character and purpose of Professor Coe's task. It is strictly that of the psychological analysis of religious experience. To this circumscribed field he holds himself more rigidly than many. Seldom does he permit himself to be drawn away from his legitimate task across the border line into any of those alluring fields of inference that surround the domains of the psychological analysis of religion. For this very reason his chapters will often seem to stop short of constructive conclusions. Within this field of analysis, however, he cannot be surpassed. He possesses an exceptional gift for keen and penetrating psychological dissection. Time and again he will be found pressing on and on beyond one traditional stopping place and then another until he has at last stripped our religious experiences,

apparently, of all their characteristic features. It is this unusually searching analytical process, through which he puts his data, that becomes the occasion of much unjust and unfounded criticism.

The very nature of this task is bound to arouse many misgivings. It invites us to enter the Holy of Holies where the most sacred and private experiences of the human soul are enacted, and then proceeds to lay bare the mechanism of their operation for our observation. At first, the experience is so unaccustomed that we feel like guilty intruders. It seems as though we have no business there prying into the secret workings of the soul. And what adds to our discomfort is that every item of knowledge gained seems to rob our religious experience of some of its mystery, and the mystery of it all has ever been regarded as one of the chief marks of its religious genuineness. Yet when one stops to think of what mighty and important consequences hang upon this knowledge and its intelligent control, this task takes on a new sacredness and urgency. It reilluminates the old adage of Socrates: "Know thyself."

The first fundamental psychological principle upon which we stake the entire issue is that which was fully worked out in the article, *The Theologian Among the Psychologists*,⁵ *i. e.*, that religious experience always functions through the natural channels of our human nature, and cannot function otherwise. This is now such a commonplace in psychological work that it would not need to be mentioned save for the fact that when we begin to apply it at certain points, it seems to produce such unsatisfactory results that religious leaders are disposed to play fast and loose with it.

⁵The Bible Magazine, March, 1915.

However, a more determined effort fully to comprehend its real nature and purpose will yield most invaluable results.

Let us try to throw some light upon this point by putting it to the test upon the three most sensitive subjects in Professor Coe's book: The Genesis of the Idea of God, Conversion, and Prayer.

The chapter on The Genesis of the Idea of God concludes with these words:

In short, the genesis of the god-idea is a spontaneous, underived conviction that what is most important for us is *really* important, that is, respected and provided for by the reality upon which we depend.*

At first reading this statement seems to be shorn of every shred of theism. But when the first shock of disappointment clears away, and we ponder it more sympathetically it opens up to us with new meaning. We find here simply an attempt to reduce to its lowest unanalyzable human elements this development. To be sure, not one in a thousand would ever have pushed the analysis to this extreme point, but it can be reduced to this limit, and still contains all of its inherent elements, and not much else. It should not be judged as an attempt to give full theological or metaphysical description of the growth of this idea. This does not come within the province of psychology. Yet even this bare psychological skeleton contains most unmistakable theistic lineaments. These can be brought out by italicizing a few of the key words: "The genesis of the god-idea is a *spontaneous underived conviction* that what is most important for us is *really* important, that is, *respected* and *provided for by* the *reality* upon which we *depend*." What more have theists a right

*P. 106.

to expect of psychological analysis when carried to this low point? If this does not yield valuable theistic implications the fault is not with the psychologist, but with the theist.

Again the chapter on Conversion concludes with this statement:

The point that we have now reached is that religious conversion is, all in all, a particular instance of the differentiation of the individual consciousness, which is also social consciousness.⁷

The words that stand out so prominently in this statement, and those that are deliberately left out, combine to arouse our sensitive suspicion that here this religious experience has been reduced to exclusively human categories. And by so doing it has eliminated the real vital religious factors of conversion. Yet when we remember that we are studying an attempt to reduce to its lowest terms the mechanism of this experience, on the human side, it could not be better done. If the full content of the words, "individual consciousness" and "social consciousness," as Professor Coe sets them forth, is read into them, they bring back the very elements which seemed lost. To this fact Professor Coe is very careful to call our attention. After pointing out many mediating factors that are found to contribute to this experience of conversion, he adds:

But alongside of this mediate factor there is a factor of immediacy also.⁷

In that simple statement is found all that the theist has a right to claim of psychological analysis. This point is further developed in these words:

Granted that his training has prepared him for the crisis, and that conversion puts him under the control of existing social

⁷P. 174.

standards and ideas of God, the fact remains that conversion makes these things real to the convert. Heretofore he has "knowledge about" them; now he has "acquaintance with" them. The world or God has meaning *for him* and makes response *now*. Here is no mere repetition of the past, for the individual is a new and unique one, and this experience *as his* is as fresh as the creation morn itself.⁷

Again in his chapter on Prayer he says:

It is a way of getting one's self together, of mobilizing and concentrating one's dispersed capacities, of begetting the confidence that tends toward victory over difficulties. It produces in a distracted mind the repose that is power. It freshens a mind deadened by routine. It reveals new truth, because the mind is made more elastic and more capable of sustained attention.⁸

Here we find more things described as wrought by prayer than most believers imagined. And such a statement is comparatively satisfactory. But when he takes the next step and adds:

Prayer is a conversation both sides of which, structurally considered, are mental states of the one who prays,⁹

the whole value of the discussion seems to be irreparably marred. For such an explanation apparently reduces the experience to a pure subjective transaction. Yet even here a more careful understanding of the fact, that this description is nothing more than an analysis of the structural side of the human mechanism of the operation of prayer, makes it better understood. For what is here said of the conversation called prayer is also true of all conversation between ourselves and our neighbors; and this fact does not involve the denial of the reality of that conversation or of our neighbor. Upon this point he takes particular pains to caution us. So we find him saying:

The tendency of these considerations is not necessarily toward skeptical subjectivism or solipsism unless one first assumes that

⁷P. 315.

the whole reality of the I-and-thou relation can be set forth in the structural terms of particular states succeeding one another. If the essence of a conversation lies * * * in meanings for selves, then a particular movement of my own states might have meaning for two selves. The second self for which the situation has meaning is never found as an addition item in the succession of states, any more than I myself can discover myself as one of my own states. The fact that prayer is a conversation both sides of which, structurally considered, are mental states of the one who prays, has no particular bearing upon the question whether prayer is a mutual relation between the worshiper and God.*

These three illustrations have been presented, not in defense of Professor Coe, which is entirely apart from our concern, but as typical examples of the way in which the reader is liable to misunderstand completely the work of psychological analysis when it deals with those religious experiences with regard to which he is acutely sensitive. These misunderstandings are not fanciful but have been taken from actual experience in the discussion of these very chapters. One can readily see that it is impossible for the psychology of religion ever to contribute its valuable share to theological thinking and religious work unless the fundamental character of its real task is more clearly comprehended. The psychologist's workshop is the laboratory, not the observatory; in his work he uses the mental microscope, not the philosopher's or theologian's telescope. Emerson, in commenting upon Goethe's keen insight, and, at the same time, his inability to grasp things in the big and large setting, asks: "Was it that his sight was microscopic, and interfered with the just perspective, the seeing of the whole?" Perhaps he, here, gives us a hint which will help to explain why psychologists so often fail

*Representative Men.

to catch a just perspective of things in their larger relations. May it not be that their very gift for keen and minute analysis sometimes exacts its penalties upon this other side? If, however, in this world where the division of labor is so necessary, the psychologist does his work honestly and well, it should be the responsibility of other experts to take over these results in the shape of raw material, and intelligently relate them to the whole of reality.

With this preliminary clearing of the field, we are now ready to enter directly upon the study of the subject matter in hand. The limits of this paper will not permit, nor does its purpose require, any detailed review of Professor Coe's book as a whole. Our object will best be served by confining this study to the two outstanding portions in which his most distinctive contributions lie. This part of our investigation may entail some heavy plodding, for in it Professor Coe leads us through some primitive and hitherto unexplored psychological regions. And we will have to work amid strange and unfamiliar surroundings. He shows himself to be a natural son of the psychological jungle; he seems to be at home everywhere, and his knowledge and native instincts guide him so unfailingly that he rarely loses himself even in its trackless frontier regions. Because he has himself become so accustomed to pioneer work he fails to appreciate the helplessness of the ordinary reader who is trying to follow him. The book, he tells us, was originally designed as "a handbook for beginners." But beginners are the last ones into whose hands it should be placed. Inexperienced readers are almost certain to misunderstand almost every important chapter. And clever opponents can

easily turn its material to unwarranted ends. The book needs a mediator. In laying it down after its first reading the writer was constrained to remark to a friend: "Now if only some one would write a companion volume, and in it tell us just what Professor Coe has not, and what he has, said in this book, a great deal of confusion and much unjust criticism might be avoided." And this, not because Professor Coe has not said, and said well and clearly, just what he desired, but simply because there is such a great gulf fixed between his familiarity and knowledge of this subject and that of most of those who will try to understand him, outside of the experts, that they cannot get together. The very thoroughness with which he conducts his analysis and the technical character of his fundamental discussions remove them from the range of the uninitiated. Notwithstanding all of this, we will do our best not to get hopelessly lost in the subject.

Those who recall the discussion of Professor Coe's articles, *A Proposed Classification of Mental Functions*, and *On Having Friends: a Study of Social Values*, which was presented in the writer's paper, *The Science of Prayer, Theoretical*,¹⁰ will not be surprised to find Professor Coe centering his whole problem of the psychology of religion in this entirely new realm of reality. He moves us onward from the study of mental structure and mechanism to that of personal self-realization. This necessity emerges just as soon as the question, *What is the psychical?* demands explanation. In making this transition he says:

Psychology * * * has commonly understood itself to be the science of "states of consciousness *as such*," that is, without

¹⁰THE BIBLICAL REVIEW, October, 1916.

regard to their relation to any metaphysical soul or ego. * * * It is not at all surprising that students, and even professional psychologists, come to think of mental life as compounded of simple elements, after the analogy of chemistry, or as a mechanism of which sensations, feelings, and the like are the ultimate units.¹¹

Paradoxical as it seems at first, we may have to conclude that sensations as well as atoms are not facts of experience but constructs from experience.¹²

The "states of consciousness" type and the behaviorist type—necessitate a third type. The concrete experience out of which we abstract "states of consciousness" is the experience of being a personal self. Each sensation, feeling, or other "element" of structural psychology is simply a particular discriminable aspect of a self-realizing life. Sensations and feelings are not known to have any other kind of existence, and what other kind of existence they could conceivably have has never been explained. Now, since self-realizations are not less actual than sensations, but more so, and since much of our behavior is communication of self-realized meanings, we must have an empirical science of self-realizations, or, in short, of selves. This is psychology *par excellence*, because its data are the most concrete and the most distinctive.¹³

So that, from this new point of view, "persons become the paramount reality."¹⁴

It is curious how a cross section of one branch of science when compared with that of another in the same stage of development seems to bear such striking structural resemblance. This observation holds true even in the case of two such dissimilar branches as material science and psychology. In the paper, *The Science of Prayer, Theoretical*, it was pointed out that even the facts of natural science, in the last analysis, fall back upon "the physiology of vision and the psychology of perception for their final reality." The

¹¹P. 15.

¹²P. 16.

¹³P. 19.

¹⁴P. xiv.

way in which Mr. Balfour sums up this situation in natural science strikingly parallels Professor Coe's findings in psychology. Mr. Balfour says:

The physical causes of perception are inferred, but not perceived. The real material world has been driven by the growth of knowledge further and further into the realm of the unseen, and now lies completely hidden from direct experience behind the impenetrable screen of its own effects.¹⁵

Professor Coe shows us that this same stage of development is now just dawning in psychology. For "states of consciousness," feelings and sensations are inferred, but not perceived. The real world of psychology has been driven by the growth of knowledge further and further into the unperceived, and now lies completely enmeshed in personal selves. This discovery sadly shatters the original dream of those psychologists who, a few years ago, so confidently informed us that in a short time they would be in position to solve for theologians all the problems which have baffled them for centuries, and that without entangling religion up with metaphysics. For we are now directly facing the same old problem dressed in the new guise of the metaphysical soul or ego of the experiencer. And, if we have not already discovered it, we will soon be aware that none of its bewildering features have been lost in transition. As there is no hope of being able to follow this new development in psychology of religion unless the essentials of this new conception are mastered, let us look a little more closely into it. Professor Coe explains it thus:

Human experience is an individuating process, a struggle to be individual, unique, an "I"; but the experience of being an

¹⁵Theism and Humanism, p. 162.

individual is *per se* an experience of other individuals. * * * Both phases of experience simply arrive; they are not derived, and they are as inexpugnable as any other data. Thus, all our mediated knowledge rests upon—is made possible and meaningful by—social immediacy, which is common to science, art, morals, and religion.¹⁶

Evidently we are mediated to one another as well as immediate, and each of us is both immediate and mediated to himself. I am self-conscious by an utterly original act, yet I find out only gradually and partially, by observation and inference, and much self-deception, what this self of mine is. Just so, with equal originality, my self-consciousness is all one with consciousness of others like myself—my self-consciousness is social consciousness. Yet only by much putting of two and two together do I secure any working acquaintance with my *socii*. This intermingling of mediacy and immediacy, the presence of both at exactly the same point, may be paradoxical, but if so the paradox is in reality itself."

There yet remains another additional complication:

Whenever we try to fixate an individual as a mere particular, it mocks us for our pains. "Here you will find me," it promises, but it adds, "you found me before you commenced to hunt for me, and you didn't find me a *mere me* but an *us*."¹⁷

The head begins to whirl, and a dizzy intellectual feeling takes hold of one before this idea has been successfully followed through its rapidly revolving cycle of gyrations, between self and society and back again. Yet this is the very problem that psychology was destined to encounter, in some form, when it tackled the task of simplifying the problems of religion. They lead inevitably back to the metaphysical. There is also apparent, in the ramifications of the above conception, a structural similarity to the problems of the Trinity, pre-existence, and the Atha-

¹⁶P. 250.

¹⁷P. 252.

¹⁸P. 253.

nasian conception of two natures in one Person. All of which opens up an attractive field for further study. It is worth noting that even here this very structural similarity can be traced way back into the biological realm. M. Bergson finds it in cell life:

This itself reveals to us, in the genesis of the individual, a haunting of the social form, as if the individual could develop only on the condition that its substance should be split up into elements having themselves an appearance of individuality and united among themselves by an appearance of sociality.¹⁹

Our troubles are not yet at an end, for Professor Coe now proceeds to raise the teasing problem of mental functionalism. With respect to this, he tells us:

There is something * * * in our social and ethical experience that is not a complex of states of consciousness. Never shall we understand this something by merely reanalyzing the mechanism. As well might we explain a line of poetry by merely marking the quantity of its syllables. We must go forward to a psychology of values, functions, self-realizations.²⁰

The moment that self-conscious human beings cross the border-line, even in the realm of the biological, into the sphere where mind begins to operate, function takes on an entirely new characteristic. It seems to possess a superior nature, for it immediately assumes directing and controlling influence. All of this inheres in the very nature of a person, which Professor Coe thus defines:

A person is any reactor that approves or disapproves its own reactions, or that realizes consequences as successes or failures of its own.²¹

Functional psychology, accordingly, should be, first and foremost, a psychology of personal self-realizations. The functional psychology of religion must be this above all things else.²¹

¹⁹Creative Evolution, p. 260.

²⁰P. 12f.

²¹P. 30.

Accordingly, mental evolution is no mere extension of biological functions, but also the emergence of fresh functions.²²

Evolution may be original at every step, and may be going on with originality in our own experience.²³

Limiting attention for a moment to physical nature, we may say unhesitatingly that the business of mind is far less adjustment of ourselves to environment than adjustment of environment to ourselves.²⁴

This turns out to be the very same idea at which Professor Eucken arrives, from an entirely different angle of approach, when he says:

The given world, in which the determining influence of nature is preponderant, now appears merely as a stage of reality, which the onward movement leaves behind as it rises to the stage of the spiritual life and acquires therewith for the first time a self-immediate being. In man, however, the two stages meet. Belonging in the first instance to nature, he can yet rise to spirituality and by achieving a new life and being can at the same time further the progress of the world.²⁵

We now come upon a clearer delineation of the true function of religion. Professor Coe puts it thus:

All values press for organization into wholeness of life, and
* * * this is just what religion has been about from the beginning.²⁶

Religion does not introduce any new value; it is an operation upon and within all our appreciations. If we are to speak of religious value at all, we should think of it as the value of values, that is, the value of life organizing and completing itself, or seeking a destiny, as against the discrete values of impulsive or unreflective existence.²⁷

²²P. 25.

²³P. 53.

²⁴P. 26.

²⁵Can We Still Be Christians? p. 98.

²⁶P. 70.

Possibly the chief thing in religion, considered functionally, is the progressive discovery and reorganization of values. Possibly the central function of religion concerns ends rather than means.²⁷

It is interesting to notice how far away this lands us from the pragmatism of Professor James, and the utilitarianism of Professor Leuba and others. The tangle of this conception of function, which at one and the same time seems to become both the instrument and victim of its own magical powers, may unravel just a little if we watch it at work in the realm of prayer. Professor Coe says:

In the words of Fosdick, prayer may be considered as dominant desire. But it is also a way of securing domination over desire. * * * Here, then, is our greater problem as to the function of prayer. It starts as the assertion of any desire; it ends as the organization of one's own desires into a system of desires recognized as superior and then made one's own.²⁸

We have thus hastily made our way over the newly opened territory in the psychology of religion. In transit we have caught glimpses of vast stretches of unexplored and undeveloped fields. We have also come upon some most valuable theistic material. It is to be hoped that it will not be neglected. It is quite possible that, if we do not claim it as ours by right, our energetic and clever opponents will soon be found appropriating it all to their use. If, however, the leaders in the Christian church are fully alive to their superb opportunity, this will not happen. As we leave this fascinating field let us take one last bird's-eye glance at some of the most prominently outstanding theistic implications, to satisfy ourselves that they are actually there.

²⁷P. 65.

²⁸P. 318.

1. Religion survives religious doctrines because the adventure of life is large, and because in its very largeness as adventure it is *an original acquaintance with the real*.²⁹

2. The real world of the modern man is nature *plus society*.³⁰

3. Our very selves are enmeshed in the mechanism of nature as well as in other selves.³¹

4. Whatever we call it, we have here within one's particular valuations an immanent critique which is also a movement towards completeness, unity, and permanence of the value of experience as a whole.³²

5. Religion is the discovery of persons.³³

6. Mind lies for us wholly within the objectively real world-order called Nature—not partly within and partly without.³⁴

7. Persons are the paramount reality.³⁴

8. Mental process is process of the real in relation to the real.³⁴

9. The inner world of desire and action does not whirl upon a subjective axis.³⁵

10. The mind lives, moves, and has its being within reality; it is reality.³⁶

11. One cannot write a truly realistic history of mind without recognizing the religious enterprise as a fundamental factor therein.³⁶

12. Mental changes imply, *prima facie*, some doctrine of mental dynamics.³⁷

13. The conclusion is that social valuation is of itself recognition of the real; that the evolution of social valuations is a progressive discovery of persons as reals, that intense valuation of persons, when it becomes reflective, tends to define itself in terms of a cosmic reality that has social character.³⁸

But why increase this list? From whatever position we stop to take a survey of this field, theistic implications rise up against the horizon to greet our

²⁹P. 235.

³⁰P. 233.

³¹P. 213.

³²P. 74.

³³P. 240.

³⁴P. 231.

³⁵P. 230.

³⁶P. 232.

³⁷P. 219.

³⁸P. 245.

eyes like the separate peaks of a "great divide." Varying, indeed, in prominence, yet all elemental upheavals from the same primordial mass of homogeneous and indestructible truth.

It seems most fitting now, in conclusion, that our study should further safeguard itself against the possible accusation that its inferences are entirely unwarranted perversions of the true implications of modern psychology of religion. For this purpose let us grant Professor Coe himself the privilege of a word upon the main point under discussion. As a cautious psychologist he speaks in the following language:

From the standpoint of the moral will, the rational possibility of faith in a personal God, and in life after death seems to me to be immensely important. * * * So with regard to God. It is socially desirable that "an ideal *socius*" should exist."

We have at last reached the end of our journey, and the adventure has turned out abundantly worth while. For it still leaves us within the limits of "the rational possibility of faith in a personal God." The significant value of this expedition lies in the fact that it has been conducted, not by a psychologist who would have guaranteed beforehand to get us to this destination anyway, facts or no facts, but by one whose reputation, even among our opponents, for honest and fearless pursuit of truth stands unquestioned.

To be sure, there have been occasions when one has felt inclined to stop and question details of statement and deductions, but all these have been passed over so as not to allow anything else to obscure the great objective of our study—the theistic implications of modern psychology of religion. So far as this subject is concerned, the entire field has been thoroughly

covered, and no inherently anti-theistic data have been discovered. This fact should hold significant value for the college class room as well as for the Christian pulpit. It is, indeed, a refreshing and pleasant surprise to follow a psychologist as "eminent" and of as "high culture" as Professor Coe over this field, and not be left stranded in the "far country" with conclusions such as these of Professor Leuba:

Theism having become logically impossible, * * * where shall we look for a religion of the future?³⁹

OR

I cannot persuade myself that divine personal beings, be they primitive gods or the Christian Father, have more than a subjective existence.⁴⁰

Without unduly pressing any of his statements, it may be safely said of Professor Coe that he leaves us at least in sight of the "Father's house."

"But when he was yet a great way off his father saw him, and had compassion, and ran, and fell on his neck, and kissed him." Mr. Balfour says:

It is enough to say that * * * the course followed by scientific discovery, as I read its history, cannot be wholly due to reasoning and experience. * * * We seem forced to assume something in the nature of a directing influence, and (as I should add) of supramundane design. And if "a Power that makes for truth" be required to justify our scientific faith, we must surely count ourselves as theists.⁴¹

Behind the dim unknown

Standeth God within the shadow keeping watch above his own.

³⁹A Psychological Study of Religion, p. 321.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴¹Theism and Humanism, p. 240.

THE DECAY OF RELIGION

II

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THE view expressed at the close of the preceding paper, that the vices of paganism are marks of degeneracy, finds striking confirmation in other features of religious development. We have to consider under this head the portentous and significant fact of magic. Mr. J. G. Frazer, the author of a number of weird and unbelievable theories, has propounded the notion that religion originates in the despair of magic.¹ This involves the supposition that magic everywhere precedes religion. This theory has been very thoroughly demolished by Mr. Andrew Lang on anthropological grounds, and is seen to involve at one and the same time a misinterpretation of magic and a misunderstanding of religion. With these two exceptions the theory is complete and ingenious.

If magic is the attempt to control destiny by man's own agency and religion is propitiation or "the conciliation of powers superior to man," what more natural to suppose than that, after trying to direct his own destiny and failing, man should call in the aid of the gods and thus ascend from magic to religion. Mr. Lang² deals effectively with Mr. Frazer's definition of religion and clearly shows that evidence as to

¹Golden Bough, *passim*.

²*Ibid.*, i, p. 63.

³Magic and Religion, p. 48ff.

the existence of the alleged despair of magic, which is the mainspring of the whole development, is not forthcoming. On the contrary, the belief in magic among people of little culture is almost indestructible. The authorities constantly insist upon the strength of the faith⁴ and missionaries say⁵ that the "native convert in abjuring fetich and refraining from the white art is at a disadvantage, humanly speaking, alongside of his heathen fellow" because "the heathen, armed with his fetich, feels strong" and "the Christian convert is weak in his faith."

We are confident that Mr. Frazer has misinterpreted magic just as he has misinterpreted religion, because magic is not looked upon as accomplishing results solely by the power of man. It involves dependence on supernatural or at least superhuman agency. It, therefore, presupposes religion.⁶ Magic, always and everywhere, is the attempt to make the practical benefits of religion certain and automatic; or, as Professor Pfleiderer puts it, "magic came by way of forcing help from unethetical spirits." Magic, therefore, is a process of obtaining, by a method which involves the principle, *opus operatum*, that which naturally would come as a gift from higher powers in response to prayer. This accounts for the aggressive certainty of the heathen with his fetich as compared with the somewhat timid and vacillating attitude of the Christian convert.

As a matter of fact, the Christian has no such immediate certainty as lies in the mind of the believer

⁴See Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, p. 103, for illustrative incident; cf. statement of Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 322.

⁵*E. g.*, Nassau, *op. cit.*, p. 112ff.

⁶See De La Saussaye, *Manual*, p. 131.

⁷*Op. cit.*, p. 44.

in fetich, for, as Dr. Nassau well puts it:⁸ "The faith of a Christian does not assure him, in any emergency of life, that he will be successful in his place; it only certifies him that, whatever be the result, success or failure, of any single act or series of acts in life's drama, his own will must be subordinated to God's, who, if not granting his specific wish to-day, will overrule everything in the final *dénouement* for his best spiritual good."

This is the faith of the Christian, but not of the Christian only, for it is the essential principle of all genuinely religious belief, the decay of which is seen in magic. In further illustration and enforcement of this position we bring forward two bits of interesting documentary evidence, which would seem sufficiently conclusive as to the relationship between religion and magic.

Attention has already been called to the co-existence of lower and higher elements in the religion of Babylonia as expressed in the texts. We simply recall these texts in order to point out a hymn "which begins with an address to the Sun-god full of deep feeling and exalted thought, and finally passes into an incantation equally full of dull pathos and debasing superstition."⁹ This hymn is said to be late, so that it is possible to hold, as Professor Sayce seems to hold,¹⁰ that the magical element is "primaeval belief" surviving amid the later development. Even thus it damages beyond repair the theory of Mr. Frazer. But, in some instances, it is not open to us to look upon the magical element as earlier than the religious, or

⁸*Op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁹Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, 1887, p. 320.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 322.

even coeval with it, for here we find that the religious poem was used as a formula of incantation. It is clear from this that the religious text already in existence has been by improper use degraded from a higher to a lower office." The magical liturgy, unlike the hymn embodied in it, was not the outcome of a truly religious longing for communion with the gods, but rather embodies the results of an "attempt to compel them by particular rites and words to relieve the worshipper from trouble, or to bestow upon him some benefit."¹¹ Thus the two incongruous elements combined in one text are attributable to radically contrasted tempers and attitudes of mind. The high religious quality of the hymn could never have been appreciated by those who used it for purposes of incantation. It is simply another example of the downward tendency of ritualism.

In the case of ancient Egyptian magic we have a still stronger demonstration of the relationship between religion and magic. By way of preliminary we must emphasize the fact that Egyptian magic is frankly supra-naturalistic, that is, it is always connected with the worship of deities. It is also evident that the power of magic over the minds of the Egyptians was due to their firm belief, which so far as we can see never issued in "despair" but persisted to the end of the history, in the *de facto* power of the spoken and written word under certain definite circumstances. It would seem to be a simple matter to infer that religion interpreted as faith in the helpfulness of superior powers in response to

¹¹*Cf.* Tiele's remark upon the statement of Professor Hopkins, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, vol. i, p. 23.

¹²Sayce, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

prayer, passing under the influence of the notion that the prayer in and of itself had power to bring about the desired result, issued in ritualistic magic. This conclusion is borne out in the most striking way by the texts.

The twenty-fifth chapter of the Book of the Dead¹⁸ contains the description of the judgment scene before Osiris, the noble moral quality of which has been so deservedly admired. That judgment turns upon the moral quality of the life of the deceased person brought to the test of an absolute divine righteousness. No one can find fault with the principle involved—but note the sequel. When we turn to the rubric attached to this chapter we find, among other things, the following words: “Thou shalt draw a representation of this in color upon a new tile moulded from earth upon which neither a pig nor other animals have trodden. And if thou doest this book upon it in writing the deceased shall flourish, and his name shall never fall into oblivion.”

What is the meaning of this? According to the rubric the painted representation of this strongly ethical judgment scene will serve to justify the deceased before the seat of Osiris. It is, of course, pure magic and the motive of it is the motive of all magic, that is, to make the benefits of religion, which are contingent upon the will of the deity and the virtue of the worshiper, independent of both contingencies. Psychologically, therefore, it represents a declension from the true religious temper, and since the rubric must have been later than the text, the chronological relationship also seems to be clear.

¹⁸The Coming Forth by Day; see Budge's translation, Introduction, p. CLVff., for remarks on Egyptian magic.

Another item in the history of religious degeneration is given us in this same connection, for Sayce points out that certain Babylonian texts "agree with the hymns in form and character, but differ from them in being addressed, * * * to an inferior order of super-natural beings."¹⁴

The whole tendency of the evidence is to confirm the statement of Pfleiderer: "Spiritism and fetichism are thus nothing but degenerate forms of a belief in mediators and means, which in the case of peoples without culture and fallen into moral savagery had overgrown and stifled the belief in God."¹⁵

There is another group of facts involving the problem of religious degeneration which we must consider at this point. Mr. Lang has collected data indicating the presence very generally among degraded and savage people of a higher belief, involving many of the characteristics of ethical theism. The conclusion which is drawn from these facts, as stated from a hostile point of view by Mr. Hartland and accepted by Mr. Lang, is as follows: "The belief in a supreme being came, in some way only to be guessed at, first in order of evolution and was subsequently obscured and overlaid by belief in ghosts and in a pantheon of lesser divinities."¹⁶

Mr. Lang summarizes his case¹⁷ in the following sentences: "I was led to these conclusions, first, by observing the reports of belief in a relatively supreme being and maker among tribes who do not worship ancestral spirits (Australians and Andamese), and,

¹⁴*Op. cit.*, p. 318.

¹⁵*Op. cit.*, iii, p. 44; *cf.* also Boyd Carpenter, *Permanent Elements of Religion*, p. 381, note.

¹⁶*Folk Lore*, March, 1901, p. 21.

¹⁷Developed at length in *Making of Religion*, and in chapters II and XII of *Magic and Religion*.

secondly, by remarking the otiose unworshipped supreme being, often credited with the charge of future rewards and punishments, among polytheistic and ancestor-worshipping people too numerous for detailed mention. Granting the validity of the evidence, the hypothesis appears to colligate the facts. There is a creative being (not a spirit, merely a being) before ghosts are worshipped. Where ghosts are worshipped, and the spiritual deities of polytheism have been developed, and are adored, there is still the unworshipped maker, in various degrees of repose and neglect.¹⁸

In explaining the origin of this strange and seemingly contradictory conception of a supreme god whose worship is neglected Mr. Lang says: "Early man, looking for an origin of things, easily adopted the idea of a maker, usually, an unborn man, who was before death and still exists. Round this being crystallized affection, fear, and sense of duty; the sanctions of morality and early man's remarkable resistance to the cosmic tendency: his notion of unselfishness."¹⁹

Mr. Lang's critics have met his arguments with strenuous skepticism rather than with any particular effectiveness of rejoinder. The hypothesis runs counter to current theories and must expect determined opposition. Professor Tyler has grappled with Mr. Lang as regards the validity of his evidence and has been frankly and fairly met.²⁰ The cautious words of Professor Ladd indicate both the common reluctance to accept Mr. Lang's view and the difficulty

¹⁸Magic and Religion, p. 224f.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 225.

²⁰See Magic and Religion, chapter II.

of meeting his carefully constructed argument.²¹ "Neither does history seem fully to justify Mr. Lang's hypothesis * * * that, however, there is a sort of savage Deism existing side by side with Fetishism, Magic and the grossest superstitions is the opinion of Waitz and other anthropologists."²² "Savage Deism" is an exceedingly felicitous description of the belief upon which Mr. Lang bases his hypothesis. The *primitive* character of that belief is the point to which Professor Ladd is inclined to demur. In order to get at this latter question, let us take up the representation of Dr. Galloway who has attempted to deal philosophically with Mr. Lang's theory.

Dr. Galloway urges²³ five (though he numbers but four) arguments against Mr. Lang. The first (un-numbered probably because it is not, strictly speaking, an argument) is, that "if he is right the current notions of religious development must be entirely revised; animism and spiritism cease to be primitive, and must be regarded as lapses from a higher and an earlier level." Second, the evidence is comparatively recent and cannot be taken as bearing upon what is primitive. "Though some modern savages have formed for themselves an idea of a Supreme Being, this is no proof that pre-historic man could have done so." Third, these gods can be explained as later products, "super-added to the spirits." Their "otiose" character, so emphasized by Mr. Lang, may be due to the fact that these higher deities "were never so firmly fixed in the traditions and sentiments of the people." Fourth, this primitive theism is not

²¹*Cf.* also the use made of Lang's material by Ladd in *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. ii, ch. XXXIX, especially p. 316ff.

²²Ladd, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. i, p. 153.

²³Studies in the *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 123f.

so general and widespread as animism and therefore cannot be assumed to be the primitive starting point. Fifth, the theory represents the "psychical capacity" of primitive man on too high a level.

As we view it, this argumentation is open to assault at every point. To begin, the first consideration is of force only to those who are so absolutely convinced of the truth of the animistic hypothesis as to be proof against evidence against it. The very question at issue is the truth of this animistic theory, and Mr. Lang's data are specifically urged against it. His theory is, that the animistic stage of development was preceded by an anthropomorphic stage when the divine being was recognized simply as being, and "not envisaged as spirit." We have already seen that animism cannot be primitive because it represents an advanced stage of elaborate invention. We have also noted that animism is not necessarily nor primarily religious. Animism *per se* is not the outgrowth of the religious instinct nor is it adapted to satisfy it. Dr. Galloway sees this difficulty, and in the attempt to meet it unconsciously betrays his case. He says:²⁴ "It is the supervention of human need on the animistic view of the world which begets the religious bond: the determining factor is within, not without."

On this hypothesis the animistic view of the world had to wait for the supervention upon it of human need before it could become religious, and the religious instinct had to wait for the development of the animistic view of the world before it could objectify and attach itself. In other words, we are to believe that primitive man's religion was due to a combination of philosophy and the religious instinct in which

²⁴*Op. cit.*, p. 111.

the philosophy was the primary factor. This implies that the religious instinct did not have anything to supervene upon or attach itself to before the "animistic view of the world" came into existence. This is inherently impossible, for the religious instinct is primary and its action must have been immediate. It must have become active with man's awakening consciousness and have gone forth directly upon its object. Since animism does not provide an object but simply affords an explanation of the world in the terms of the conscious self, it could not have satisfied the religious longings of the primitive man.

Moreover, there is demonstrably an earlier stage in the development which issues in animism. Animism is the ascription to natural objects of self-conscious voluntary life analogous to man's own. It implies, therefore, a previous recognition, on man's part, of his own self-conscious, voluntary life. What is to prevent the supervention of human need upon this previous stage of progress and the moving out directly upon deity in the anthropomorphic conception of God called for by Mr. Lang's theory? Relative to animism the anthropomorphic feature of the conception of high gods among savage races is certainly primitive. If nature and natural objects alone were fitted to call forth man's religious emotion, we should be led to believe in a primitive naturism as the starting point; but, as has been clearly shown, nature, except as interpreted in terms of spirit, does not arouse religious emotion.

As D'Alviella²⁵ says: "From the very first, worship must have been addressed, not to the material

²⁵Origin and Growth of the Conception of God, p. 97ff.; quoted and commented upon by Ladd, *Philosophy of Religion*, i, p. 154.

object conceived as such, but to the personality supposed to be embodied in it." The category of spirit could only be obtained by elaboration upon the materials furnished in experience of death and dreams. We are thus forced back upon the consciousness of self as furnishing the first form in which the sense of the divine could embody itself. "The determining factor," therefore, is "within not without," and there is no valid objection to be drawn from animism to the theory that the earliest conception of God was of a being "envisaged" as man but without ordinary human limitations.

All this reasoning pro and con evidently proceeds upon the supposition that primitive man was left to form his first conception of God through inference. Taking that supposition for granted, the anthropomorphic theory has everything to recommend it as against the animistic.

To the further objection, that Mr. Lang's theory is improbable because it involves the supposition that animism represents a decline from an earlier and higher level, we reply, that, according to Dr. Galloway himself, animism has to be fecundated by the sense of need before it can be called religion at all; that, as a form of philosophic doctrine, it incorporates (as we shall show immediately) only the lower elements of the religious consciousness which it nearly succeeds in secularizing altogether; and, finally, that the very fact, that the two conceptions of God coexist in such a way that religious beliefs of men lie in two strata, a higher and a lower, of which the lower is connected with practices oppugnant to the higher but which the higher is impotent to destroy, amounts almost to a demonstration that a decline has taken place.

This statement, of course, anticipates Dr. Gallo-way's third contention, which it may be well to take out of its order, that their otiose and unworshiped condition may be due to the fact that these high gods were super-added to the spirits and not popular. If so, it is very difficult to understand why, without the practical demand of worship, they should be added at all. The most striking fact concerning the belief in these gods is that they are not worshiped, have no cult either of prayer or sacrifice. The motive for increasing the number of deities already known and worshiped is almost universally the practical one of need. Besides, the reason given by savages for the neglect of the high gods points in the opposite direction. What we discover here is so strikingly in line with our Scripture instances illustrative of the causes of religious decline as to carry conviction that we are studying the same phenomenon under different conditions.

Dr. Nassau says: "Standing in the village street, surrounded by a company whom their chief has courteously summoned at my request, when I say to him, 'I have come to speak to your people,' I do not need to begin by telling them that there is a God, * * * I have yet to be asked, who is God?"²⁶ He goes on to give their invariable answer to the questions: "Why then do you not obey this Father's commands, who tells you to do so and so? Why do you disobey his prohibitions, who forbids you to do so and so? Why do you not worship him?" "Yes," they say, "he made us; but, having made us, he abandoned us, does not care for us; he is far from us. Why should we care for him? He does not help

²⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 37.

nor harm us. It is the spirits who can harm us whom we fear and worship, and for whom we care."²⁷ Dr. Nassau on the next and following pages adduces testimony of Dr. Wilson and others to the same effect.

Along similar lines Mr. Lang has gathered together evidence to show the practical universality both of the belief and the causes here given for the peculiar attitude of men toward their own higher beliefs. How can we resist the conclusion that in these impotent beliefs of savagery we have undoubted instance of religious declension, the root of which is a failure to respond to the ethical demand of the religious consciousness? We have thus met Dr. Galloway's first and third objections.

We now turn to the second. The debate between Mr. Lang and Professor Tyler turns upon the nature of the evidence collected by the former. The point at issue is, whether these higher gods are genuine native products or are the result of contact with civilization. The question is a nice one, but Mr. Lang is able to ground his opinion upon evidence furnished by authorities satisfactory in other respects to his opponent, and succeeds in presenting a chain of proofs for the indigenous character of the beliefs in question.

Dr. Galloway holds that the evidence, even where satisfactory (in the above particular, we suppose), carries no weight as to the beliefs of primitive man. The form of his objection obviously begs the question as to whether the idea of a supreme being is the achievement of the modern savage, who treats it so cavalierly, rather than the work of a nobler and more enlightened being than he. We hold this to be a vital moot point which cannot be granted without

²⁷*Op. cit.*, p. 38.

discussion. We remark also, that, if the higher beliefs of the modern savage cannot be relied upon for the interpretation of the primitive man, neither can the lower elements of his life and thought, since some of them, at least, are manifestly the ripened historic product of non-natural perversion of normal instincts under the malign influence of selfishness and fear. But, if this principle is to be carried to its logical conclusion, then much of the anthropology upon which Dr. Galloway and those who hold with him rely in the portraiture of primitive man must be definitely surrendered.

The animistic hypothesis can be plausibly maintained only upon the hypothesis of universal savagery as the original state of man. Animism is the savage side of belief wherever it is found; universal animism finds its counterpart in universal savagery. Doubt of the one shakes the foundations of belief in the other.

This suggestion provides us with the exact answer to Dr. Galloway's fourth contention, which places animism behind all later developments of religion. The test supplied by the history of progress enables us to see that animism does not lie behind, but beneath, the higher developments of religion. Between animism and ethical monotheism there is a similar relationship and a similar difference as between low-growing brush and forest trees. They grow out of the same soil of human nature; they involve a similar organic response to environment; but, the primordial germ, the structural constitution, and the life history of each are altogether different. Behind ethical monotheism, in the sense of being organically connected with it in the same order of development, is that which is cognate with itself. And it seems that we

are able to arrive with some certainty at the differentia of the higher religious development as contrasted with the lower.

Here documentary evidence must give place to psychological analysis. In most of our earliest religious texts animism appears along with higher and more distinctively religious elements, or else we find, as Tiele²⁸ claims, religion dominated by animistic philosophy. On the supposition that the higher elements in these texts are later developments and the lower represent vestiges of earlier ideas, we are logically carried back to a time when only the lower ideas prevailed. This is a pure speculation, the erroneousness of which we believe to be demonstrable.

Back of the period represented by the earliest documents lies an indefinite time in which man's nature came through experience to self-expression. Behind this self-expression, which came to be embodied in documents and institutions, and behind the development through which the expression was reached, as the starting point of the entire process, is the self which is developed and expresses itself. Religion, as of all other things in which man has a hand, starts from the human psychical organism—"out of the heart," in the comprehensive Biblical sense, "are all the issues of life." Religion is one expression, as we believe, the first and deepest expression, of man's longings and needs.

When we come close to it, man's religious consciousness, which is the psychical organism interpreted as going forth in longing and aspiration, is itself capable of analysis into higher and lower elements. That sense of need which is said to beget the religious

²⁸*Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 68.

bond is of two specific varieties, distinguished by the ethical quality of each. The sense of need may mean, and often does mean, that satisfaction and fulfilment of self in another which is the noblest of impulses, or it may mean that clamoring for egoistic satisfaction which is the perpetual blight and curse of human life. We maintain that, defined in harmony with its genius, religion is the outgrowth of the former temper, and that its manifold and horrible perversions are due to the operation of this latter impulse.

Dr. Galloway says: "Primitive man acted on the rule *do ut des*, and the things he renounced were always those he supposed could affect him for good or ill."²⁹ In other words, primitive man was fundamentally selfish, and his religion was thus the outgrowth of his nature. In quoting Dr. Galloway to this effect we have summoned practically the entire anthropological faculty of modern times.³⁰ The universal selfishness of primitive man is the common postulate of all these theories which involve his savagery. We have already stated that these savage animistic beliefs embody only lower elements of the religious consciousness. They are, as a whole, marked by extreme selfishness. The general attitude is, not surrender to a higher power, but the desire to control it. For this reason, among others, we have rejected savage beliefs as an adequate clue to the beliefs of primitive man. As we see it, this view of early man cannot be true. It is easy to say: Man is selfish; but it is also necessary to say, in the interests of truth: But, not always nor altogether selfish; else

²⁹*Op. cit.*, p. 111.

³⁰*Cf.*, *e. g.*, Tiele, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 70.

there could be no explanation of much that is most significant in his history. We must also qualify in speaking of primitive man. Always and altogether selfish primitive man could not have been, else there would have been no progress in religion or society to record.

As a matter of fact, the principle of selfishness, as an explanation of all that has happened, in nature, in political economy, in religion, has been vastly over-worked,²¹ and is in peril of speedy collapse. "Hobbes's unwieldy Leviathan, nauseous with the stench of its selfishness"²² has infected our thinking too long and too deeply. So far as religion is concerned, it may broadly be affirmed, that not one forward step has been taken except under the influence of an essentially altruistic impulse. Religion could never have been established among men nor achieved progress except for men who delighted in God for His own sake. This and this alone is of the genius of religion. From Abraham, who went out not knowing whither he went, and Moses, who esteemed the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt, and Paul, who counted all things but loss for Christ, onward, creative epochs in religion have centered about men who have forgotten self in devotion to God. There is nothing in common, except the fact that both issue from the human constitution, between this temper and the service of the divine in the interests of selfish wants and needs.

This brings us to the fifth and last objection urged by Dr. Galloway against Mr. Lang's theory. An overestimate of primitive man's psychical capacity

²¹See W. L. Walker, *Christian Theism and a Spiritual Monism*, p. 129f.

²²Lowell, *Literary Essays*, IV, p. 36.

would be a serious mistake. We must not forget, however, to distinguish between primitive man's external conditions and his "psychical capacity." This we take to be the fundamental error of much modern anthropology. We find a stone axe-head and straight-way construct a man of stone to fit it. We must remember that civilization and psychical capacity do not always correspond. The "psychical capacity" of David with his sling may be greater than that of Goliath with his sword. To underestimate primitive man's psychical capacity would be as fatal as to overestimate it.

We should urge two considerations before permitting ourselves to infer that the notion of a supreme God is beyond primitive man's capacity. First, that idea has emerged and is held without difficulty among savages as low as it is possible for men to be and still be men, even "for purposes of classification," retaining the capacity to improve even under instruction. Since these savages are scarcely more than potentially human, it is not clear upon what grounds we can consider primitive man anything less in "psychical capacity."

In the second place, we are constrained to quote Dr. Galloway against himself. He says:³³ "This much we may affirm, anything worthy to be called religion could not have emerged among mankind prior to the promotion of some kind of social union, and without a certain development of language." This is all we could possibly ask for as indicating the psychical equipment of primitive man. We are told by the highest authorities that "no word ever came, or can come, into existence spontaneously"; and "that

³³*Op. cit.*, p. 104.

every speech of savage tribes consists, like every other speech, not of so many sounds, but of verbs, nouns, and partitives, that is, with all the distinctively mental elements of true language"; and, that "one might as well trace a navigable river to a bottle of water, as to suppose that the inexhaustible stream of human speech has any other source than the limitless spirit of man."³⁴ The existence of language, even in its simplest and most rudimentary forms, nay, more than that, the power to learn language, implies all the psychical capacity of the "limitless spirit of man."

Moreover, the existence of the simplest form of social union implies not only the creative action of the psychical nature of man, but also the possession of ideas involved in the notion of the Supreme Being, said to be beyond the capacity of primitive man. One of the most convincing evidences to a thoughtful mind that savage communities are degenerate is the fact that their community life in its higher aspects is the outgrowth of nobler ideas than are embodied in prevalent religious practices, while many of the most cherished of the latter are emphatically destructive and anti-social.³⁵

We have treated Dr. Galloway's representations thus at length because he expounds the prevalent view of religious origins with peculiar clearness and persuasiveness, so that the views he represents can lose nothing by being taken in the dress he gives them, and because he brings out, in the series of propositions dealt with above, the vital points at issue. We are constrained to differ and have tried to set

³⁴Thomson, *Brain and Personality*, pp. 81, 84. Cf. on this point Ebrard, *Christian Apologetics*, vol. i, secs. 49, 50, especially remarks on p. 80.

³⁵See Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, p. 38. Cf. also Duke of Argyll, *Unity of Nature*, p. 379f., and Ebrard, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 319.

forth the grounds upon which that difference of opinion rests. The upshot of the whole discussion is to force upon our attention the necessity of studying with greater care religious degeneration in its relationship to the history of religion among men.

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UNDER THE ANTONINES

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It is an odd thing, this passing on of some noted dictum of some author or some authority from generation to generation, as something final and established beyond all cavil and controversy. Such is the oft quoted utterance of Edward Gibbon, that under the Antonines, and preceding his own determination of the initial stage of the Decline and Fall, the ancient world was in a state of comparative felicity.

But slavery, but the draining of the Mediterranean world for one city in Italy, the wretched position of women, the emperor-worship, the official and ever potential hostility of the huge governmental machinery to the only spiritual force extant in that world, the Christians—all these items could be cited as furnishing elements of doubt in questioning the truth of Gibbon's asseveration. If we think soberly and lucidly it is a very shallow statement. After all, religion is the core and the most substantial element in any given civilization—and the passing of pagan religion was the passing of paganism.

It is painful to write what I am now going to write, viz., how slender is the share which the professional classicists hold in such inquiries, and also, how rarely the professional divinity scholar is a thoroughly well read classicist. It is, or was, not so in England. There is, however, just there, in the survey of the contact and conflict of paganism and Christianity, a field in connection with which I would like to repeat an utterance penned by me some nine

years ago, expressing "the earnest hope [as to classicist and clergyman] that the large extent of their common domain may be more clearly seen." And such indeed is the aim and end of the studies which I have been hitherto permitted to present to the readers of *THE BIBLICAL REVIEW*, as well as of the present article. In this one I would like to present such aspects of Hellenic religion as are afforded by Pausanias and Lucian, two contemporaries of the Antonines (Antoninus and Marcus Aurelius), as well as the impotence of the philosophical schools.

I

Why should we bring in Pausanias as a witness? As to the actual religion and worship of the Greeks in the age of Justin, of Polycarp and Blandina, there is in Pausanias a marvelous wealth of data, a setting down of what was actual and concrete and recordable, far beyond any other literary source. Academic pens, ever striving for some novel or more searching or impressive presentation of well worn themes within the time-hallowed precincts of classic erudition, have pleased themselves with "stages" of Greek religion. As a matter of fact, we shall find, for the Antonines, a condition of religion, ceremonial and worship, often not rising much above fetichism, and this, too, in the land of Lycurgus and Solon, Aristides and Epaminondas, Pindar and Aeschylus, Socrates and Plato. And it is an impressive observation to see how utterly untouched and unaffected the dwellers in Greece proper remained by the refinements and moralizing of philosophers of their own speech and kindred. Such a one was Plutarch of Chaeronea, some two generations before Marcus Aurelius and before the

pious traveler Pausanias of Lydia. Plutarch may fairly be set down as a seeker after God; his soul aspires to that immutable and imperishable sovereign which he strove to find in the renewal of Platonism. (Cf. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, III 2. sec. ed., 1881, p. 167, sqq.): "God is that which truly *is*, and therefore the Eternal Being, of whom we cannot predicate anything but that it *is*, the being to which all plurality and compositeness is foreign, the self-sufficient being, raised above every need; the Good, which in generous beneficence bestows itself upon all, whose will and thought arrange everything in the fairest and most wholesome fashion; the Reason whose providential activity extends to all."

But with all these Platonizing sympathies and aspirations, Plutarch, like his spiritual sire, lacked the spiritual energy and courage of conviction to impugn seriously the polytheism and anthropomorphism of inherited Hellenic religion, so called. He vigorously combats fear and superstition as bound up with the popular religion; but he does not turn his back upon the same, he does not deny it. His essay, *De Superstitione* (περὶ δεισιδαιμονίας), is full of suggestive material. A slave cruelly treated may, in human society, demand to be sold to a gentler master, "but the superstitious fear of the gods affords no exchange, nor was it possible to find a god, whom *he* will not fear, who fears the paternal and ancestral gods, who shivers before the saving and gentle powers with trembling and fear, powers from whom we ask wealth, easy circumstances, peace, concord, and the successful issue of the best words and works" (ch. 4). The sage of Chaeronea, for his own person, sought a middle path between slavish fear and utter godlessness (ἀθεότης).

A lofty conception, philosophical interpretation of the popular tradition—but no trace of the radical courage required for denial or rejection. There is an element of loyalty and regard for these gods because they have been transmitted like speech, institutions, life itself, from generation to generation.

The actually pious person in the popular practice Plutarch describes thus, and we will beg the reader to hold this before his mental vision when we shall take up the work of Pausanias: "Then they believe in the craftsmen who emboss metal and in the marble polishers and in the wax moulders, who make the images of the gods anthropomorphous, and such they shape, construct and worship; but philosophers and men of affairs they condemn when they point out the majesty of God [τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ σεμνότητα] coupled with goodness and magnanimity and kindly spirit and concern."

Here is the monotheism of the Neoplatonist, but could it really be grafted upon the Olympian world with its lusts, loves, hates, feuds, and rancor? How was that to be done? Nor did the Stoics dare to remove these names and legends from the Greek world. What they really did do was this: They conserved the Olympic figures of Greek tradition, stripping them of all personality or moral power or intelligence, ascribing to them, or reducing them to, physical, enduring powers and properties, which are a part and parcel of this cosmos of ours; and from Zeno onward they occupied themselves much with this kind of physical exegesis of the Greek bibles, Homer and Hesiod. And there is, consequently, in this sect a pantheism, as I have recently shown,¹ but with this, and in a curious harmony with this, a system of

¹THE BIBLICAL REVIEW, July, 1917.

physical forces and established phenomena, which they clothed with the traditional names of the Olympians. The ether is Zeus which possesses the sovereign position among the elements. "When this ancient opinion had filled Greece, that Uranos was emasculated by his son Kronos, and that Kronos himself was fettered by his son Zeus, a physical theory not lacking in finesse was conveyed under the wicked legends; for they claimed that the celestial most lofty and ethereal nature (that is fiery) which produced all things through itself, was without that part of the body which needed the association of another for the purpose of begetting" (Cicero, *De Deorum Natura* II, 63). Here was the principle of allegory and accommodation, infinitely elastic for the school and sect, and splendidly convenient for safety and practical harmony with popular nomenclature. The myths and legends were not cast forth, as the Christians cast them forth, but adjusted and conserved.

To return briefly to Plutarch: "The legends must be interpreted in a pious and philosophical manner" (ὁσίως καὶ φιλοσόφως) (*De Iside et Osiride*, ch. 11). The noted study on Egyptian religion in fact exhibits the characteristic traits of the sage of Chaeronea, his fondness for connecting myths with philosophy: "For Isis is the female element in nature, and endowed with the faculty of receiving all generative processes [the matrix of new life] in respect of which she has been called nurse and all-receiving by Plato, but myriad-named by the many" (ch. 53). "Whence not without reason they have the legend, that the soul of Osiris is eternal and imperishable but that Typhon oftentimes rends the body and causes it to disappear, and that Isis wandering about seeks it and fits it

together again." And then follows the Platonist's interpretation: "For that which has Being and Intelligence and Goodness is stronger than Destruction and Change" (ch. 54). He is bitterly opposed to the Stoics who map out and dissolve the divinities "into winds and floods and sowing and ploughing and what the soil undergoes, and the change of seasons" (*loc. cit.*, ch. 66), between which conceptions and Spinoza's *Natura Naturans* there seems to be but little difference. He continues very aptly: "These differ not at all from those who rate sails and ropes and anchors as pilot, and woof and yarn as the weaver, and the cup and the potion of milk and honey and barley-water as the physician" (*loc. cit.*).

Plutarch, in fact, claims that there had been a curious deterioration and decadence, viz., whereas the earlier men honored the gods and distinguished them from their gifts in nature, the later men in a crude and foolish manner *identified and confounded the phenomena and aspects of nature with the gods themselves*; indeed, he designates as the prevailing and current and popular conception, that the Greeks call the cult-figures, not representations or images of the gods, but the gods themselves outright, the logical sequence of concrete and visible idols as a system of worship. And this furnishes an admirable point to begin our survey of Pausanias.

The work of Pausanias, the title of which we may render *A Tour of Greece* (Περιήγησις Ἑλλάδος), was written, in the main, during the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Hadrian had powerfully stimulated the interest in the older things—institutions, letters, temples, memorials, art. He had proven himself a generous patron and restorer at many points of

classic Greece. "And all the sanctuaries, which he partly built anew and partly adorned with consecrated gifts and outfittings or gave as gifts to Greek cities, it is all recorded by him in the common sanctuary of the gods," the Pantheon at Athens (I, 5:5). Of his concubine Antinous there was a noted temple at Mantinea; "Antinous also was rated by them to be a god; of those at Mantinea the temple of Antinous is the newest" (VIII, 9:7).

In order to get into *medias res* at once, I will take up one of the most curious and characteristic items. Of all the cult-figures (ἄγαλματα) he appraised most highly the most ancient rather than the masterpieces of Greek art in marble or in bronze; I mean the idols of wood carved and polished, and hence uniformly called ξόανα. Such a one, of Zeus the Counsellor, he notes as found still in the council hall, of the Five Hundred, at Athens,² or the ancient ξόανον of Artemis at Brauron;³ the wooden Hermes in the temple of Athene Polias was even held as a consecrated gift of mythical Kekrops.⁴ A ξόανον of Ariste and Kalliste in the sanctuary of Artemis near the Academy⁵ and the *most sacred* ξόανον of Nemesis at Smyrna have no wings (τὰ ἀγιώτατα ξόανα. I, 33:7); by "most sacred" he means those most resorted to by worshipers, as in our day at Lourdes and Einsiedeln. Of Ajax there is a temple on the island of Salamis, and in it his cult-figure (ἄγαλμα) of ebony.⁶ On the Attic frontier, near Plataea, at Eleutherai, there was a *xoanon* of Dionysos, the wine-god, taken away by the Athenians; the wooden cult-figure now there has been fashioned in imitation of the same.⁷ In the new marble temple of

²i. 5:3.³i. 23:7.⁴i. 27:1.⁵i. 29:2.⁶i. 35:3.⁷i. 38:8.

Apollo at Megara, erected by the Emperor Hadrian in place of the plain ancient one of brick, were three different cult-figures of Apollo; all were *xoana* (i. e., of wood and of hoary antiquity), all of ebony.⁹ In a very ancient temple of Dionysos at Megara Pausanias observed a *xoanon* equally old with the shrine itself. This cult-figure was concealed or covered over, except the face; probably the rest had mouldered away.¹⁰ In a temple at Corinth he saw wooden cult-figures of Dionysos, gilded over except the faces; these were anointed over with some red liquid (symbolism of grapes and wine-lees)—these cult-figures in the living legend were connected with the rending of Pentheus of Thebes. In Argos they even claimed that a wooden cult-figure still extant was put up by mythical Danaos himself, and the traveling student here even suggests that such cult-figures were imported from Egypt, or bore that type. At Pherai in Achaia thirty square stones were worshiped by the natives, each having the name of some god.¹¹ The oldest cult-figure at Thespieae in Boeotia was a white stone.¹² At Orchomenos they still worshiped meteoric stones.¹³

I have cited enough to show the maintenance of a very ancient form of idolatry with but slight modification by advanced art or esthetics, and I smile when I think of the fervid unction of some professional archeologists. Clearly these crude and primitive cult-figures were worshiped far more, even then, than the later and more artistic ones, chiefly because they were the oldest and nearer to the original establishment of the particular cult.

⁹i. 42:5.

¹¹ii. 43:5.

¹⁰vii. 22:4.

¹²ix. 27:1.

¹³ix. 38:1.

In that age, too, many sanctuaries were decaying or actually in ruins or roofless, and we observe that worship was essentially depending on the preservation of the cult-figure or *agalma*. Scores of such cases of dilapidation or complete ruin are recorded by Pausanias, which I have no space here to itemize, as in Sikyon, Nemea, Mycenae, Argos, Hysiae, Tiryns, Hermione, Nauplia, Sellasia, Gythion, and many other places, and many parts of ancient Hellas had become poor and depopulated, mere memories of a greater past. But correspondingly great was the fervor of local pride in pointing out the very spots; *e. g.*, where Artemis first hunted.¹³ Helen's bath,¹⁴ an olive tree twisted by Hercules,¹⁵ the stone at which nine men of Troezen purified Orestes for his mother's murder,¹⁶ the temple of Aphrodite Kataskopia where Phaedra gazed down on the fair Hippolytus,¹⁷ the crevice through which Hercules brought up the hell-hound from the lower world,¹⁸ the spot where Hera fooled by Zeus, near Thebes, gave suck to the infant Hercules.¹⁹

It is by no means all antiquarianism or the living tradition of particular legends connected with each particular cult-figure or shrine. Though for this end Pausanias almost everywhere derived much detailed lore from the particular priests and the local expounders or relators (ἐξηγηταί), who, *e. g.*, explained the particular names and descriptive epithets of local gods and worship. Often the pious traveler is compelled by divergences and conflicts of such traditions to withhold belief, or to assume a critical attitude.²⁰

¹³i. 19:6.

¹⁴ii. 2:3.

¹⁵ii. 28:2.

¹⁶i. 31:4.

¹⁷ii. 32:2.

¹⁸ii. 35:20.

¹⁹i. 25:2.

²⁰ii. 5:2; 23:5.

But more important for our own interest are the items of actual worship and sacrifice. On a certain mountain in Argolis there were altars of Zeus and Hera; here they sacrificed in his day when they needed rain (δεῖσαν ὄμβρου σφίσιν ἐνταῦθα θύουσι).²¹ Near the council-hall of the Five Hundred in Athens there is a rotunda (θόλος) where the Prytanes sacrificed. Such matters were, I need not say, rigidly prescribed in detail by tradition, conformity with which constituted the essence of Greek religiosity or piety. At Athens, *e. g.*, the sacrifice to Zeus Polieus (*i. e.*, the special guardian of the commonwealth) was enacted in the following curious manner. Barley mixed with wheat was placed on the altar; the ox which they kept ready, properly fattened, goes to the altar and begins to eat of the grain on it. The so-called oxslayer (βουφόνος) now approaches, fells the ox with his ax,²² and flees, throwing away the ax; the ax is then formally brought to trial. On the altar of Zeus Hypatos (the Highest) before the Erechtheum, only cakes were the oblation.²³ On Mt. Parnes there is an altar where they sacrifice to Ombrios (the giver of rain-showers).²⁴ Pausanias saw certain cult-figures at Epidaurus, and, he adds: "I sacrificed to them" (ii. 2:4). He believes in the efficacy of these things, for he states: "I have seen human beings already averting hail by sacrifices and incantations" (ii. 34:3). Sometimes altars were constructed from the ashes of the thigh bones.²⁵ The sacrifices are conceived as made, as at Aegae in Achaia, directly "to the cult-figures" (vii. 23:11).

²¹ii. 25:10.²²i. 24:1.²³i. 26:5.²⁴i. 32:2.²⁵v. 13:8.

Ritual and prescription we must content ourself with briefly illustrating. In the temple of Aphrodite at Sikyon the temple keeper must be a woman who no longer must know any man; the priestess who holds the annual post, a virgin. All others must stop at the threshold and perform their invocations from that point.²⁶ In the annual festival to Demeter at Hermione four elderly women perform the killing of a heifer with a sharp scythe, cutting the throat; three other heifers follow, and it is recorded as a wonderful thing, that these three always fall on the same side on which the first fell.²⁷ At Plataea they had a periodical celebration in honor of Hera, a celebration called *Daidala* (the old style cult-figures), because once, near their town, Hera, jealous and suspicious as she always was of the fickle Zeus, saw him conveying a new bride for himself on a wagon, but when she approached and rent the garment of the hated rival and perceived that it was only a wooden cult-figure she was gladly reconciled. This occurrence was the real theme of that periodic festival, the *Daidala*. Such legends were enacted by regular performers in a dramatic or mimetic fashion as recorded in IX, 3:1-9, which description is probably the most detailed of such things in Pausanias.

Our Lydian traveler believed in dreams; the authority of Homer was fairly absolute; Hesiod was rated as one inspired. While many things had passed away, a special providence had held its hand over the Olympian games;²⁸ he is rather fond of the summary and collective terms, ὁ δαίμων (the power above us), τὸ θεῖον (the deity). He has seen the Maeander as

²⁶ii. 10:4.

²⁷ii. 35:7.

²⁸v. 10:1.

well as the Rhine, the Nile, and Tiber, the palms of Palestine no less than the Anio near Rome, everywhere studying the visible elements of religion chiefly. But, with all his personal aspirations and a kind of craving for spiritual rest, he confesses at one point that, after all, Fortune (*Tύχη*) is "the greatest of gods in human affairs and furnishes the largest measure of strength" (v. 30:5). *Isis and Serapis* then were making great strides in old Hellas; fairly, the only new shrines were those erected in their honor. He notes such at Megara, at Kenchreae, at Corinth, as you go up to Acrocorinth,²⁹ at Methana, Hermione, Sparta, Patrai, and elsewhere. The "religion" of the Greeks was local, institutional, earthy, secular, and not merely unspiritual, but in the main antispiritual. But their thinkers or leaders insisted that these divinities were at least concrete and real, "*that they proved themselves*, whereas the Christians maligned these as spooks or demons, while their Founder was not even a spook but in reality a corpse, and were looking for a 'Father' resembling him" (Celsus, ed. Keim, p. 111). On the other hand, Celsus, like Plutarch, asserts that the average person actually prayed to the cult-figures, "as though some one was chattering at the walls of a room" (*loc. cit.*, p. 118), without understanding what is the essence of gods and heroes. A deist can easily compromise with idolatry, for it is, or may be accepted as, a form of "natural religion"; and where revelation is denied in principle all religions are of equal value.

II

Lucian of Samosata, a Syrian by birth, a Greek by culture, a Roman by name and political status, views

²⁹ii. 4:6.

the traditional religion of the Hellenic world as negatively as his contemporary Pausanias did positively and piously. Originally apprenticed to a sculptor, he trained in the usual way to be a rhetor and public lecturer. Some of his published pieces exhibit that professional faculty; they are, however, in our present quest, quite negligible. His tours carried him as far as the Provence. For some time he resided at Athens, and for awhile seems to have devoted himself to philosophy there.

His sure and exquisite sense of literary form made him study the old comedy, and the dialogue of Plato; the satire of Aristophanes, and the dialectic and irony of Socrates found in Lucian a curious palin-genesis. The satire of the Cynic Menippus had for his keen mind a strong affinity both of form and substance. It was the age, too, when the Neo-atticists, often in a very mechanical manner, vied with one another to reproduce the classicism of the past.³⁰ In his day he knew such shining lights of culture as Herodes Atticus and Favorinus.³¹ There is a particular vein in Lucian that reminds one of Thackeray; the plaudits and ambitions and the untold vanities of society, so-called, found in him a satirist whom nothing and no one could deceive, daunt or dazzle.

For the mythological religion of Greece, from Homer and Hesiod downward, he entertains as much respect as a child for a jumping-jack, or as the men who work the strings of a theater of marionettes. "What most makes me choke with anger," says his Prometheus (17), "is that while you blame my creation of man, and particularly of the women [as in

³⁰*Cf. Prometheus*, 6; *Rhetorum Præceptor*, 1.

³¹*Demonax*, 12:24.

Hesiod] you still are enamored of them, and you do not cease descending, sometimes as bulls, again as becoming satyrs and swans, and you deem it proper to make gods out of them." In his Dialogues of the Gods the innocent and beauteous Ganymede appears with the lustful Zeus; Hera as upbraiding the incontinence and the incessant amours of her spouse. "Love," the latter admits (*Dialogi Deorum*, 6:3), "is something forceful and not only rules over men, but over ourselves also sometimes." His amours with Semele, with Alkmene are related by junior fellow Olympians like bits of scandal at court, as of a king's newest mistresses and intrigues. It is all a mass of immoral absurdities.

But there is a serious side to it also; we cite Menippus himself, the *alter ego* of Lucian (*Necyomantia*, 3): "For I, as long as I was a boy, hearing [we would say reading] Homer and Hesiod relating wars and rebellions, not only of half-gods but actually of the gods themselves also, but further also their adulteries and acts of violence and kidnappings and trials in court and expulsions of fathers and espousals with sisters, all these things were fine, and I experienced a very positive prurience in that direction; but when I grew up to manhood, again, in turn, I heard the statutes issuing commands which ran counter to the poets, that one must not commit adultery, nor rebel or kidnap. And I got into a great perplexity, not knowing what to do with myself."

And here may be a suitable point to offer an observation which may clear some obscurities: Why could a Lucian deal so freely and with so unlimited a license and with complete impunity with these things, the stock in trade of the peculiar topical

worship and the "religion" of the Hellenic world? The efforts of loftier minds like Aeschylus or Pindar to elevate, refine, dignify, these traditions had proven utterly futile. As a matter of fact Greek mythology had long become the special preserves of the comic stage, and particularly of a species of spectacle which we may call pantomimic dramatization—as popular and as ubiquitous as films now are.

There were dancers whose fame was as extensive as the empire. Their sphere was a vast one. Such a pantomimic artist, "beginning with Chaos at once and the first creation of the world he must himself know everything up to the times of Cleopatra Queen of Egypt. For by this distance we must limit the erudition of the dancer, and the intermediate items he must particularly know, the castration of Uranos, the origin of Aphrodite, the battle of the Titans, the birth of Zeus, the ruse of Rhea [the substitution of the stone], the fetters of Kronos, the drawing of lots by the three brothers, then, next in order, the rebellion of the Giants, the stealing of the fire, the moulding of men, the punishment of Prometheus, the strength of the Eros, and after this the floating about of Delos, and the birth-pangs of Leto and the slaying of the Python, and the plot of Tityos and the central point of the Earth found by the flights of the eagles, Deucalion on top of this and the great shipwreck of Life in his time, and one ark guarding the remnant of the human race and men made out of stones once more, then the rending of Iacchos and the statagem of Hera and the burning of Semele and both the births of Dionysos and all that deals with Athena and all that deals with Hephaistos and Erichthonios and the feud about Attica and Halirrothion and

the first trial in the Areopagus, and altogether the entire Attic mythology, and particularly the wanderings of Demeter and the finding of her daughter and the hospitality of Keleos and the agriculture of Triptolemos and the viticulture of Ikarios and all about Boreas and all that befell Erigone, and all about Oreithyia and Theseus and Aegeus; and further the reception of Medea and again her flight to Persia, and the daughters of Erechtheus and those of Pandion" (*De Saltatione*, 37-40), and ever so many more, myths of Sparta, of Megara, Minos, Thebes, Corinth, Mycenae and the Pelopidae, Helen, Paris, and Troy; legends of Elis, Arcadia, Aetolia, Thrace and Thessaly. Such a dancer must know his Homer and Hesiod, his tragic writers particularly, etc., etc. In Nero's and Seneca's time there was a pantomimic dancer at Rome, all the rage in that capital, who by himself alone danced the whole story of the adulterous amours of Ares and Aphrodite (Odyssey), and did it all so marvelously that even the noted Cynic philosopher Demetrius, the friend of Seneca, cried out: "I hear what you are doing, I do not merely see it, but you seem to me to be talking with your hands" (Lucian, *loc. cit.*, 63).

With no less sweeping condemnation does the satirist of Samosata deal with the current sacrifices, the utter folly of the so-called piety bound up therewith, and the futility of the underlying conceptions. "One may buy from them sound health, may be, for some little heifer, to be rich for four oxen, to be king for a hecatomb, to return safe and sound from Troy to Pylos for nine oxen" (*De Sacrificiis*, 2). "And when one sacrifices, all [the gods] have a good time, opening their mouths wide for the smoke, and drink-

ing the blood which flows around the altars just as the flies do, but if they dine at home, nectar and ambrosia is their fare" (*loc. cit.*, 9). Of the Olympian Zeus: "Those who come forward into the temple neither believe to see the ivory from India any more, nor the gold mined in Thrace, but the son of Kronos and Rhea himself transferred to earth by Pheidias and bidden to gaze on the solitude of the people of Pisa, and well satisfied if once in four years some one will sacrifice to him a side bounty of the Olympians" (*ibid.*, 11). Zeus himself, in Homer, is much weaker than Fate (*Εἰμαρμένη*) and in a state of pitiful, even if immortal, dependency (*Jupiter Confutatus*), and his "providence" is but a precarious thing. In the Olympian Council Hermes is directed by Zeus to seat the gods so as to give them their rank according to the material of the cult-figures, "in the front seats those of gold, then after these, those of silver, then next whatever are of ivory, then those of bronze or marble, and among these very ones those of Pheidias or Alkamenes or Myron or Euphranor or similar craftsmen shall be given a preference of honor, but the rag-tag and bob-tail and inartistic ones packed together somewhere in the distance shall hold their tongues and merely give full measure to the assembly" (*Jupiter Tragoedus*, 7). This standard placed Anubis, Attis or Mithras over the Olympians.

The vast variety of ethnic worship Lucian truly conceived as an element of reflection which would lead a sober observer to general rejection; one may see here the growing necessity of those who clung to paganism to resort to syncretism, and we shall see that they did so resort, in the last stage, Neoplatonism.³²

³²*Loc. cit.*, 42.

But we must turn now to a concrete case of a cult actually established in Lucian's day, whereby we may observe the paganism under the Antonines not only *in posse*, but also *in esse*, and in characteristic operation. Lucian describes with much detail and with passionate reprobation the specific cult set up by a certain Alexander of Abonoteichos in Pontus.³³ Hope and Fear, he shows,³⁴ were the powers that drove men into sanctuaries, and that, of old, enriched Delphi and the other oracles. The hierophant of this described cult and oracle³⁵ buried, in the temple of Apollo at Chalcedon, the oldest shrine there, bronze tablets (we think of our own Mormon tables) which stated that presently Aesculapius with his father Apollo was to migrate to Abonoteichos. The tablets were duly discovered, and the fame duly spread through Pontus and Bithynia. Oracular hexameters were duly provided, extolling the new prophet, hexameters mysterious and lofty in tone. Now serpents (as at Epidaurus) were the ancillary animal of the god of healing. Among the foundations of the new temple Alexander buried a hollow goose-egg, in which he had placed a tiny snake, which amid the awe and admiration of the community was duly discovered. As the tiny reptile wound around the fingers of the priest, the crowd welcomed Aesculapius and felicitated their own town for this blessed epiphany of the god. Soon vast numbers of Paphlagonians gathered—sheep Lucian dubs them.³⁶ Meanwhile he had gotten ready a head of a serpent, a head of goodly size, made of linen, which Alexander with manual dexterity dis-

³³*Alexander seu Pseudomantis.*

³⁴*Ibid.*, 8.

³⁵*Loc. cit.*, 10.

³⁶*Loc. cit.*, 15.

played on either side of his beard. The light in his house was maintained somber and subdued. Everyone told how in so short time the god had grown so wonderfully. He was called "Glykon." "Glykon I am, third scion from Zeus, a light for all mankind."

Soon the oracle was in full blast. Clients entered the newly completed temple; they brought little scrolls sewed up and sealed. In these their inquiries were written. I refrain from alluding to modern parallels. The hierophant retired with the scrolls to the holiest (*ἁγιστον*); here he received the answers from Aesculapius, who furnished the same in hexameter, written under the questions. Alexander had clever devices for unsealing and resealing. The populace meanwhile reasoned that only a god could ascertain the contents of the sealed scrolls and append the replies. One of Alexander's mechanisms was a heated needle. Then he had a kind of paste or wax to copy the seals. For making the impression he used a kind of plaster of Paris. Some answers were involved and ambiguous, others positively obscure. He was clever in sizing up the characters of his questioners and prescribing for them. Others sought light as to expectations, profits, wills. A drachma and two obols was the ordinary fee (about 20 cents). Alexander made about 70,000 to 80,000 drachmas a year (about \$12,600 to \$14,600). Many individuals consulted Aesculapius ten or fifteen times.

Alexander supported a large staff. Also he sent agents or solicitors abroad to work up business. The followers of the school of Epicurus strove to encompass his discomfiture. He in turn gave out that Pontus was full of *atheists and Christians*, whom the populace should stone if they desired to have the god

be gracious to them. As to Epicurus, one of his oracles said that he was seated in mud, below, with leaden shackles on.²⁷ So the Christians, in the pagan mind, were in curious company. For the Platonists and Stoics and Neopythagoreans²⁸ were on good terms with Alexander and his following.

His fame meanwhile spread even to Rome. A man of high rank there, Rutilianus, earnestly took up the cult, and sought direct reports through envoys. He even proclaimed Alexander's fame at court, and became himself a client of that interpreter of the god, asking, *e. g.*, what instructor to place in charge of his son's studies. Alexander gave him Pythagoras and Homer; and, when the youth soon died, the hierophant explained that now he had the company of these eminent men in the lower world. Alexander operated himself with the metempsychosis of the Pythagorean system;²⁹ Rutilianus was a follower of the same. He married Alexander's daughter, born to the beauteous new Endymion by Selene herself. Rutilianus sacrificed entire hecatombs to his celestial mother-in-law.

The height of Alexander's fame fell in with the great plague, in the reign of Marcus Aurelius, 167-168 A.D. His agents in Rome informed him in advance of the questions that were coming from that quarter, so that he was fairly prepared. He also devised special initiatory rites and forms somewhat like those of Eleusis. There was a prefatory announcement running thus: "If any *Atheist or Christian or Epicurean* has come as a spy of the rites, let him flee, but those believing in the god shall be initiated with good fortune." Then at once, at the beginning, the expul-

²⁷*Loc. cit.*, 25.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Loc. cit.*, 34.

sion would take place, and he would lead off by saying: "*Out with the Christians!*" and the whole mass of worshipers would respond with the acclamation: "*Out with the Epicureans!*"

We will leave the hierophant of Aesculapius here, and briefly turn to the famous passage in the life of Peregrinus Proteus the Cynic, who in 166 or 168 A.D., at Olympia, voluntarily immolated himself, like Empedocles. Surveying his career, Lucian relates that at one time he was a Christian, at least, "he thoroughly learned [ἐξέμαθες] the marvelous wisdom of the Christians, and in a short time attained a very conspicuous position among them, even expounding some of their books" (*De Morte Peregrini*, 11). He goes on to say: "*They still revere [σέβουσι] that great one, the man who was crucified in Palestine because he introduced this new esoteric religion [τελετήν] into life.*" He was imprisoned for a while as a Christian, when they exerted themselves to the uttermost for his preservation and comfort, old women, widows (deaconesses), and orphan children. Funds were placed at his disposal in the most generous manner. "*For the wretched beings have persuaded themselves that they will be altogether immortal and will live forever, wherefore also they despise death and as a rule [οἱ πολλοί] they voluntarily surrender themselves. And then also their first law-giver persuaded them that they were all brothers to one another; after once having gone over [παρὰβάντες] they had denied the Greek gods and worshiped that crucified sage of theirs and lived in accordance with his laws*" (*loc. cit.*). The Christians as a whole impressed Lucian as ἰδιῶται, i. e., "common folk," uncultured. The dialogue *Philopatris* is clearly not by Lucian, but a later forgery. Gesner

suggested Julian's time, Niebuhr even that of the age of the Byzantine Emperor, Nicephorus Phocas, 968 A.D.

Almost more trenchant and uncompromising than his rejection of the Olympians and their current cult was Lucian's condemnation of the Greek philosophers of his time and their schools. At a certain point in his career, when he was still in the profession of a traveling lecturer, he looked forward himself to such a life with anticipations of spiritual benefit and intellectual advancement as well,⁴⁰ when he planned for himself a long residence at Athens itself, the far-famed center of such pursuits. Whereas Rome was full of noise, of sycophants, of flatterers, and crude worldliness, a curious training ground indeed for those who wished to see how strong was their moral fiber in withstanding these currents of evil and the shows and crude pleasures that fairly engulfed the sojourner there.⁴¹ But his subsequent residence at Athens destroyed, for him, all such illusions.

For the sincere Cynics, with their contempt of all shams, Lucian felt a certain affinity, as was obvious, and especially for Menippus of Gadara, who served his critical purpose almost as much as did the figure of Socrates in the dialogues of Plato. What impressed him most was the striking inconsistency between their lectures, their tenets, their professions, on the one hand, and their life and conduct on the other, as one Thrasykles (a fictitious name), with his noble beard and eyebrows so serious and awe-inspiring, and so decorous in appearance and so unctuous in his discourses on virtue and in his contempt for the votaries

⁴⁰*Nigrinus*.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 19.

of pleasure (the Epicureans) and in his eulogy of a minimum of material wants, clearly a Stoic lecturer. But what a contrast in the evening when he dines! A glutton from every point of view, and feeding with unseemly voracity, licking the very dishes when he had emptied them of their contents, and in his cups so immoderate that often he had to be carried away; in his sober hours a flatterer and hot after money, and a perjurer.⁴² In the *Dialogi Mortuorum*, 10:8, a philosopher enters the lower world; Hermes removes the garment from the newcomer's real being. "How great folly and contention and empty-opinion and bootless questionings and prickly statements and complicated notions and much vain labor forsooth and not a little empty babbling and nonsense and petty theorizing, and by Zeus also this gold here and luxury and shamelessness and wrathfulness and display and softness; these have not escaped my notice," says Hermes, the escort of souls, "although they are concealing them very hard. And put away lying and conceit and the belief that you are better than the others; for if you embark [on Charon's skiff] having all these, what fifty-oared vessels could hold you?"

Lucian charges Aristotle with gross flattery toward Alexander and as being insatiable in getting appropriations out of him.⁴³ Vanity drove Empedocles to leap into the crater of Aetna.⁴⁴ Plato flattered the autocrats in Sicily.⁴⁵ As to the antinomies of the schools and sects, one commends pleasure as the *summum bonum*;⁴⁶ another, toil and severe exertion; another despises money and rates it as an *adiaphoron*; another commends it as a boon; as to the universe

⁴²*Timon*, 54-55.

⁴³*Dialogi Mortuorum*, 13:5.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 20:4.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 20:5.

⁴⁶*Menippus*, 4.

what shall one say? So, too, in the various theses of the sects as to the cosmic problems, with all the contrasts between the materialists and the idealists. As to money, pleasure, glory, they despise them in their lectures, but pursue them avidly in their life and conduct. In his auction of lives (*Vitarum Auctio*) Zeus is the master and Hermes the factotum of the business, and does the crying. The schools appear in turn in their founders, offering the best life, each of them, the greatest measure of happiness to the purchaser. So Pythagoras comes forward, whose doctrine is briefly, one must fairly say, oddly presented; then Diogenes the Cynic, cosmopolitan, representative of freedom and fewest and simplest wants, who teaches endurance and emancipates the soul from all fear of caste and social pretense. Next follow the hedonism of the Cyrenaic School, Democritus the laughing, and Heraclitus the gloomy philosopher, Socrates, who is somewhat confounded with Platonism." Chrysippus follows, the chief expounder of the Stoa; evidently our satirist keenly dislikes the micrology of Stoic logic, and the caricature is plainly a part of Lucian's design. The Aristotelians and the Skeptics are somewhat briefly dispatched.

One might be inclined to take it all as mere jingle, not seriously meant. But the most important as well as the most elaborate of these anti-philosophical dialogues, the *Hermotimus*, must be taken seriously. Hermotimus has spent twenty years⁴⁸ to master completely and soundly all the tenets of a single sect, doing nothing but attending the lectures, for the path to excellence is long and rough and steep; the higher

⁴⁷*Vitarum Auctio*, 18.

⁴⁸*Hermotimus*, 2.

happiness is the prize and goal, when the adept⁴⁹ expects to look down on the rest of mankind as upon mere ants and rubbish, utterly emancipated, too, from the sway of ambition, wealth, and pleasure, freed from all emotion and passions. Clearly Hermotimus is a disciple of the Stoa. But we learn that his professor drags his pupils to court if they are behindhand with their fees; many, too, have given their notes and pay interest. He has had a sharp *rencontre* with the Aristotelian professor at a birthday dinner, and drank heavily, too, so that he was unable to lecture the next day.

But who will prove what is the best philosophy? Shall numbers determine that, or reputation, or outward appearance? How is it to be determined? By whom? For the sectaries all abuse and depreciate one the other's philosophy. Supposing Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, appeared once more, what could a Stoic say to overthrow or disprove them? To judge of their philosophies fairly, should not Hermotimus be willing to spend as much time and labor on the study of each of these great schools as he has bestowed on the Stoa, to wit, twenty years? The only proper judge, then, is he who knows the wisdom of all the schools equally well.⁵⁰ And the prime qualification of this expert must be, to be critical and cautious and to withhold assent. Life is hardly long enough for this end. And then, too, the reading of all the books written by them on every topic—a formidable task! Or how could the taste of the first morsel be a reliable guide for the appropriation of the whole?

Clearly Lucian is a kind of agnostic as over against the professional philosophers. We must not

⁴⁹*Hermotimus*, 5.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 45.

forget the fact that for some four hundred years, more or less, these schools had been going on, and in the main in a rigid and scholastic way of dogmatic and didactic iteration and repetition; *and the idolatry and crude superstition of the many had been neither lessened nor refined by the sects at all.* Antoninus, and still more the imperial Stoic, Marcus Aurelius, had made philosophy fashionable. At Rome many of the rich established Greek philosophers in their households, but the life of such was humiliating, glittering misery, set in a substance of crude luxury and superficial pretense, rated a little lower than cooks and lap-dogs, where concubines and dancing masters have the first consideration.⁵¹ All indeed is vanity—this sad and weary tone echoes and re-echoes from all of Lucian's writings. Futile is athleticism;⁵² futile is military renown; fanciful and vain is apotheosis, when skulls of kings or beggars lie in democratic juxtaposition; pompous the pretense of great tombs, or costly ones; vain the accumulation of wealth; and there is no immortality of the soul.

It is all a sad author, this Lucian, no less sad than his imperial contemporary, Marcus Aurelius himself, of whose night-thoughts we recently presented some survey.⁵³ Greek culture had run its course, but it had no transcendental end or perspective, limited as it was by this little earth and our common mortality; none of their culture-leaders could furnish what he had not gained himself, nor knew where to gain, a universal truth and the central element of it, God, He, of whom St. Paul wrote—in a hopeless and weary world: "According to the working of his mighty

⁵¹*De Mercede Conductis.*

⁵²*Dialogi Mortuorum*, 10:5.

⁵³THE BIBLICAL REVIEW, July, 1917.

power, which he had wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality and power and might, and domain, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come" (Eph. 1:19-21).

As Polycarp died for that Name under Marcus Aurelius, so Paul of Tarsus, under Nero, laid his head on the block, probably not far from the Ostian Road. Under Vespasian the elder Pliny wrote his cyclopedic work, the *Naturalis Historia*, dedicated to Titus who destroyed Jerusalem. In the introduction there is a declaration which, while it antedates the Antonines by three-quarters of a century, still should not be left unrecorded in these pencilings, for Pliny was perhaps the most widely read of all the Romans, and his mental eye swept over the entire domain of ancient culture, science, invention, and attainment in the widest periphery of human aspiration and endeavor. As a *testimonium animae* it is, then, here recorded. And it also exhibits, I think, the close proximity with pantheism in which a kind of agnosticism is apt to be found. After having extolled the sun and having almost deified it, he proceeds thus (*Naturalis Historia*, II, 14ff.):

"Therefore I deem it a peculiarity of human weakness to inquire into the shape and form of god. Whatever god is, if only he is another [*scil.* than the universe] and in whatever part, he is wholly of perception, wholly of sight, wholly of hearing, wholly of vitality, wholly of mentality, wholly of himself. To

believe in innumerable ones indeed [as Romans did] and even some derived from the moral failings of men [by contrast], like Chastity, Concord, Thought, Hope, Honor, Clemency, Fidelity, or [as Democritus held] two altogether, Punishment and Benefaction—this means an augmentation of folly. Frail and toilsome mortality has subdivided these things into separate elements, mindful of its own weakness, in order that each one might by way of portions worship that of which he stood most in need. Consequently we find some names in some nations and others in others, and innumerable divinities in the same, those of the lower world also being mapped out in classes, diseases and many plagues also, while with fearful mind we crave to have them appeased. Therefore also by act of Government a shrine of *Fever* had been dedicated on the Palatine; an altar of *Orbona* [Bereavement] near the temple of the Lares, and of Evil Fortune on the Esquiline. Wherefore the people of the celestials may be conceived as more extensive than that of human beings, since individuals also out of themselves make as many divine Junos and Geniuses by choosing them for themselves, and nations indeed hold certain animals and even obscene things as gods, and many things more shameful to utter, swearing by stinking onions and such like things.”

He then sums up his estimate of the Olympian mythology in the following words:

“To believe in matrimonial unions indeed among gods, and that in so long an age no one is born of them, and that some are always aged and gray, others young men and boys, of swarthy complexion, wearing wings, lame, sprung from eggs [Helena], living and dying on alternate days [Castor and

Pollux], is a matter of almost childish craziness. But on top of impudence it is that adulterous relations between them should be invented, and by and by feuds and hatred, and that there should be divinities of thefts and crimes. A god is it, for one mortal to help another, and this is the road to eternal glory; it is by this that the great men of Rome passed, it is by this now that, with the step of gods, strides with his sons the greatest ruler of all time, Vespasian Augustus, devoted as he is to the service of the weary world."

It is not only the worldly wise courtier who speaks here, but we see clearly, how, in Roman paganism, the Olympians being pretty well used up, not much remained but *emperor-cult*; it was indeed an obvious development. Pliny continues:

"This is the most ancient custom of rendering thanks to those who deserve well, that they enroll such men among divinities. * * * Who in the interpretation must not confess that it is absurd [*inridendum*, absurd to believe] that that highest being, whatever it is, cares for human affairs? Or must we not believe, that it [the supreme being] is stained by so gloomy and manifold service? * * * Others on the Capitol deceive and swear falsely by the Jupiter who propels lightning. * * * Still mortal men * * * find an intermediate divinity, that there might not be even any obvious conjecture about what god is, for in all the world, in all places, and at all hours, by the utterances of all, *Fortune* alone is invoked and named [we observed the same note in Pausanias], alone is accused, alone made the defendant, alone is thought about, alone is praised, alone subjected to criticism. And when she is wor-

shipped with abusive words, slippery of movement, but esteemed by most people even blind, roving, inconstant, unreliable, changeful, and a patroness of those who are unworthy. She alone has charged to her all outgo and all income, and in all the book-keeping of mankind she alone determines both pages of the ledger, and to such a degree are we in the power of a controlling lottery, that the lottery itself takes the place of god, by which [lottery] god is proven indefinite."

THE PROPHETIC NOTE IN THE MINISTRY OF JESUS

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WHAT is meant by the prophetic note? Not prediction, though most of the prophets of Jehovah foretold future events, or at least described the future progress of the Kingdom of God. By the prophetic note we mean the ethical energy and moral courage displayed by the prophets of Jehovah in denouncing sin and sinners.

While the true prophet was sometimes permitted to sing of peace and prosperity, and to announce comfort to Jehovah's people, the prevailing note in Old Testament prophecy is the courageous denunciation of sin in Israel, accompanied by warnings and promises. Thus Micah contrasts his own ministry with that of the false prophets who proclaimed peace: "But as for me, I am full of power by the Spirit of Jehovah, and of judgment, and of might, to declare unto Jacob his transgression, and to Israel his sin" (Mic. 3:8).

Jeremiah also taught that the chief business of the true prophet was to warn men of the evils that were coming upon them on account of sin. When the false prophet Hananiah predicted that within two years the captive Jews should return from Babylon, Jeremiah could not withhold his hearty "Amen"; but he also promptly expressed his conviction that Hananiah's pleasing message was not inspired by Jehovah. Addressing Hananiah in the

presence of all the people, he says: "The prophets that have been before me and before thee of old prophesied against many countries, and against great kingdoms, of war, and of evil, and of pestilence. The prophet that prophesieth of peace, when the word of the prophet shall come to pass, then shall the prophet be known, that Jehovah hath truly sent him" (Jer. 28:8, 9). Shortly afterward Jeremiah predicted that Hananiah should die within the year, because he had spoken lies in the name of Jehovah. A few weeks later the false prophet passed away.

Perhaps no better description of the true prophet could be found than that given in Jeremiah 23:29: "Is not my word like fire? saith Jehovah; and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces?" Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, and all the other prophets smote sin with sledge-hammer blows. No true prophet ever compromises with people as to their sins.

John the Baptist, who came in the spirit and power of Elijah, shows that the prophetic note, which was characteristic of his own preaching, would be strong in the Messiah's ministry; for His "fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly cleanse his threshing-floor; and he will gather his wheat into the garner, but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire."

We are not surprised to learn that Jesus commenced His public ministry by proclaiming, as John had done before Him: "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe in the gospel" (Mark 1:15). Repentance is the keynote in all prophetic preaching. The careless reader might overlook the fact that our Lord was constantly seeking to win His hearers to repentance.

Many of His most beautiful parables, notably that of the Prodigal Son, were an appeal to men to repent and confess their sins. He did not hesitate to say to all classes, the respectable as well as the outcasts: "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish" (Luke 13:1-5). Jesus was the greatest of the prophets.

I. JESUS PERFORMED THE DEEDS OF A PROPHET

John describes vividly the conduct of Jesus at the first Passover after the beginning of His public ministry (John 2:13-17). When Jesus saw that the temple of God had been converted into a house of merchandise, He was indignant, and resolved to drive out the traders and the cattle. To this end He first platted a whip. It was a good whip, adequate to the task of driving out of the temple the oxen and sheep and those who owned them. Jesus was very much in earnest; with eyes aflame with righteous indignation, He cracked His whip over the backs of the oxen and the sheep, overthrew the tables of the money-changers and spilled their coins on the floor, and ordered the owners of doves to take them away. There was something in His bearing that made men quail and withdraw rapidly from His presence. Even the money-changers probably hastened out of the temple, without waiting to gather up the coins which had been spilled in every direction. The sharp crack of the whip kept oxen and sheep moving, until the temple area had been completely cleared. Zeal for God's house was fairly devouring the prophet from Nazareth. He might have been Elijah denouncing Ahab in Naboth's vineyard, or Amos thundering against the house of Jeroboam at Bethel.

Three years later, according to the Synoptic Gospels, Jesus once more cleansed the temple (Matt. 21:12, 13; Mark 11:15-18; Luke 19:45-48). He knew well enough that interference with the revenues of the priests would bring on the collision that would end in His own death; but His hour had come, and He was ready. There was some satisfaction in chasing the cowards from their stalls and tables in the temple precincts. The three evangelists agree in stating that He cast out the traders. If in the first cleansing, as described by John, He used the whip on oxen and sheep, now He drives out men, whether with push of hand or merely with command and flashing eye, we are not told. That there was again physical violence on the part of our Lord is made clear by the statement that He upset the tables of the money-changers and the stalls of those who sold doves. Mark adds that He would not suffer any man to carry a vessel through the temple.

Jesus was thoroughly indignant that His Father's house should be converted into a den of robbers. High prices ruled in the temple sales. No doubt those who bought their sacrificial animals in the temple would receive special consideration from the priests who profited by the trade. As Jesus stood in the midst of the cleansed temple with the light of battle in His eye, the common people beheld in Him at least a great prophet, if not perchance the Messiah Himself, and they hung upon Him listening.

II. THE PROPHETIC NOTE IS STRONG IN THE PREACHING OF JESUS

If our Lord sometimes behaved like a prophet, even using physical violence to cleanse the temple of God,

He frequently spoke with the moral energy of the ancient prophets of Jehovah. The masses of the people almost all thought of Him as a prophet. When He asked His disciples: "Who do men say that I am?" they replied: "Some say John the Baptist; some, Elijah; and others, Jeremiah, or one of the prophets" (Matt. 16:14). It should not escape attention that Jesus was oftenest taken for John the Baptist, or his Old Testament prototype, Elijah. Nothing soft or effeminate here, but a virile manhood and a fearless grappling with the forces of evil. If we needed evidence of the manliness of Christ, the popular verdict of His contemporaries would settle the question. Even Jeremiah, to whom some compared Him, was always denouncing sin and proclaiming the fate of the incorrigible. He was no soft and weak character, but one who sometimes called down frightful vengeance on his foes (Jer. 11:20; 12:3).

The multitude were unanimous in identifying Jesus with some great prophet. The moral energy which throbbed in all His preaching and teaching so impressed them that they could compare Him with none but a great and fearless prophet. Has not this sense of the moral imperative in our Lord's ministry faded from much of our modern preaching? Do we not omit from our presentation of the Gospel many of His characteristic messages because of our softness and moral flabbiness? A sermon on hell, as Jesus pictured it, might cost many a pastor the loss of his pulpit; and a discourse on hypocrisy as set forth in the twenty-third chapter of Matthew would probably be called a foolish tirade by persons who have not been accustomed to the voice of a prophet.

1. Faithful warning is one of the marks of a prophetic ministry.

Jehovah's message to Ezekiel well expresses the function of the true prophet in the Kingdom of God: "Son of man, I have made thee a watchman unto the house of Israel: therefore hear the word at my mouth, and give them warning from me" (Ezek. 3:17).

Throughout our Lord's public ministry the note of warning is frequently heard. No one ever reminded men more frequently of the danger of dropping into hell, and no one among all the Biblical writers has pictured more vividly its horrors. Hear Him in the Sermon on the Mount: "And if thy right eye is causing thee to stumble, pluck it out and cast it from thee; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members perish, and not thy whole body be cast into hell" (Matt. 5:29, 30). He also says that "the sons of the kingdom will be cast into the outer darkness. There will be the weeping and the gnashing of teeth" (Matt. 8:12). In the harvest at the end of the age the angels will gather those who do iniquity, "and shall cast them into the furnace of fire; there shall be the weeping and the gnashing of teeth" (Matt. 13:40-42). In Mark 9:43-48 the evangelist reports one of our Lord's most striking and terrific warnings. He there speaks of hell as the place "where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." He warns men to fear the mighty God, who can not only kill but also has authority to cast into hell (Luke 12:4, 5). Luke also reports our Lord as describing the disappointment of many who hope for admission, but are thrust away (13:23-30).

In the last great apocalyptic discourse, delivered by Jesus on the Mount of Olives during the closing

week of His ministry, warning is the keynote (Matt. 24, 25). He tells of the evil servant who gets drunk and beats his fellow servants, and how his lord will come unexpectedly and cut him asunder and put him among the hypocrites in hell (Matt. 24:48-51). The wicked and slothful servant, who insults his lord, is cast into the outer darkness of hell (Matt. 25:30). In describing the final judgment Jesus closes with words of mingled warning and promise: "And these shall go away into eternal punishment: but the righteous into eternal life" (Matt. 25:46).

Never did there live a prophet more faithful and insistent in warning men of the terrible consequences of sin. If Billy Sunday is wrong in preaching hell his critics must at any rate admit that he is imitating the greatest of the prophets, the Saviour of the world. Soft-mouthed, chicken-hearted pulpiteers, who are too polite to refer to hell in their so-called sermons, may well consider the responsibility of the man who stands as a prophetic watchman (Ezek. 3:16-21). Because Paul imitated Jesus in warning men of the frightful consequences of sin, he could affirm confidently: "I am clean from the blood of all; for I shrank not from announcing to you the whole counsel of God" (Acts 20:26, 27).

2. Pungent preaching is another mark of the true prophet's ministry.

The spokesman for Jehovah seeks to touch the conscience. As a faithful surgeon, he probes deep into the wound. His purpose is not to please, but to cure. For good examples of pungent preaching on the part of Old Testament prophets, turn to Amos 4:1-3; Hosea 4:1-19; Isaiah 1:2-31; 5:1-30; Micah 3:1-12.

The most pungent and biting of all the prophetic discourses can be paralleled in the teaching of our Lord. In Matthew 12:30-45 Jesus speaks plainly and sharply to the men who were accusing Him of being in league with Satan. He even allows Himself to shout aloud: "Brood of vipers! How can ye, being evil, speak good things?" Are we to suppose that Jesus spoke these stinging words in mellifluous, flute-like tones? Did He not the rather thunder them in the ears of the hypocrites who were already plotting to kill Him? No wonder that the people who heard Him speak in this fashion were reminded of John the Baptist (Matt. 3:7).

In Mark 7:1-23 two pungent discourses are briefly reproduced: First, a sharp arraignment of the Pharisees for setting aside the word of God by their teaching as to Corban; second, a very plain talk about the things that defile a man. The prophetic note is also heard in the conversations recorded in Luke 12:41-59. Jesus even addresses His hearers as "hypocrites."

But while the Synoptic writers agree in portraying Jesus as a pungent, fearless preacher, it is to John, the beloved disciple, that we owe the account of the sharpest debates between our Lord and His enemies. After the healing of the lame man at the pool of Bethesda, Jesus, in defending Himself from the charge of breaking the Sabbath, said to the Jews: "Glory from men I do not receive. But I know you, that ye have not the love of God in yourselves" (John 5:41, 42). He also speaks sharply to the fanatical multitude in the synagogue in Capernaum, after the feeding of the five thousand: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Ye seek me, not because ye saw

signs, but because ye ate of the loaves, and were satisfied" (6:26).

Perhaps the bitterest controversy in all our Lord's ministry is recorded in the eighth chapter of John. Read especially verses 31-59. In the climax of His arraignment of the Pharisees for refusing to accept Him as the Son of God, our Lord exclaims: "If God were your father, ye would love me: for from God I came forth, and have come; for neither have I come of myself, but he sent me. Why do ye not understand my speech? Because ye cannot hear my word. Ye are of your father the devil, and the desires of your father ye wish to do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and stands not in the truth, because truth is not in him. When he speaks the lie, he speaks of his own: because he is a liar, and the father of it" (John 8:42-44). Not even Elijah ever spoke such stinging words as these.

3. Blistering denunciation of incorrigible sinners is another element in the prophetic ministry.

One of the marks of the Messianic age, as described by Isaiah, is that men get called by the right name: "The fool shall no more be called noble, nor the churl said to be bountiful" (Isa. 32:5). Amos calls the luxurious, sinful women of Israel "cows of Bashan"; and Isaiah addresses the rulers of Judah as "judges of Sodom," and the masses as "people of Gomorrah." Ezekiel describes Samaria and Jerusalem as two vile harlots.

The most severe and galling denunciations of the Old Testament prophets can be paralleled in the preaching and table talk of our Lord. Passing by without comment the sharp arraignment of the cities

in which most of His mighty works were done (Matt. 11:20-24), let us turn to Luke 11:37-52.

All the world has come to recognize Jesus as a perfect gentleman. Observe, then, that He did not hesitate to denounce the sins of the Pharisees, while a guest at breakfast with one of them. Instead of seizing the occasion to denounce the worldliness and unbelief of the Sadducees, which would have pleased His host, He boldly attacked the characteristic sins of the persons who were reclining at table with Him. He denounced the Pharisees for rapacity, pride, and hypocrisy, calling them fools, and likening them to hidden graves. When called to account by a lawyer for having insulted his companions at table, Jesus did not apologize, but pronounced woes upon the lawyers for putting upon others burdens that they themselves would not even touch with one of their fingers, and for hiding the key of knowledge so that no one could enter.

Observe that there is no hint of humor in our Lord's denunciations. Sam Jones could call saloon-keepers all sorts of hard names without causing a riot, because he first put his audience in a good humor by many bright sallies of wit and an occasional humorous anecdote. Like Sam Jones, Billy Sunday uses a good deal of slang to make his message more palatable. But Jesus sometimes applied the lash without word or look to coax the victims to submit.

The most blistering denunciation in all literature is recorded in the twenty-third chapter of Matthew. Not a hint of a rainbow to add a touch of beauty to the storm of wrath! Jesus knew the men whom He was denouncing. He had given them every inducement to repent and enter the Kingdom of Heaven;

but they had rejected His appeals with scorn. Now He pronounces their doom. He calls them blind guides, fools, and hypocrites. In the climax of His arraignment He exclaims: "Serpents! Brood of vipers! How shall you escape the judgment of hell?"

Is the Jesus who warned men of hell and denounced hypocrites the Christ of history? Could it be possible that the evangelists were mistaken in ascribing to Jesus the pungent sermons and ringing denunciations that meet us so often in the Gospel story? Not all the acids of the most thoroughgoing criticism can eat away the warnings and denunciations of the Teacher who reminded men continually of John the Baptist and Elijah. He who taught men the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of men did not hesitate to expose hypocrites and warn of an endless hell. If we are ever to recover from the sentimental mush and moral flabbiness characteristic of large sections of modern Christendom, it will be necessary to recover the Christ with the whip in His hand and the thunderbolt of moral indignation falling from His lips.

No one can exaggerate the goodness of God, save when he robs God of His justice and might, and paints Him as a benevolent but weak grandfather. No one can exaggerate the grace and compassion of the Christ, save when he robs Him of His hatred of hypocrisy and oppression. Jesus was the manliest man of history. Pride, oppression, and hypocrisy stirred His soul to the keenest moral indignation. Patient with the weak and erring, and ever ready to forgive a repentant soul, He will yet overthrow the forces of evil in the universe of God. He will one day sit as Judge of all men. To the righteous, who

have imitated the Christ in His unselfish service of the needy, He will say in that great day: "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." But to the wicked He will say: "Depart from me, ye cursed, into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels." From the wrath of the Lamb the wicked will summon mountains and hills to fall upon them, and hide them from the face of Him that sitteth upon the throne.

Wherever the Christ of the Gospels is preached in all the fulness of His multiform activities, the blessing of God rests upon the message. If the effeminate Christ of the painters could only be displaced by the manly Christ of the Gospels, red-blooded men could more easily be persuaded to rally to His banner. If this article should chance to fall into the hands of some young minister who has been fooled into trying to preach a soft, goody-goody Gospel, let him break away from the devil's leading-strings, and go at once to the four Gospels for a fresh inductive study of the character and teaching of the Prophet from Nazareth.

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EXEGETICAL OUTLINES

'EMUNAH IN HABAKKUK 2:4

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DR. DRIVER very truly says that "The central and distinctive teaching of the" Book of Habakkuk "lies in the declaration of 2:4" (New Century Bible, Minor Prophets, vol. ii, p. 61). This verse he renders: "Behold, his soul is puffed up, it is not even in him; but the just (or the righteous) will live by his faithfulness." And the true sense of these words he affirms to be, "that, while the wild excesses of the tyrant carry in them the germs of ruin, the faithfulness of the righteous—*i. e.* his honesty, integrity, trustworthiness—will be to him a principle of life" (*ibid.*, p. 62, top).

Dr. Driver, of course, is not unaware that the LXX renders these words of Habakkuk, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεώς μου ζήσεται. Whatever difficulties this rendering might be supposed to present to his own view, Dr. Driver obviates simply by translating the LXX itself, "but the righteous shall live through (lit., from) my faithfulness" (*ibid.*, p. 63). For he holds that, like *'emunah* in the Hebrew, πίστις, in the LXX, means not "faith," but "faithfulness." Further, the fact

that Paul, in Romans 1:17, and again in Galatians 3:11, attaches to the word *'emunah* if he is rendering from the Hebrew, or to the word πίστις if he is citing the LXX, the meaning of "faith," serves only to elicit from Dr. Driver this comment: "St. Paul, familiar with verse as it read in the LXX version, amplifies and spiritualizes the words of Habakkuk—as he does sometimes with other passages quoted by him from the Old Testament—interpreting them in a sense which does not properly belong to them, but which, as it was permitted, or suggested, by the Greek, fitted them in that form for use in his argument" (*ibid.*, p. 64).

Surely, in any other than our modern atmosphere such a statement from a Christian exegete would be as startling as it is painful. It need not, however, too greatly disturb us. Indeed, that the sword of our "modern scientific exegesis" should know neither prophet nor apostle is a thing not to be regretted. This cannot be otherwise. It should not be otherwise.

That this sword sometimes plays havoc with the ethics and even with the common sense of those who wield it is, of course, another and a graver matter. But this is not the fault of the sword. In this case, for instance, "sainting" Paul, even when done with the utmost sincerity, is obviously a salve totally inadequate to healing the wound that Dr. Driver has quite unintentionally, and, singularly enough, apparently quite unconsciously, inflicted upon the intelligence, the integrity, and the authority of the Apostle. It would be an interesting situation if examination should prove that it is Dr. Driver, and not Paul, who has amplified the words of Habakkuk, and interpreted

"them in a sense which does not properly belong to them." Let us see.

Transliterating the prophet's words, then, and taking account of the fact that we have in them an instance of antithetic parallelism, Habakkuk 2:4 runs thus:

*Hinne! upp'la, lo-yash'ra naphsho bo;
Utzaddiq b'emunatho yiyeh.*

The first line, in addition to the exclamatory particle with which it opens, consists of two distinct predications. Apparently the *naphsho bo* is the subject of both. This, however, may be due merely to the fact that the syntax of the Hebrew language did not furnish the prophet with the rhetorical machinery requisite for an exact expression of his thought. Be that as it may, the emotional energy with which the line is charged is evident from its asyndetic structure and its exclamatory character. That the prophet designed the main emphasis to rest upon *upp'la* appears not only from its position, but from the fact that the predication made by it grounds the second predication, that is, the one made by *lo-yash'ra*. It is quite certain that it was for the purpose of giving additional force to *naphsho*, "his soul," that the prophet added *bo*, "in him." "His very soul" would perhaps give the force of this phrase as a whole.

In the second line the emphasis, as indicated by the order of the words, is distributed between the adjective, *tzaddiq*, here used as a noun, and the phrase *b'emunatho*; the major portion, however, falls upon the phrase. There is nothing, either in its position or in its relation to the thought expressed by the first

line, to indicate that any emphasis whatever attaches to the verb *yiyeḥ*.

To sum up: As any translation, including that of Dr. Driver, will show, that which is signalized in the first line is neither conduct nor destiny, but character. The character there sketched has two distinguishing traits. Of these the second springs out of the first. The second is a total lack of uprightness, or righteousness. How complete and thoroughgoing this moral depravity is, is indicated by the phrase *naphsho-bo*, his *very soul*. This phrase in connection with *lo-yash'ra* marks out the person whom it designates as the very embodiment of that moral depravity that evokes the displeasure and judgments of God. The other trait mentioned in this brief character sketch is arrogant self-confidence. This trait is signalized first as being at once the evidence and the cause of the thoroughgoing moral depravity designated by the second. The first line of this parallelism, then, brings before us a character portrayed as the very embodiment of moral depravity, because the very embodiment of arrogant self-confidence. Such being the case, it is clear that the parallelism requires that the second line should also signalize character, and neither conduct nor destiny. This of course is not to say that destiny may not be implicated, but simply that it must not be the central idea expressed in the second member of the parallelism. If the parallel is to be complete, the distinguishing traits of the character presented in the second member of the parallelism must be the contradictory opposites of those of the character portrayed in the first. As to one of these traits there is no dispute. Righteousness is obviously the contradictory opposite of unrighteous-

ness. It is equally obvious that humble dependence upon God would be the contradictory opposite to arrogant self-confidence.

With the foregoing facts in mind, let us now turn to Dr. Driver's translation and interpretation of this important passage. It would be rash to say that Dr. Driver, if he had tried, could not more effectually have obscured the meaning of the prophet's words, and stripped them of their force; but one must regretfully recognize the fact that he has accomplished wonders in both these directions. To say that Dr. Driver's translation is essentially tame and feeble might be to inject a subjective tinge into a discussion that ought to be as objective as the case permits. But to say that there is nothing in Dr. Driver's translation to indicate the gnomic character of Habakkuk 2:4, nothing to suggest its antithetic, parallelistic structure, nothing to disclose the distribution of the emphasis, is simply to direct attention to facts patent to the observation of everybody. How completely Dr. Driver has succeeded in wrecking the parallelism, and with it the sense of the verse, is partially hidden from the reader's eyes by the use of the word "faithfulness" in the second member. For it is almost inevitable, unless one is on his guard, that, while he reads "faithfulness," he will think "faithfulness" to God, or to Jehovah. It is only when for "faithfulness" one substitutes honesty, or integrity, or trustworthiness that he feels fully the jar of the wreck. Further, on comparing Dr. Driver's translation with his interpretation, one finds to his surprise that the ideas brought to his attention in the former are conspicuous by their absence from the latter, and that the dominant ideas of the latter are conspicuous by

their absence from the former. The translation knows nothing of conduct and destiny; the interpretation knows almost nothing of traits of character, and what it does know of them is mainly inferential.

It is, however, when we discover the method to which Dr. Driver has had to resort, and the obstacles that he has had to overcome in order to reach these unhappy results, that our surprise becomes greatest. How, then, does Dr. Driver convince himself, and seek to convince his readers, that "‘faith’ is not the sense belonging to *’emunah*" in Habakkuk 2:4? He is content to cite some twelve passages in which "faithfulness," in the sense of honesty, integrity, trustworthiness, is obviously, and admittedly, the intended meaning of *’emunah*. Astonishing as it is, that is absolutely all that Dr. Driver has thought it necessary to do. Surely, never was exegesis "easier," or more inconsequent. The sufficient answer to such reasoning is: Well, what of it? For what phenomenon is more common than to find a word, familiar to us from many occurrences in a given sense, suddenly emerging in a new sense, because in a new context? So true is this that a really careful and faithful exegesis, at every recurrence of a word, will interrogate the new context in which it appears for its meaning *in that context*. This procedure is all the more incumbent upon the exegete because equally familiar is the fact that a word of frequent occurrence will sometimes in *one single particular context* have a meaning that it has nowhere else.

And this leads me to notice, in a word, the difficulties which in this instance Dr. Driver had to put aside in order to hold on to the position that *’emunah* in this passage connotes "honesty," or rather that it

is unthinkable that in this passage it should connote "faith"—*i. e.*, "trustful reliance upon God." He was aware, then, that scholars so competent, and so "independent" as Wellhausen and Nowack, not to mention others, hold that *'emunah* here means "faithful allegiance to God," or loyalty to God. Not only so, but Dr. Driver himself admits that the idea of steadfastness, the primary idea of *'emunah*, might pass into that of loyalty; and if so, it is obvious that it might equally as naturally and easily pass into that of "trustful reliance" upon God, or "faith." But, having made this admission, Dr. Driver thinks it enough simply to say, "the Old Testament furnishes no evidence that *'emunah* ever acquired this meaning." "No evidence"? Why, manifestly the very question raised by Wellhausen's and Nowack's translation is: Does not Habakkuk 2:4 itself furnish evidence that here at least *'emunah* has acquired a new meaning? But, even after having thus been put on notice, Dr. Driver persists in refusing to face, if not the only, certainly the most important, exegetical problem with which as an exegete he was called to deal.

And here, without additional comments, or farther explanation than that I am transcending the limits of space assigned this paper, I must be permitted abruptly to close.

ΔΩPEAN

By JAMES COFFIN STOUT, Professor of Greek Exegesis, Bible Teachers Training School

Ἡ δωρεά and τὸ δῶρον are an interesting and usually quite distinguishable pair of synonyms. Thayer

(Lexicon under δόμα) thus defines the distinction: "Δωρεά differs from δῶρον in denoting a gift which is also a *gratuity*, hence of the benefactions of a sovereign; a δῶρον θεοῦ is something which becomes the recipient's abiding possession, a δωρεά θεοῦ is an expression of God's favor."

This element of graciousness, this free gift quality, which seems to be the outstanding characteristic of δωρεά, is reflected in the fact that in New Testament usage its reference is invariably to gifts of *God to men* (John 4:10; Acts 2:38; 8:20; 10:45; 11:17; Rom. 5:15, 17; 2 Cor. 9:15; Eph. 3:7; 4:7; Heb. 6:4), whereas δῶρον is almost as uniformly appropriated to gifts and sacrifices offered *to God by men*, from which, in the very nature of the case, all thought of gratuity or special favor is wholly excluded. Δωρεά emphasizes not alone the fact that *something* has been given, but also the added fact that something has been *given*. It calls attention to the gracious aspect of the gift; it reveals the subjective attitude of the giver; and it stresses the fact that the act of giving has been put forth freely and with no thought of a return.

Δωρεάν, the subject of our Exegetical Outline, is an adverbial accusative from this noun δωρεά, and, as might be expected, carries over into its significance as an adverb the special shade of meaning which inheres in the substantive. In the New Testament it is found in Matthew 10:18; John 15:25; Romans 3:24; 2 Corinthians 11:7; Galatians 2:21; 2 Thessalonians 3:8; Revelation 21:6; 22:17.

Three of these passages (2 Cor. 11:7; Gal. 2:21; and 2 Thess. 3:8) carry the translation "for nought;" and at least in the Corinthian and Thessalonian passages the meaning is unmistakably plain. Paul's

preaching at Corinth and Thessalonica had been done without asking or expecting any return, "gratuitously," "by way of gift" (Meyer); although, as Paul himself in each case intimates, a return might properly have been required (2 Cor. 11:8, 9; 2 Thess. 3:9, 10).

Galatians 2:21 is usually linked with John 15:25 and they are treated almost as though in a class by themselves. Thayer defines: "By a usage of which as yet no example has been noted fr. Grk. writ., *without just cause, unnecessarily*: Jn. 15:25, Gal. 2:21." Lightfoot, Meyer, Ellicott, *et al.* (on Gal. 2:21), agree with this, and all find the justification for their position in the evident reference of John 15:25 to Psalm 69:4 (*cf.* also Psa. 35:7), where the Septuagint has *δωρεάν*. And indeed the rendering "without a cause" has an evidently close kinship with the "for nought" of 2 Corinthians and 2 Thessalonians. DeWitt, in his scholarly and suggestive translation of the Psalms, renders *δωρεάν* in Psalm 35:7 "unprovoked," and in Psalm 69:4 "causelessly;" that is, the Psalmist says, they that hate me and hide their nets for me do so without return in kind on my part. In this case, too, although the flavor of graciousness which usually characterizes the word has been completely extracted from it, the emphasis upon the subjective attitude of the actors is still there. Their action has nothing to warrant it in the return which they receive.

But if *δωρεάν* is robbed of its sweetest, most exalted quality in these passages, the loss is more than compensated by its usage in Romans 3:24; Revelation 21:6; and 22:17, in each of which it is translated "freely." Perhaps the exquisite beauty of the gracious suggestion of these passages could not better be voiced

than through the following quotation from Andrew Bonar's *Diary and Letters* (p. 264):

"Sabbath, July 4th.—Got a great view of Rev. 21:6, Christ standing at the fountain and giving forth blessing δωρεάν ('freely'). It was last night in reading the passage I saw Him so gracious. We have come to Him and have been made righteous, and now He is continually giving, and will hand out to us blessing upon blessing. If we wonder, He will smile and say, δωρεάν. If His love to us be expressed in marvellous fulness, and my soul feels it is utterly beyond expression why He should thus love me, He will smile and say, δωρεάν. Today I may stand with Him at the fountain, and ask 'life more abundantly,' and He will give it δωρεάν. I may ask joy and peace in believing. He will at once give it δωρεάν, not because of anything in me, but because of His own grace. Lord, I ask at this moment to be filled with the Holy Spirit, who will be in me always, showing the things of Christ, and raising intercession for others, and who will be to me 'eye salve.' Thou wilt give all I ask δωρεάν. Thus, when I further ask blessing on my people, and upon my family, and upon the land also, even a new revival, will He not do it? I have no argument but one to use, and that is this most gracious word, δωρεάν. When I get the crown from Him, the crown of righteousness, δωρεάν will be written upon it."

One other passage remains to be noticed, and it will fittingly close this brief exegetical study, Matthew 10:8: "Freely ye received, freely give," "Δωρεάν ye received, δωρεάν give." It is the life philosophy of Him who is Himself the fulness of the "unspeakable δωρεά" of God to this needy, sin-burdened, sorrow-weary world (2 Cor. 9:15), and who so graciously imparts

the δωρεά of God to those who will but receive it that they enter upon an experience so transcendently wonderful that it can properly be described as "reigning in life" (Rom. 5:15, 17). And all this is given and can only be received δωρεάν. But having been thus given and received, it transforms and transfigures every life-relationship. "Δωρεάν ye received, δωρεάν give."

Lord, speak to me, that I may speak
In living echoes of thy tone!

LITERARY REVIEWS

[Authors and publishers are requested not to send either books, periodicals or pamphlets for review. The editor prefers to select and purchase whatever is to be reviewed in these pages.—EDITOR.]

A MODERN SCIENTIST ON EVOLUTION¹

THIS little book, which is full of interest from the first page to the last, was written by a thoroughgoing, up-to-date, radical scientist, who, at the same time, is a devout, traditional believer in the Bible.

The author emphasizes in several places the fact that he is, from the scientific point of view, perhaps, talking out of school and saying things to the people at large which are ordinarily said by scientists to one another in their own gatherings. He says, for example: "Thus it happens that the common people are still being taught in this second decade of the twentieth century many things that real scientists outgrew nearly a generation ago, and assertions are still being bandied around in the individual sciences which are wholly unwarranted by a general survey of the whole field of modern natural science" (Preface, p. 10). This being true we are particularly glad to be instructed in this frank and suggestive way.

The book consists of eight chapters, which are as follows: Matter and Its Origin, The Origin of Energy, Life Only from Life, The Cell and the Lessons It Teaches, What Is a "Species"? Mendelism and the Origin of Species, Geology and Its Lessons, Creation and the Creator.

By way of general introduction let it be said that the book is written in a clear, concise, and interesting way. It is a small book, but, like many another small book, for example, Lotze's *Metaphysics*, or John Fiske's *Through Nature to God*, it is so free from

¹Q. E. D., or New Light on the Doctrine of Creation, by Professor George McCready Price. New York and Chicago, 1917. Pp. 144.

divagations and extraneous matter that it has more solid weight than many another much larger volume.

The question which Professor Price discusses is whether or not the demonstrated or probable teachings of modern science, that is, those conceptions of modern science which investigation and experiment make either certain or highly probable, point to the creation of the world in the sense in which that doctrine is taught in the Bible. We cannot give his argument in detail, but can only point out certain interesting features of the discussion.

The first point to be enforced is that the experiments of modern science, especially in connection with the phenomena of radio-activity, seem to show that there is a common structure underlying the many seeming diversities of what we call matter. The homogeneity of matter, which the author holds to be the only rational view of the composition of the material universe, points directly to the fact of Creation. He says that the theory that atoms have inherent and unchangeable properties leads naturally toward materialism; and the fact that units of organic and inorganic matter seem chemically and even physically duplicates of one another but act very differently even under the same sort of external stimulation and manipulation, points to the truth, which the author maintains, that these particles have no powers or properties except those imparted to them by the unceasing activity of God.

He also points out the evidence from radio-activity that matter is not being brought into existence now, but must have been brought into existence at some time in the past. He says: "The facts of radio-activity very positively forbid the past eternity of matter" (p. 30). Since matter is not now being brought into existence by any means that we call natural, the conclusion follows that matter must have originated at some time in the past by some method or means which are equivalent to Creation. The same conclusion is to be drawn from observation of the phenomena connected with energy and its laws in the universe. No physical theory, according to the author, accounts or can account for the phenomena of the material world. The qualities attributed to ether and the law of gravitation are alike inexplicable on any materialistic theory. Activity at a distance is explainable by the living will of God and not otherwise.

All the phenomena that are to be catalogued in connection with the origin and changes of matter indicate that "Creation is a completed work and is not now going on" (p. 42). The undeniable fact of biogenesis points in the same direction. The inference from biogenesis is that the origination of life must have been by a process of Creation radically different from any process in the transmission of life which is now going on. The transition from non-living to living matter can be bridged only by the hypothesis of Creation. The same principle is to be deduced from the fact that the primal unicellular forms from which all creatures are derived are indistinguishable. The author conducts a very concise and fascinating study of cell-development and differentiation in which the creative process involved is clearly brought into view. This he applies specifically to the origination of species in plants and animals which are merely isolated and self-contained groups of cells. His conclusion is this: "Do not these facts constitute strong presumptive evidence that among animals and plants, though there may be variation in plenty within certain limits, perhaps within even wider limits than used to be thought possible, yet among these distinct organisms, little and big, new forms develop only after their ancestral type, in full accord with the record given in the first chapter of the Bible?" (p. 67).

The analysis of the generally accepted Mendelian laws and their significance is full of intense interest. "According to Mendel's law," says the author, "nothing can be developed in the offspring which is not manifest or latent in the ancestry" (p. 91). Ancestry alone, not changes in the environment, furnish the material for the genetic factors which produce change for after generations. No amount of induced change can get itself registered in the organism so as to come into the circle of ancestral characters which are passed on to posterity. True variations are seen to be confined within well-defined and narrow limits. No combination of diverse factors can originate anything really new, and its field for operation among these factors is extremely limited. Pure Darwinism, or natural selection, cannot explain new organisms or new forms. Mendelism destroys the other foundation of supposed biological evolution by showing that small variations cannot be accumulated into large variations equal in value to a new character or a new species.

In this particular portion of the author's discussion it might be well to call the reader's attention to the fact that he makes a very careful study of the term "species." A very helpful clearing-up of the obscure question as to what constitutes a species, and the allied question as to whether or not new species are being formed at the present time, is given in these pages.

The most radical part of the author's treatment of the problem of origins is that devoted to Geology and Its Lessons. Reference is constantly made to a larger book of the author's, called *Fundamentals of Geology*. The twenty-five pages of this section are full of suggestiveness and awaken in the reader a desire to study more carefully into the author's position. In outline the discussion is as follows: The great outstanding ideas of geology (as regards origins) ordinarily taught are, first, that life has been on the globe for many millions of years; second, that there has been a graded succession of different types of life in a well-defined invariable order; third, that this succession moves from lower and more general lines to higher and more special lines.

There are five leading arguments against the reality of successive ages: 1. The so-called oldest fossiliferous rocks occur in detached patches over the globe while other or younger kinds are just as likely to be found on the primitive or next to the archaean. Some of the youngest rocks may be so metamorphosed as to resemble the oldest. Some of the oldest, like the Cambrian strata around the Baltic, may consist of muds scarcely indurated and sands still incoherent. The position of the strata, as well as their composition, contradicts the theory of the successive ages.

2. Many rivers of the world ignore the varying ages of the rocks and treat them as if they had begun sawing at them all at the same time. This is also true of the old ocean lines around the continents. It is also true of most of the great faults or fissures which are of more than local extent. The natural chronometers of the earth seem to treat the fossiliferous rocks as if they were all of about the same age.

3. Very many genera of animals found in fossils in the oldest rocks have skipped all the others and are found in comparative abundance in our modern world. The current distinctions as to the ages of the fossils are purely artificial; one fossil is intrinsically just as young or just as old as another.

4. Every kind of young rock may be found in perfect conformability on some of the oldest beds without any suggestion of time intervening either by decomposition or erosion. Incongruous strata are repeatedly found in the same locality, as if interbedded.

5. Conformable conditions specified in the previous statement are exactly reproduced upside down, that is, very old rocks on top of very young rocks. In some cases this covers an area of five or six thousand miles.

The geologic series is really a traditional taxonomic classification, a chronological arrangement of the forms of life that used to live on the earth.

He illustrates the artificiality of this "geological succession" by an interesting comparison to a card index, in which rearrangement can be made very simply by taking a card out of one place and putting it in another where we may think it more properly belongs. "When a new set of rocks is found in any part of the world it is simplicity itself for any one acquainted with the fossil index system to assign these new beds to their proper place"; in other words, the system is purely artificial. He says one might just as well arrange in series modern dogs from the spaniel to the St. Bernard, "for the geological series is just as artificial as would be this of the dogs" (p. 122).

The first, and as the author considers, the incontrovertible conclusion from the facts that he enumerates is that the theory of successive ages must be a gross blunder. The geological distinctions as to the ages between fossils are fantastic and unjustifiable. The second conclusion is that there has obviously been a great world-catastrophe and that this catastrophe must be assigned as one of the causes of the changes recorded in the fossiliferous rocks. Finally, "that life in all its varied forms must have originated on the globe by causes not now operative, and this Creation of all the types of life may just as reasonably have taken place all at once, as in some order prolonged over a long period" (p. 123). He says that strict scientific methods cannot show how or when life or the various kinds of life did originate; they can only show how it did not.

His general conclusion is this: "But if life is not now being created from the not-living, if new kinds of life are not now appearing by natural process, if above all we cannot prove in any way worthy of being called scientific that certain types of life lived

before others, if in fine man himself is found fossil and not one fossil can be proved older than another or than that of man himself, why is not a literal Creation demonstrated as a scientific certainty for every mind capable of appreciating the force of logical reasoning?" (p. 124).

A summary of the facts in the departments of knowledge entered by the investigator are these:

"1. Both matter and energy seem now to be at a standstill, so far as creation is concerned; no means being known to science whereby the fixed quantity of both with which we have to deal in this world can be increased (or diminished) in the slightest degree.

"2. The origin of life is veiled in a mist that science has not dispelled and does not hope to dispel. By none of the processes that we call natural can life now be produced from the not-living.

"3. Unicellular forms can come only from pre-existing cells of the same kind; and even the individual cells of a multicellular organism, when once differentiated, reproduce only other cells after their own kind.

"4. Species of plants and animals have wonderful powers of variation; but these variations seem to be regulated and predestined in accordance with definite laws, and in no instance known to science has this variation resulted in producing what could properly be called a distinct new kind of plant or animal.

"5. Geology has been supposed to prove that there has been a long succession of distinct types of life on the globe in a very definite order extending through vast ages of time. This is now known to be a mistake. Most living forms of plants and animals are also found as fossils; but there is no possible way of telling that one kind of life lived and occupied the world before others, or that one kind of life is intrinsically older than any other or than the human race" (p. 125f.).

He points out that philosophic evolution attempts to smooth out all distinction between Creation and the modern régime of natural law. The author claims that this process of amalgamation cannot be successfully accomplished. Creation and the reign of natural law are essentially incommensurable. "The one thing that the doctrine of Creation insists upon is that the origin of our world and of the things upon it must have been brought about by some direct and unusual manifestation of the power of the Being whom

we call the Creator; and that since this original Creation the things of nature have been perpetuated and sustained by processes and methods which (though still essentially inscrutable by us) we call the order of nature and the reign of natural law" (p. 128).

There is some very interesting discussion of the doctrine of divine omnipresence or immanence; the will of man as the real cause of change in the world; the divine operation in the world; the personality, revelation, and redeeming activity of God. The author says: "Even His universe partakes so much of His prerogative of infinity that it is utterly beyond the compass of our finite minds" (p. 137). He calls on the church to return to a faith in the Bible as true and adequate for the spiritual and physical and intellectual needs of our modern world.

This little book will assuredly arouse intense antagonism, and that for two reasons. It is so radical from a scientific point of view and so conservative from a theological point of view that both scientists and theologians will be eager to contest the writer's positions. That it is likely to be misunderstood is clear already, from reviews which have appeared. This is due in large measure to the great condensation which the discussion has undergone. In several particulars, *e. g.*, the indeterminate character of atoms and cells, the author's viewpoint should receive more detailed exposition. The subject is somewhat abstruse, and the argument suffers from lack of more specific setting forth. Taken all in all, the book is great for its size and demands and will reward thoughtful consideration.

LOUIS MATTHEWS SWEET.

DR. WORKMAN'S FOUNDATION OF MODERN RELIGION²

It is not difficult to analyze the charm of this exceedingly interesting book. There is first of all the fascination of the subject with which it deals. The sub-title, which also is essential to an understanding of what Dr. Workman means by *The Foundation of*

²The *Foundation of Modern Religion* (the Cole Lectures for 1916), by Herbert B. Workman, D. D., LL. D. New York, Chicago, Toronto, 1916. Pp. 249.

Modern Religion, is A Study in the Task and Contribution of the Mediaeval Church. That is, the field of research extends from the fall of the Roman Empire to the rise of Protestantism, and includes such subjects as the spread and defeat of Mohammedanism, the establishment and influence of the Holy Roman Empire, the migration of the nations which have given to modern Europe its varieties of population and civilization, the heroism of the missionaries who often at the hazard of life itself pioneered for Christ and the church among those nations, the romance and the tragedy of the Crusades, the growth of the papacy until the extravagance of its claims led inevitably to the overthrow of its supposed omnipotence, the development of the great monastic orders, the philosophy and the piety of the scholastics, the consolidation of national life, and the deliverance of the common people from the thralldom of feudalism. Surely, a thrillingly interesting period of history.

And all this is treated, not in an academic manner, but from the standpoint of its contribution to The Foundation of Modern Religion. In his introduction to Hallam's Middle Ages Professor Marsh of Harvard writes: "The real fact is that in the middle ages we see the beginnings of ourselves. * * * To study the middle ages is not to spend our time upon what is remote, and for that reason an object of purely intellectual curiosity. Rather it is to ascertain the sources and history of innumerable practices and habits of mind that are still very much alive and concern us in our daily walks of life." From the point of view of the historian of the Christian church this was Dr. Workman's thesis as he delivered these lectures on the Cole Foundation before Vanderbilt University in 1916. And how he approached this overwhelmingly large subject may be at least superficially gathered from the titles of the six lectures, which form the chapters of the book now given to the public: The Church and Its Task in the Middle Ages, The Dawning of the Missionary Consciousness of the Church, The Ideals and Antagonistic Forces of the Middle Ages, The Dawning of the Modern Social Consciousness, The Monks and Their Work, Mediaeval Educational Ideals and Methods.

But the charm of the book is not simply in its subject, but also in its method. In working out his theme our author illus-

trates several of the characteristics of fine history writing. There is, for instance, the art of selecting for a more extended treatment those subjects which are vital to his ultimate purpose, the high lights in the picture he is planning to paint. This may be illustrated from the first lecture, where, after a survey of the ruins of civilization resulting from the fall of the Roman Empire and the invasions of the Western world by the barbaric nations, an exceedingly satisfactory as well as thoroughly interesting account of the rise and spread, the conquests and final overthrow of "Muhammadanism" (as Dr. Workman spells it) is condensed into six or seven pages. This is followed by a section of his lecture which may perhaps be epitomized in a sentence quoted from Harnack: "No flight of imagination can form any idea of what would have come over the ancient world had it not been for the Church." And the lecture concludes with an informing analysis of the moral causes of the downfall of the Western Empire and the consequent task and opportunity of the church, and an equally careful discussion of "the problem of the fall of the Eastern Empire and the triumph of Islam."

It will be impossible in a brief review to follow through all the chapters in this way. But this first chapter will suffice to illustrate how, by concentrating upon certain pivotal historic movements and relating other facts and details to them, the lecturer has escaped the inexcusably uninteresting dreariness of much that masquerades under the name of history. This result is also attained by the introduction of a wealth of incident—little humanizing touches which transform what might otherwise have been a lifeless recital of facts into a narrative peopled by living men and women. A multitude of examples might be cited. They are on every page.

Another feature, which proves Dr. Workman to be not only a fine historian but also a true teacher, is the frequent use of well conceived and illuminating summaries. Through these the mind is constantly reminded of the precise point that is being made, and is kept in touch with the main trend of the argument. In the development of material, which, because of its mass and detail, might easily become diffuse and not easily graspable, the complex is thus reduced to simplicity. The reader is always conscious that he is listening to an accomplished scholar, who writes

with strict observance of the requirements of historical science, and yet he is just as truly aware of the fact that this scholar is also a very human man, to whom the events of history are only and always the garment of life.

The spirit of Dr. Workman's book is vividly illustrated in his concluding paragraph:

"We must bring these lectures to a close. We have touched merely the fringe of an inexhaustible and fascinating subject. In reality the secret of the mediaeval Church must always remain unexpressed, since to-day it is incapable of expression. With all its defects—and the reverse side of the page may well fill us with amazement and indignation—the mediaeval Church and the task she accomplished presents a noble spectacle of moral grandeur. Pages of her history are written in letters of living light, of more than golden glory. Where can we point to a sacrifice so deep, so abiding, so sacred as that of her sons? Who have climbed to higher peaks of spiritual experience? We may condemn the claims of her papacy as unjustifiable in origin, impossible, nay hurtful, in execution, yet cannot but admire the earnestness with which the great pontiffs believed themselves to be the ministers of a higher than human righteousness. We may despise the theology of her saints, but we cannot deny that they had learned the secret of the Cross. We may mourn over their superstition, but cannot refuse that they had an anointing from the Holy One. We may point out the depth of their errors, their limited vision, their rude methods, their warped ideals, but these things are but the rough externals which veil but do not conceal the inward nobleness of their characters. That they without us should not be made perfect is not the condemnation of their hope, but the providential law of evolution. Considering, therefore, the issue of their life, let us imitate their faith:

"Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever."

It is a charming book, yet not a book for those who have no acquaintance with the facts of medieval history. It is not elementary in its purpose or method. It was addressed to a cultured audience. But for all who bring to it a reasonably informed mind it will certainly prove stimulating to thought and helpful to faith.

JAMES COFFIN STOUT.

AN EXAMPLE OF FUTILE INGENUITY*

THIS book is a collaboration by two men who at one time studied with the Christian ministry in view—one, at least, is now a consulting engineer. It represents some years of labor, as is very evident, but it may be said at the outset that its processes of reasoning and its conclusions are so fanciful and preposterous as hardly to claim a reviewer's time. However, it is a type of argument to catch readers of superficial scholarship and radical inclinations respecting the Christian faith, and so may be given some attention. A circular describes it as "the most astounding book of this generation." In a sense this may be true, when the evident sincerity of the authors is seen to be combined with their complacent faith in the credulity of "every candid mind courageously seeking the truth concerning the identification of the Son of Man" and with the hope that this grotesque attempt at scientific investigation can overturn the faith, knowledge, and scholarship of the ages.

The stated purpose is to prove the historical existence of Christ. This is attempted by trying to identify Him with the Jewish patriot of the first century A.D., Simon Bar Giora. The chief points of argument are that the historian Josephus has blackened and slandered the character of this notable leader of his race, while the New Testament writers recognize his noble and patriotic character, yet conceal his identity by cryptic names and devices, for fear of the Romans, so that he is known therein as the Son of Man, as well as by other familiar names traditionally applied to Christ. After the fall of Jerusalem the scattering of the disciples over the world, we are told, led to confused impressions of the great Jewish hero, so that he appears in historical literature as Jesus, St. Stephen, Simon Magus, Valentinus, Appollonius of Tyana, Simon Zelotes, Simon the Tanner, Simon the Leper, and others. Paul turns out to have been the same as Justus of Tiberias, otherwise James the Little, otherwise the brother of the hero of the book. The authors discover that "the writings of 'Paul' are deliberate cryptic history." Some of the other startling pieces of information are, that Calvary was the

*Simon Son of Man, by John I. Riegel and John H. Jordan. Boston, 1917. Pp. 269.

Capitoline Hill in Rome, "the demons of the Gospels were the Romans of profane history," Peter was the son of this Simon Bar Giora who led the Jews in their futile struggle against Titus, and Joseph of Arimathaea and Josephus the historian are one and the same.

The argument rests largely upon the supposed cryptic writings, upon the alleged unreliability of Josephus, upon the confusion of homophones—words of similar sound but of dissimilar meaning, and upon the presumed errors of copyists. Opposed utterly to the church's interpretation of the New Testament, the volume opens its preface with the naïve remark: "This book is in no sense a polemical work."

At the time when Jerusalem was besieged by the Romans under Vespasian and Titus there existed within the unfortunate city three rival factions, struggling against each other for supremacy. These internal enemies were destroying not only the lives but also the food that had been accumulated in prevision of a siege, as each hoped to deprive the rival faction of its sustenance, thus greatly increasing the sufferings of the people who had not known "the time of their visitation."

The only historian whose writings are left to inform us at length of those terrible events is Flavius Josephus, himself a witness and participant in many of the happenings which he relates. It is generally conceded that Josephus is, in the main, pretty accurate, and that his better qualities emerge particularly in his Jewish Wars. Indeed, he made a special effort to be fair-minded, for contrasting himself with other historians he says: "They have a mind to demonstrate the greatness of the Romans, while they still diminish and lessen the actions of the Jews: as not discerning how it cannot be that those must appear to be great who have only conquered those who were little. * * * However, I will not go to the other extreme, out of opposition to those men who extol the Romans, nor will I determine to raise the actions of my countrymen too high, but I will prosecute the actions of both parties with accuracy" (Wars of the Jews, Preface, 3, 4).

Any one who has read the Wars knows that Josephus has kept his promise fairly well. He often blames the Romans and their commanders when they are worthy of blame, but he praises

them when praise is due. And he does exactly the same, in the description of his own countrymen. This appears especially in the case of the three principal leaders of the factions that were contending for pre-eminence amidst the ruin of their own country. Perhaps Josephus might have been inclined to paint a little blacker the figure of John of Giscala, a political adversary against whom Josephus had fought when he was himself one of the Jewish leaders. He certainly had no particular reason for grudge against the other two chiefs. Indeed, the authors of the work we are endeavoring to review say: "Josephus has hardly a single good word to say of either John, Eleazar, or Simon Bar Giora who commanded the Jewish forces during the long siege of Jerusalem" (p. 33f.). If their deeds were such as Josephus describes (he is the only witness left, as we have noticed) he could hardly do otherwise. But what the authors add to that statement does not correspond to the facts in the case.

We will have to consider the matter somewhat carefully, since one of the main contentions upon which the book is based depends upon this point. "Joseph Bara Matthias, otherwise Josephus, as might be expected from such a traitor or apostate, does all he can to whitewash the black record of the sanguinary Romans, as he displays equal zeal in besmirching the poor, distracted, disorganized, but brave and passionately patriotic Jews who fought with desperation for their altars and their firesides, * * *. According to Josephus, all the Romans were noble and brave, while all the Jews, excepting himself, were rapacious and cruel cowards" (p. 34).

With respect to such affirmations, it may be noted that one has only to read the account of the barbarities of the Roman procurator, Gessius Florus, which are described by Josephus, in the fourteenth chapter of the second book of the Wars, to persuade himself that he does not represent "all the Romans as noble and brave."

We quote only the last sentences of Josephus' account: "The citizens fled along the narrow lanes, and the soldiers slew those that they caught, and no method of plunder was omitted; they also brought them to Florus, whom he first chastised with stripes and then crucified. Accordingly, the whole number of those that were destroyed that day, with their wives and children (for they

did not spare even the infants themselves) was about three thousand and six hundred. And what made this calamity the heavier, was this new method of Roman barbarity," etc. (book II, ch. 15, sec. 9). Josephus, indeed, tries to show that it was the ferocity of such a government which forced the Jews into the war.

Now, as to Josephus describing "all the Jews, excepting himself" as "rapacious and cruel cowards," this is no more accurate than the previous statement. Josephus does not spare praise to his fellow countrymen, whenever he can do so in harmony with the truth. Thus he praises very highly the virtues of Ananus, son of Ananus, and Jesus, the son of Gamala, whom he calls with the endearing epithet of "the best esteemed of the High Priests" (book IV, ch. 3, sec. 9). Indeed, one cannot read, without emotion, the discourse of Ananus to the people, reported at length in section 10 of the same chapter. Far from describing him as "a coward" Josephus makes him say: "Certainly it had been good for me to die before I had seen the house of God full of so many abominations * * *," and he ends his discourse by saying: "It is a right thing * * * to die before these holy gates, and to spend our very lives, if not for the sake of our children and wives, yet for God's sake, and for the sake of the sanctuary."

And this is the effect of his words upon the people: "So the multitude cried out to him, to lead them on against those whom he had described in his exhortation to them, and every one of them was most readily disposed to run any hazard whatsoever on that account." A strange kind of "cowards" they certainly were! And such instances might be easily multiplied by appropriate quotations. Suffice it to state that Josephus far from describing his personal enemy John of Giscala as a "coward" says of him: "It was known to everybody that he was fond of war;" and of the inhabitants of Jerusalem he says that Titus himself "esteemed the men that were in it so courageous and bold, that even without the consideration of the walls it should be hard to subdue them; for which reason he took care of, and exercised his soldiers beforehand for the work, as they do wrestlers before they begin their undertaking" (book IV, ch. 2, sec. 1).

From this it appears very clearly that the authors of the book under review are starting from absolutely mistaken premises.

These being destroyed we might as well rest here. But it may be asked, What is the authors' contention? Briefly this: Granting that Josephus, the "traitor or apostate," represents all the Jews, excepting himself, as "rapacious and cruel cowards," he has especially done so in the case of one, "Simon Bar Giora." But here again we must call the reader's attention to the fact that this affirmation is no more correct than the previous ones we have examined. Josephus represents him everywhere as a very courageous man, though cruel and violent (book II, ch. 19, sec. 2, etc.). The first mention he makes of him is as having defeated the Romans themselves: "The Jews retired into the city; but still Simon the Son of Giora, fell upon the backs of the Romans, as they were ascending up Beth-horon, and put the hindermost of the army into disorder," etc. (book II, ch. 19, sec. 2). But why should Josephus particularly vent his wrath against Simon Bar Giora rather than against John of Giscala, for instance? Here lies the great secret of the book—Simon Bar Giora happens to have a name which, by proper manipulation and sundry exegesis, may be made to be equivalent to the title "Son of Man." But this title is the one given to the Messiah in the Old Testament, and to "Jesus" in the New. Hence it follows that Simon Bar Giora is the true historical Christ of the Gospels! This is so extraordinary that the authors say:

"It will be difficult for many whose minds have become prejudiced against the great general of the Jews by the scurrility of that arch-traitor, Josephus, to recognize at first glance as the divine hero of the Gospels the caricature silhouetted in the pages of his Jewish Wars * * *. But, nevertheless, here and there a phrase or a sentence stands out which indicates that the Son of Man was not in reality the wan and pallid creature we see in the gray light of the Gospels. The real military character of his mission flashes forth in such sentences as that in Matthew 10:34, in which he is quoted as saying, 'I came not to send peace but the sword.' His real mission is indicated in Luke 22:36, in which with ardor he exclaims, 'He that hath not, let him sell his coat and buy a sword'" (p. 10f.).

The numerous Aramaic, Hebrew, and Greek words occurring in these pages are very apt to produce upon the "layman" the impression of profound scholarship. But the explanations of

the words are marvelously original and unique. "Gi'ora is the equivalent of the Aramaic *Gibhora*, a word which means 'man,' 'power,' 'might.' The aspirated or undageshed *b* being equivalent to our *w*, and having no equivalent in Greek, was doubtless omitted in Greek transliteration, as well as it might be, without materially affecting the phonetic value of the word, as compensation for the elided letter was made by the lengthening of the succeeding vowel, in this instance *o*" (p. 9f.).

Any one who has the least acquaintance with Hebrew and Greek will understand at once the absolute futility of the above affirmation. But since the whole book is based upon such foundations, we will have to consider this matter briefly. It is not true that the "undageshed *b*" has no equivalent in Greek. We have only to look at the Septuagint to see that the contrary is the case. Whenever an "undageshed *b*" is found in the Hebrew it is constantly transliterated by β in the Septuagint (and by *b* in the Latin Vulgate) while the *b* with "dagesh forte" is constantly transliterated by double *b* in the Latin Vulgate and by the same β in the Septuagint. This may be seen by the following parallels, which might be multiplied:

Nehemiah 7:25, *Bnê Gibh'ôn*= $\Upsilon\iota\omicron\iota \Gamma\alpha\beta\alpha\omega\nu$ (LXX); *Filii Gabaon* (Vulgate). Joshua, 15:57, *Gibh'ah*= $\Gamma\alpha\beta\alpha\acute{\alpha}$ (LXX); *Gabaa* (Vulgate). (Cf. Ezra 2:10; 1 Kings 15:27; Neh. 11:8, in the Hebrew, Septuagint, and Vulgate.)

We notice also that, according to the excellent system of transliteration introduced by Professor C. P. Fagnani of Union Theological Seminary in his Hebrew Primer, the "undageshed *b*" is conveniently transliterated by the Greek β which indeed it resembles in pronunciation.

The attempt, therefore, to identify the name *Giora* with the Aramaic *Gibhora* is perfectly absurd. Furthermore all scholars, both Jewish and Christian, agree that the name indicates "the son of a proselite," and has therefore an entirely different origin from *Gibhora*. The same convenient method of "accommodation" of words is prevalent all through the book.

Let us take a few illustrations at random, as they abound everywhere. On pages 93, 94 we read: "A close study of the text will show that 'Barabbas' is but another name for the Son of Man. The personality of Barabbas grew out of the indistinct

penmanship of a scribe. In Hebrew the *k* and the *b* are very much alike, as there is but a small difference in the formation of the base lines of these letters," etc. And on pages 95, 96: "'Cyrenian' in Hebrew is 'Kurini.' This is easily mistaken for 'Kirinu'—'our fortress,' a title not unbecoming the brave defender of the Holy City. Attention should again be called to the fact that the *i* and the *u* in Hebrew are similar in form and differ only in length," etc.

But this wonderful system is equally applied to other languages as well. Thus we read on page 98: "*Simon Megas* would be the Greek equivalent of *Simon Gi'ora*. Careless orthography coupled with a primitive weakness for the marvellous [the lesson comes from a worthy pulpit!], easily turned the '*Megas*' into '*Magos*,'" etc.

On page 120: "The phrase usually translated 'Joseph, husband of Mary,' is in Syriac 'Joseph Gi'ora damaria.' The *d* in Syriac is almost circular while the *s* is formed by a small circle tangential with a larger one; but changing time or careless copyists could easily alter the letter to a *d*. In the genealogical table in the Syriac of Luke 3:23, the lengthening of a single line, the prolongation of an *l* below the base makes of it a *g*," etc.

Finally we must add that such arguments and explanations as those above outlined run through nearly three hundred pages, while the volume contains also maps and illustrations.

AGIDE PIRAZZINI.

A TEXT-BOOK UPON INTER-CHURCH WORK

As the movement toward church federation has gathered headway a demand has arisen for a reliable hand-book to guide Christian workers in putting their efforts for closer unity into more effective form. Following the notable Pittsburgh Congress, held in October, 1917, by the Commission on Inter-Church Federations of the

"The Manual of Inter-church Work, edited by Rev. Roy B. Guild. New York, 1917. Pp. 221.

Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, there has been issued such a volume under the title, *The Manual of Inter-Church Work*. It presents the recommendations of the eight sub-commissions, which had considered for several years and with very evident care the leading problems that have emerged in the progress of the movement. Each sub-commission consisted of a group of representative workers, coming from various denominations and widely separated parts of the country. In all, one hundred and five persons served on these sub-commissions.

The results of the long and painstaking deliberations of these several bodies of leaders are presented as a series of reports upon the respective subjects taken up by the sub-commissions. There are eight such reports in all, the subjects being: Inter-Church Comity, Community Evangelism, Home and Foreign Missions, Social Service, Religious Education, Religious Publicity, International Justice and Goodwill, Principles and Methods of Organization. Each report deals with various phases of its particular theme, so that a brief but comprehensive survey of the situation, its needs, and methods for meeting them, is given. These reports were originally printed in time for distribution to the delegates to the Pittsburgh Congress, by which assemblage they were discussed at length. They are, as a result, given in this book in their amended form.

The fine Christian spirit of this movement for higher and more efficient interdenominational service is illustrated in the tone of this printed result of the harmonious and fruitful labors of men of different communions. One is also struck by the concrete, tangible nature of the contents; for the book is not an academic discussion of abstract principles and theoretical proposals for improving inter-church relationships, but contains much authentic data, and numerous illustrations taken from actual experience in applying various methods to problems in hand.

There has been a tendency in late years to exalt social service almost to the exclusion of the claims of personal religion. One might think, in the light of some utterances, that the church has erred in her efforts to seek the conversion and regeneration of individuals through the merits of Christ, their Redeemer, and that souls are to be saved through some sort of redemption of society as a whole. It must be admitted, on the other hand, that many

devout people are so greatly concerned over the salvation of particular individuals that they overlook the fact that the church has certain social obligations as well. It is only another instance of the truth that human nature is prone to overemphasis—that balanced judgment is exceedingly rare. On this account one is pleased to find that Evangelism and Social Service are both given special attention in this hand-book. It may be added, on this point, that these two reports were presented at the same session of the Pittsburgh Congress, and that great stress was laid upon the fact that the two are companion forms of Christian service.

In addition to the sub-commission reports, there is a forceful Introduction by Mr. Fred B. Smith, who presided over the sessions at Pittsburgh; a special report of the Committee on Observation and Recommendations of the congress; and a model constitution for local federations. This book should be a potent factor in spreading intelligence concerning the church federation movement, in impressing the Christian public with its spirit and aims, and in furnishing practical information and suggestions, as well as in unifying and strengthening the cause as a whole.

ROBERT M. KURTZ.

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